The Sociological Quarterly 25 (Winter 1984):5-26

Social-Structural Analysis: Some Notes on Its History and Prospects

Jeffrey C. Alexander, *University of California, Los Angeles*

Social scientists have begun to move away from the postivist and empiricist models within which they have traditionally conducted their behavioral studies. This change has been effected by the impact of historians of science (like Alexandre Koyre' and Thomas Kuhn) and philosophers of science (like Michael Polanyi and Imre Lakatos) and by the impact, as well, of the disruptive social developments which destroyed the ideological consensus of the postwar period. In the United States, however, this movement toward a postpositivist perspective is still very much confined to a small minority of social-science practitioners. Indeed, it has been accompanied by a movement among the majority in an opposite direction, an increasingly self-confident scientism among the positivists and empiricists themselves. Thus, while postpositivist sensitivity has been increasing, we have also witnessed the transformation of important journals (like the *American Social Review)* from broad, intellectual organs into specialized outlets for "scientific sociology"—atheoretical exercises in verification, falsification, and theory "construction." Nonetheless, the minority that now rejects positivism and empiricism is a vocal one, and it has had an increasing impact on the various disciplines. This impact has coalesced around the idea of "paradigm," the concept which Kuhn (1962) introduced to indicate the strong effect that nonempirical assumptions have on the very perception of empirical variables.

This essay will investigate the impact of certain kinds of paradigmatic, or framing, elements on social science, specifically, the understanding that action is organized by structural constraints that are, in some sense, external to any particular actor. In order to place this discussion in its proper perspective, however, we must deal briefly with certain analytic problems in the term "paradigm." There is, of course, an enormous literature on this issue; in the present context, I deal with it only as it relates to the particular problem at hand.

In his initial formulation, Kuhn defined a paradigm as a framework that provides scientists with preprogrammed information that reduces the normal task of empirical investigation to mundane acts of atheoretical problem solving. The paradigm is a jigsaw puzzle in which most of the pieces are already in place; the scientist examines reality only to find out how the three or four remaining pieces should be arranged. Yet, while apparently straightforward, this formulation actually obscures some important problems, problems which relate to Kuhn's tendency to exaggerate the unity of science. While insisting that paradigms provide ready-made frameworks for research, Kuhn also identified paradigms with general, metaphysical assumptions (like atomism or holism) and with particular kinds of models (like equilibrium or dynamic models). He associated "paradigms," in other words, with both very general and very specific

 0038-0253/84/1600-0005$00.75

kinds of commitments, with philosophical orientations, and with complex propositions attached to strongly developed research strategies.

But if paradigms refer only to generalized orientations, they will not produce the kind of scientific consensus that Kuhn assumed, for there is a great range of variation in the way that general, philosophical orientations can be specified. On the other hand, if paradigms refer only to agreement on propositions and research strategies—what Kuhn later called "exemplars"—then much of the richness of the original formulation is lost (Alexander, 1982b): the excitement that this seminal idea created was due, in large part, to the way it linked the metaphysical environment of science to changes in mundane research.

Kuhn's original formulation of paradigm, then, was undifferentiated. I am suggesting, by contrast, that 'paradigms' contain a range of elements of different levels of generality. These elements, moreover, are not necessarily tied closely together. This issue, we must see, is directly relevant to the task at hand. When we speak, for example, of rational-choice theory, we are actually referring to a number of different levels of analysis. On one hand, we are speaking of general assumptions about actors—that they are efficient and rational. On the other hand, we are talking about concrete theories within which these assumptions are operationalized, theories which are associated with particular carrier groups, rather than diffuse traditions—"the British utilitarians," "Simon's shop," "Skinner's research team," "Tilly's group," "resource-mobilization theory." Paradigms in social science operate forcefully at both general and specific levels of orientation. "Rational action," "normative action," and "social structure" function as philosophical orientations, as broad traditions that create the most general lines of division between different kinds of social-scientific work. These traditions cross disciplinary lines, for their assumptions refer to presuppositional, analytical problems, rather than to the empirical and ideological concerns that differentiate, for example, political science and sociology. At the same time, these three orientations are embodied in operationalized "research programs" (for this term, see Lakatos, 1969), in theories that have highly elaborated, empirically specified world views: for example, neoclassical economics, organization theory, symbolic interactionism, Marxism, and structural functionalism. For a discussion of structural analysis to be accurate and revealing, it must address itself to both the general and specific dimensions of structural analysis.

The Problems of Action and Order

The most fundamental assumptions that inform any social-scientific theory concern the nature of action and order (Alexander, 1982a:64-112). Every theory of society assumes an image of man as an actor, assumes an answer to the question, "What is action?" Every theory contains an implicit understanding of motivation. Is it efficient and rational, concerned primarily with objective calculation, or is it nonrational and subjective, oriented toward moral concerns or altruism, strongly affected perhaps, by internal, emotional concerns? The problem of action is concerned, in other words, with epistemology, with the relative materialism and idealism of action. Action has vexed and divided classical thinkers from Plato and Aristotle to Augustine and Hobbes, and it con-

tinues to do so today. Modern social science was born from the 18th and 19th century struggles between Enlightenment rationalists and reactionary traditionalists, and later between romantics and utilitarians. This struggle was, to an important degree, a fight about whether—and how—action was "rational."

No intellectual tradition, however, can be grounded in conceptions of action alone. We are concerned here with *social* theories, and every social theory must also be concerned about the problem of order. How is action arranged to form the patterns and institutions of everyday life? There have been two prototypical answers to this problem of order: the individualistic and the collectivistic. Society may be viewed as the product of negotiation freely entered into, as the result of individual decisions, feelings, and wants. On the other hand, we can view society as constituting, in Emile Durkheim's famous phrase, a reality *sui generis,* a reality "in itself." Such a collectivist view does not have to posit society as a metaphysical entity that has an ontological status. It can simply see individual decisions as aggregated through a long, historical process: the decisions of those who came before us have become sedimented into institutions. When we make decisions today, we can do so only within the context of this social environment.

Every conception of order is necessarily informed by assumptions about action. If we adopt an individualistic approach, we must know whether these negotiating actors will evaluate one another in an objective or subjective way. If, by contrast, we conceive of order as rooted in the collectivity, we shall want to know whether it asserts itself by appealing to rational interest or by promoting feelings of altruistic obligation. It is, of course, logically possible for theories to combine rational and nonrational modes of action; in practice, it is rare for them to do so.

Individualistic theories have been attractive to modern social science because they emphasize a quality which is at the heart of modernity itself: voluntarism. Modern social thought emerged out of the long process of secularization and rebellion against the hierarchical institutions of traditional society. During the Renaissance, Machiavelli emphasized the autonomy of the rational prince to remake his world. English-contract theorists (like Hobbes and Locke, from whom so much of contemporary thought is derived) also broke free from traditional restraints by emphasizing the individual bargaining upon which social order must depend. The same kind of path was followed by some of the principal thinkers of the French Enlightenment, who were the first to transform this new, secular, social thought into an attempt at empirically - oriented science. Each of these individualistic traditions was strongly rationalistic. In different ways and with emphases on different kinds of individual needs—power, happiness, pleasure, security—each portrayed society as emanating from the choices of rational actors. Today, these classical traditions have many progeny. The crucial, conceptual bridge was utilitarianism, particularly classical economics, for its theory of markets and resources provided an empirically elegant explanation of how individual decisions can be aggregated to form "societies." There is but a short step from the early Bethamite theories to the organization treatises of Simon (1964), the exchange theories of Homans (1961), the collective decision-making theories of Coleman (1966), and the political theories of Downes (1957).

Yet, despite their origins in the secular rebellion against traditional thought, individualistic theories have also assumed a nonrational form. In its inversion of the Enlightenment and its revulsion against utilitarianism, 19th-century romanticism inspired theories about the passionate actor, for example, Wundt's social-psychological writing on the central role of emotional needs. Freud is the most famous modern exemplar of such romantic theorizing, and the psychoanalytic perspective continues to supply one of the fundamental strands of individualistic thinking about society. Another, less scientistic branch of this antirationalistic movement issued in phenomenology, a movement which can be traced from Hegel Schleiermacher, and Dilthey through Husserl to modern movements, like existentialism. In terms of the social-scientific paradigms which have concretized this kind of individualistic approach, one thinks first of symbolic interactionism, the tradition rooted in American pragmatism and individualism of Dewey, Mead, and Blumer; in more recent years, there are the theoretical developments of ethnomethodology, which takes its immediate intellectual roots from Schutz and Heidegger.

But if individualistic theories have the great advantage of embodying the freedom which we associate with the modern age, this is also their great weakness, for it seems that they have achieved voluntarism much too easily. Do actors really create social order by a process of purely individual negotiation? This, indeed, seems like an extremely unlikely proposition. Consider the problem of order and the rational actor. Are we really so rational that we can be aware of all the influences and constraints that enter into our decisions? We might think, perhaps, that we are simply trying to drive the best bargain with a salesman for a new car, but is this negotiation completely unaffected by external factors—unaffected, for example, by the size and variety of the particular dealership, the oligopolistic structure of the automobile market, or the government's regulation of production? These external factors, in turn, can be seen as the outcome of a vast range of other extra-individual facts, from the speed of technological innovation to domestic political struggles over ecology and revolutionary upheavals in the Middle East. Our individual negotiation, then, may appear to be confined to two parties, but it actually is constrained by a whole host of factors, which we, as individuals, have not negotiated at all. Our decision to buy an automobile, moreover, will create constraints for future actors: could any actor ever be so omnisicently rational as to follow out all the ramifications of this individual choice?

Thus far, my illustrations of individualistic approaches have been confined to rationalistic tradition; similar arguments, however can be made against individualism that takes a more nonrational form. Consider the actor as an emotional being who is conceived as dealing with the outside world in terms of personality needs. Is this personality his own, something he has developed purely as the result of his individual acts or is it rather the product of a lifetime of interaction, something in which the needs, wishes, and intentions of significant others have become synthesized and internalized to form a self? Emotionally sensitive actors, while appearing to respond to one another merely as individuals, actually are responding in terms of their discreet histories of social development. The same might be said for interactionist theories, like those of Goffman (1959), that stress the moral sensitivity of individuals to questions of face, pro-

priety, and taste. These concerns, after all, are forcefully embodied in standards. Certainly, individuals may negotiate in relationship to them; yet, the standards themselves are never established by the individual interaction.

When we closely examine the most conscientious individualistic theories, we see, in fact, that they make assumptions about social structure that they do not explicitly theorize: they leave these assumptions, rather, as un-thought-out residual categories. Rational-choice theories, for example, often assume a certain distribution of resources and a certain relationship of bargainers to one another; they assume, in other words, important facts about economic and political *structure.* Homans' writings on exchange admitted that standards of distributive justice are critical, but he never explained how they come about. Coleman (1966) argued that collective structures can be seen as products of rational cost accounting, but he acknowledged that the conflict so produced must be regulated by certain givens, like constitutions. Nonrational, individualistic theories place similar brackets around the structuring of the symbolic world. They assume—without explaining—the aftereffects of socialization, the resources of cultural symbolization, the norms that define the nature of social solidarity. Goffman (1961), for example, explained insanity as the product of the self-conceptions of the professionals who manage asylums; yet, the sources of professionalization and the reasons for the existence of asylums were never discussed. Garfinkel's (1981) recent search for the ethnomethodology of individual orientation to the collectivity also leaves the normative order of the collectivity unexamined. (For an analysis of the persistence of striking residual categories in individualistic, nonrational theories, see Alexander, 1984a.)

The realization that individualistic theories cannot and do not stand without some reference to a collective order has always been the stimulus for social theory to move toward the perspective of social structure itself. Such a movement has occurred within both the orientations to action I have described. Hobbes (1962/1651:98) was the first great theorist of social structure within the rationalist tradition, for he recognized that if society were actually composed only of rational and completely selfish individuals, it would soon be destroyed: "And therefore if any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the way to their end, which is principally their own conservation, and sometimes their delectation only, endeavor to destroy, or subdue one another." Hobbes formulated a conception of an all-powerful sovereign, the Leviathan, which would counteract this imminent chaos of individualism through intimidation and hierarchical control. The parallel for this breakthrough in the normative tradition can be found in Durkheim's critique of Spencer, the 19th-century individualistic social scientist *par excellence.* Durkheim argued against Spencer's contract theory in terms that strongly recalled Hobbes'. "If interest relates men," Durkheim (1933/1893:203) wrote, "it is never for more than some few moments . . . [and] each individual finds himself in a state of war with every other." It was to counter such "provisory and precarious" contractual relations that Durkheim created his conception of the "collective conscience," the normative center of society that controls individualism by penetrating and socializing individual consciences. From Hobbes' Leviathan and from Durkheim's collective conscience, every modern theory of social structure can be logically derived.

Social-Structural Theory in Its Instrumental Form

The revolt against individualistic, instrumental explanation in the 19th century always occurred for ideological as well as analytic reasons. The first great theories that placed rational action within a collective context were those of Bentham and his utilitarian followers. Bentham (see Halevy, 1972/1901-04) saw through the facile assumption of the "natural identity of interest" by which classical political economy justified its purely individualist argument. Realizing that economic and political actors actually possess unequal power and wealth—and that consequently, no "invisible hand" would ever produce consensus and equilibrium—Bentham argued that government must act to reformulate the social context in which such action occurs. The identity of interests, if it were ever to be achieved, must be one that is artifically constructed by such external force. Bentham utilized this theoretical argument to suggest aggressive reforms of criminal law and state bureaucracy; there is a direct link between his structural orientation and the social and historical theorizing about the effects of the capitalist social structure which Fabian writers produced at the end of the century.

The greatest theorist of social structure in the instrumentalist tradition, however, was Marx. If his critique followed the general lines of Bentham's, it carried the logic much further; indeed, it translated the general social-structural argument into an empirically specific theory, or examplar, which, in one form or another, would dominate this strand of structural thinking throughout the 20th century. Marx refuted the argument that society is the product of individual exchange. It is not simply a bargain between two individuals that determines the contract of labor, he wrote, or even the aggregation of individual decisions through an impersonal market. The labor contract, he insisted, was determined by a peculiarly coercive kind of social structure that issues from the concentration of private wealth: capital. "Capital," Marx wrote (1963/1844:85), "is the power of command over labor and its products. . . The capitalist possesses this power, not on account of his personal or human qualities, but as the owner of his capital. His power is the purchasing power of his capital, which nothing can withstand." Social structure, in Marx's view, affects action by fixing in advance its material environment. Since actors are rational, their behavior follows the structure of this external environment, just as response follows stimulus. Marx's capitalism is a tightly interdependent system within which economic exigencies set the pace. He specified the function of the economy as ever more efficient production, and it is these productive demands that establish the individual-role structure of capitalist society. The other institutions in his system are the bourgeois state and ideology; yet, as "superstructures" they perform tasks that are subordinate in complex ways to the demands of capital. Human beings enter this social structure in their role as members of classes, groups of like-minded individuals who perform the same general kind of economic role tasks. Role relations reflect this systemic hierarchy: capitalists dominate proletarians as the economic base dominates the superstructure. Although Marx emphasized social structure over voluntary negotiation, he did not view his system in a static way. To the contrary, capitalism is driven by contradictory, functional requirements, contradictions which produce a struggle for existence between

workers and capitalists and, eventually, the transformation of the capitalist system itself.

Marx set the tone for subsequent rationalist theorizing about social structure, and even those who "secularized" his work by neutralizing its revolutionary, chiliastic spirit followed closely his general logic. The greatest among these ambivalent secularizers, the man who has been called the "Marx of the bourgeoisie," and the only 20th-century thinker whose contributions to the rationalist tradition rank with Marx's own, was Max Weber. Although we shall see in a following section that Weber also made an effort to criticize instrumentalist thinking, his contributions are as much to the Marxian tradition as to any other.

Weber carried Marx's approach to social structure from the economic into the political realm, and he carved out independent structures of stratification and conflict which Marx had never imagined. Weber (1946:196-244) insisted that bureaucracy is a coercive structure every bit as powerful as economic systems. Bureaucracy responds to demands for administrative efficiency much as economic factors like markets, factories, and contracts respond to needs for productive efficiency. Bureaucratic roles, like economic ones, follow from those external demands: if capitalism demands competition and exploitation, bureaucracy demands impersonality and rationality. Bureaucracy creates order through political domination from above and passive subordination from below, a structure, once again, which follows the logic, if not the empirical context, of Marx's earlier model. If Weber gave any functional system dominance, it was the political sphere within which he discovered this bureaucratic force. Where Marx analyzed precapitalist societies in terms of their economic arrangements, Weber (1968:1006-11) defined feudalism as a system which created certain distinctive political conflicts. Yet, Weber emphasized that social systems, particularly modern ones, are never ruled by one form of external sanction alone. He (1946:180-95) described three hierarchical domains: class, status, and power. Each hierarchy of control structures instrumental rewards in a distinctive way, and each is the scene of struggles for different kinds of power. Men can use a surplus in one kind of good, moreover, to increase their power by exchanging this surplus for goods of another type. They can trade money for prestige, as the *nouveau riche* do when they train their offspring to enter the professions or the arts. They can, on the other hand, exchange power for money, as corrupt politicians and bureaucrats do when they enrich themselves through political office. In each case, the motivation is an instrumental one, but the bargaining proceeds within highly structured systems of stratification (for a recent very rich empirical application, see Azarya, 1978).

It is the theoretical legacies of Weber and Marx that have framed modern instrumentalist explanations of social structure. Although each theory retains its orthodox adherents, there has more often been a more or less conscious melding of the two. The most important contributions have followed Marx and Weber in their concentration on economic and political systems and these systems' effects on role stratification and conflict. Arguments about the economy have focused on whether the functional exigencies of capitalism have changed, and if they have, what new role structures and social conflicts result. There has been general agreement that in its late stage, capitalism has shifted toward capital-intensive production that involves more mental than physical labor, labor

that relies, in turn, increasingly upon education. On more specific levels, however, there has been vast disagreement about the shape that these new external conditions take (1) Is "capitalism" still a relevant way of describing these conditions? (2) If so, does property ownership continue to be decisive in structuring role position and conflict? (3) If not, what structures and forces remain?

Because Goldthorpe and Lockwood (1963) argued that property ownership is still primary for structuring economic roles, they could argue that the new privatism and individualism of ideological *embourgeoisment* is braced by an ideological collectivism; this collectivism becomes more widespread as the newly created classes are forced—because of their propertylessness—to enter the trade-union movement. Baran and Sweezy (1966) agreed that economic production in western societies is "capitalist," and they linked this capitalist character to the external exigencies of private property. For them, however, ownership and, indeed, wealth distribution become largely irrelevant; profit maximization and wasteful surplus are the primary "structures" of later capitalist society, and they produce social conflict on qualitative, rather than quantitative, grounds. Braverman (1974) elaborated these qualitative consequences, arguing that capitalism's destruction of workers' skills constitutes the "objective" conditions within which any working-class action must be understood. Wright (1978) continued the movement away from property ownership as such; he articulated the structural, antisubjective constraints of capitalist society in a differentiated and specific way, emphasizing the contradictory, ambiguous character of various class positions. These contradictions, however, are thoroughly "external" in character. They are the product of advanced economic development, and the class conflict they produce is structured, in turn, by changes in differential interest. Zeitlin (1974) shares this emphasis on the specificity of class conflict within a context of "External" control, but he tries to push Marxian analysis back to the significance of property ownership as such.

"Critical theorists" and other structuralists have articulated these economic changes in a less orthodox way. Marcuse (1964) viewed the productive power of late industrial capitalism as bursting the economic barriers of private property itself; he saw its unlimited affluence and technical control as blurring the capitalist/socialist distinction and as anesthetizing potential conflict over economic roles. Other theorists, like Bell (1973), have de-emphasized the significance of the "capitalist" element in a more liberal direction, describing recent economic development as a movement toward a postindustrial society that will have the same basic structural characteristics, whether capitalist or socialist: the decline of manual labor as a volatile force, the growth of work that centers on abstract knowledge, and the growing centrality of political decisions in a society whose security and progress depend more upon the quality of the public ethic than upon economic organization. Lipset and Bendix (1959) contributed to this anti-Marxist theory of economic structure by suggesting that economic mobility depends simply upon the complexity of the economic division of labor, rather than upon the capitalist or socialist framework within which this division occurs. Treiman (1977) made this argument much more elaborate and precise, producing a "structural theory of prestige" which aggressively denies any independent role to cultural causation.

Modern debates over the state have taken economic development as a parameter, focusing instead on the possibility for democratic participation in a capitalist system whose unequal economic opportunities are given. The theoretical assumptions, however, are the same: first, the objective resources which are available to actors will determine the course of political events; second, the course set by this particular social structure (the state) will determine the course of the rest of society. Empirical argument centers around the tightness of the link between economics and politics, whether and how political actors are subordinated to the needs of dominant economic classes. Within the Marxist camp, Domhoff (1967) took the orthodox view that capitalists reproduce themselves directly in the corridors of power; there is one homogenous "ruling class" which has an economic branch and a political branch. By contrast, Miliband (1969) saw the state as completely devoted to capitalist needs and emphasized the relative indirection of this process: the importance of factors like differential educational opportunities to bureaucratic recruitment and the inevitable dependence of the state upon corporate funds. O'Connor (1973) took this argument further, suggesting that the contradictions of modern capitalism will take the form of the fiscal crisis of the state.

Another tradition of contemporary political theorizing, less directly Marxist, comes out of Mills' argument that the coercive power over society is really a "power elite" that fuses military, political, and economic power. This elite, in Mills' (1959) view, is composed of those who control the functional exigencies of these different sectors, rather than members of a hereditary upper class. Yet, the actors who man these functional directorships are subsequently interrelated through a complicated system of revolving directorships, intermarriages, and social clubs. Mills' argument has been challenged, or at least empirically specified, by sociologists (like Bottomore, 1974:132-43), who made elite recruitment into the government bureaucracy an issue that varies in different capitalist countries. Lindbloom (1977), by contrast, recently argued that the structural independence of different elites is partly neutralized by the necessary reliance of the state on financial resources which are in private, corporate hands. Skocpol (1979) made a broadly similar argument for the "relative" autonomy of state and economy in revolutions. But this institutional autonomy, she made clear, has nothing at all to do with the autonomy of individual actors in a presuppositional sense. Describing her theory as an "nonvoluntarist, structural perspection," she linked her explicit exclusion of individual effort and goals to the elimination of ideology as a cultural force.

The line of thought which actually led to a more exclusively political view of state control began with Michels' (1949/1911) argument—which was strongly influenced by Weber—that political power had to be sharply differentiated from economic power. Michels insisted, nonetheless, that any organizational elite is bound to monopolize political resources to ensure its continued domination. While Selznick (1957) agreed that fragmented patterns of participation often allow organizational elites to rule unopposed, he expressed confidence that certain kinds of organizational resources, like leadership, can encourage more effective participation and more responsive use of power. Lipset and his colleagues (1956) argued that norms assuring the opportunity for electoral challenge would structure the self-interest of outgroups in a manner that would lead them to

challenge entrenched elites. Bendix (1964) and Lipset (1963) both emphasized that the effect of constitutional government in western nations was to produce a "democratic class struggle," in which the formerly oppressed masses could participate strongly in their own government. Aron (1969) took the argument for a pluralist political structure to its most extreme form. He suggested that far from enslaving modern society to the exploitation of a primordial ruling class, the extraordinary differentiation of modern society has produced a situation in which functional exigencies cannot be coordinated by any overarching group. The result, he believed, is a dangerous stalemate between different elites of roughly equal power.

The instrumental version of the social structural paradigm, then, has taken a number of different, concrete forms, shaped by different kinds of successful research strategies and different political ideologies. It has, of course, been applied to a wide range of subjects which I do not have space to mention—education, race relations, mass communication, law—but the basic theoretical logic that structures such various efforts is the same. The great accomplishment of instrumental structuralism is to demonstrate that individual action is strongly affected by the material context in which it occurs, but this very achievement points also to the tradition's great weakness: by assuming that actors are efficient calculators of their own material environment, the instrumental approach to social structure makes action completely determined by external control. The antivoluntaristic implications of this general position can be modified by certain empirical propositions; while assuming that actors are rational and directed by external constraints, theorists can describe these constraints in a way that makes them extremely pluralistic (e.g., Aron [1969]). Actors in such a modern society will then have a relatively wide choice of different material options. Thus, although any specific actor will be described in a way that eliminates reference to his internal volition and will, the situation of modern society as a whole can be described in a voluntaristic way. (This illustrates, once again, the need for a conception of "paradigm" in which specific research programs and ideologies are given autonomy vis-a-vis more general philosophical assumptions.)

On the whole, however, the social structural paradigm in its instrumental form denies the possibility of individual control. While it has clearly articulated the darker side of "modernity," it has obliterated another side which can scarcely be ignored—the feeling that modernity has opened up a vast, almost uncontrollable range of individual freedom and responsibility at the very center of society. After all, we may agree with Hobbes that individualistic approaches to order are figments of the analytical imagination without deferring to his belief that the alternative to individualism must assume a purely material form. There is a different way of conceptualizing the action that informs collective order, one which avoids this difficulty. It is to this normative approach to order that we now turn.

Social-Structural Theory in Its Normative Form

The aim of the normative approach to social structure has been to allow for collective order without eliminating the consideration of individual control. This can only be accomplished, however, if the individual is viewed in a manner that

is not rationalistic. Only if theorists are sensitive to the internal components of action, to the actor's emotions and moral sensibilities, can they recognize that social structure is located as much within the actor as without. Only with this recognition can social theory make the individual a fundamental reference point without, at the same time, placing him outside of his social context.

Although we can go back to earlier 19th-century theorists, it was Durkheim who translated the logic of anti-utilitarian romanticism—and the antimechanistic strand of Enlightenment thought—into its modern sociological form. For Durkheim, the emotional bonds of social solidarity and the symbolic codes of social morality were the fundamental social structures from which all others emerged. These structures, moreover (1973/1898), protected the independence of the individual, rather than eliminated it. On one hand, Durkheim insisted on the collective status of moral facts as "things" external to isolated individuals. At the same time, he argued that individuals themselves are social beings, and these "moral things" are precisely what give them their very sense of individuality (see, e.g., Durkheim, 1951/1897, 1958/1896, 1961/1903, 1915/1912, 1957/1900).

Durkheim developed an intricate theory of social structure that inverted the base-superstructure of Marx and challenged the belief that a theoretical emphasis on social morality had to share the conservative ideology of traditional society. At the heart of society, Durkheim found a system of beliefs, symbols which represented collective moral commitments. This symbol system had a distinctive kind of organization, for it articulated and, indeed, enforced morality by dividing symbols into contradictory patterns of sacred and profane and by encasing sacred symbols in rituals that made violation sacreligious. Despite its clear reliance on the forms taken by traditional and primitive religion, Durkheim believed that his theory of the symbolic core of society applies equally to secular modernity. The content of symbolic systems can change, but the form does not.

Modern society, Durkheim believed, is centered around a diffuse civic morality that emphasizes the rights of individuals in a highly abstract, generalized way. This "religion of individualism," Durkheim insisted, permeates modern life. Particular social roles evolve when different institutions "specify" this moral individualism. Schools, for example, inculcate rationality, individualism, and discipline through the powerful pedagogy of the dedicated teacher. The state also reinforces individualism, for its differentiated institutional status vis-a-vis general morality allows "representation" to focus public opinion, to define different perspectives more sharply, and to develop a morality that can be rationally related to specific situations. Other secondary groups produce different kinds of morally regulated roles. Occupational associations (like the professions) translate the abstract obligations of individual rights into economically appropriate forms, and the legal system develops an elaborate system of justice to articulate such rights in every possible situation. In times of crisis, Durkheim believed, consciousness will withdraw from these restricted roles and embrace the social (i.e., moral) whole. In such periods, society will be reintegrated through ritualistic ceremonies like rallies, speeches, and marches. Such periods of "collective effervescence" will revivify the moral structure.

Durkheim's work, then, formulated a complex economy of moral obligations. Much as Marx had viewed morality as an irrelevant superstructure to a material base, Durkheim relegated economic factors and the political struggle for material rewards to equally inconspicuous positions. He was not conservative. He, too, perceived a "crisis of modernity" (see Seidman, 1983), but it was a crisis of moral, rather than material, scope. He recognized the often destructive egoism and conflict in modern life, but he insisted that they can be counteracted only by a moral regeneration which can restructure the internal environment of action.

Although Durkheim created a powerful school before World War I, his legacy to contemporary social science has been more indirect than Marx's. During the interwar years, Durkheim's impact was limited to anthropology. British functional anthropologists, like Radcliffe-Brown (1952), studied morality in its complicated interaction with specific institutions, but the more recent movement of French "structuralist" thought, centered around Levi-Strauss (1966) has concentrated on the internal patterns that Durkheim described in the symbolic order itself. This symbolic structuralism, indeed, provides the best possible illustration that the social-structural paradigm can assume a subjective, as well as objective, form (e.g., Sahlins, 1976). In most structuralist analysis, movement and change are considered to be generated by the internal contradictions of the symbolic system itself. In Douglas' (1966) reformulation of Durkheimian theory, however, the binary polarities of culture take on a more specifically moral tone, and the opposition between pure and impure is related to group conflicts in the social system itself. Turner (1969, 1974; cf, Moore and Myerhoff, 1975, 1977), in turn, has pushed the antistructuralist revival of such Durkheimian theory more toward a renewed consideration of solidarity and ritual process, and Shils' (1975) post-Parsonian writings on sacred charisma as the source of social structure revise Durkheim in much the same way. Sewell's (1980) work, on the centrality of ideas about and forms of fraternal solidarity to the working-class struggles of postrevolutionary France, continues this return to a more socially sensitive Durkheimianism, posing an illuminating contrast to "structural" analyses of revolution of the more instrumental type (e.g., Skocpol, 1979).

Despite this recent revival, however, the fundamental reference point for the Durkheimian tradition in contemporary sociology and political science remains the work of Talcott Parsons. Later, we will see that Parsons offered a significant synthesis of the idealist-materialist traditions, but his thinking contained a strong strand of idealist theorizing, as well. In terms of this dimension of his work, Parsons' theory (Parsons, 1964; Parsons and Bales, 1955), functioned to specify and elaborate normative structure in a manner that Durkheim himself never approached. Where Durkheim had merely asserted the complementarity of individual consciousness and cultural order, Parsons developed a philosophically sophisticated and empirically specific analysis of the "socialization" of the individual. The process centered on the internalization of moral symbols in a wide range of learning situations, in families, in early schooling, in higher education, in work, and in play. To accomplish this analysis, Parsons performed the critical integration of Freud's personality theory with Durkheim's theory of morality and demonstrated that the individuating process that Freud called ego development can also be seen as the inclusion of the individual in the system of moral regulation. Yet, the other side of this symbiosis is just as crucial,

for Parsons insisted that in modern society, moral integration itself depends upon individuation, on the progressive differentiation of the individual person from authoritarian controls, either moral or material.

From the Parsonian perspective, therefore, social structure marks the intersection between culture and socialization, and differentiated roles are created by understanding how socialization and culture come to be particularized in different situations. Parsons (e.g., Parsons and Shils, 1951:Part 2) defined five different dimensions along which cultural definitions could vary, which he called the "pattern-variables." The pattern variables structure situations in terms of the emotional control and symbolic universalism they demand, and although the particular pattern-variable combination responds to the functional exigencies of particular institutions, it is also responsive, independently of any practical consequences, to the religious and cultural history of the nation in which these institutions are embedded. Levy (1949) used the pattern-variables to describe the conservative impact of Chinese familial values on economic development, while Lipset (1963) employed them to argue that it was the traditionalism and particularism of French and German cultural structures that explain the difficulty of their political development and class relations. Barber (1952) and Merton (1973/1942) talked about the cultural regulation of science through universalistic norms, and Pitts (1974) described the hippie movement as an emotional, particularistic, cultural reaction against the universalistic, anti-effective, cultural norms of the meritocracy. Almond and Verba (1963) utilized Parsons' cultural theory to explain the degrees of democratic activism in different western political systems. Bellah (1970:168-89) linked the relative solidarity and progressiveness of American politics to the intensely universalistic American "civil religion." Deutsch (1963) elaborated the Parsonian theory of culture to outline the delicate, cybernetic "communication" between morality and government.

The empirical foci of normative structuralism demonstrate how different assumptions about action create distinctive questions about social development, even if these theoretical orientations take an equally collectivist approach and are equally committed to a humanistic and liberal order. Since the intrumental structuralists give a determinate power to the economy, they have devoted considerable energy to the internal evolution of industrial economies in the 20th century. Normative structuralists, in turn, have focused on recent cultural changes, particularly on whether the process of secularization—which deprives institutions of a common religious base—must necessarily create a society without any moral coordination or solidarity at all. This transition toward a morally disciplined secularism is accomplished, they argued, if moral codes first become abstract and generalized and if their substantive focus shifts to the "individual" and away from any particular group. In this way, the rationality of secular thinking can be achieved without sacrificing meaning or soliarity (e.g., Parsons, 1969:439-73). Yet this achievement is not only a cultural one, these thinkers have discovered; it depends also upon a vast network of internal, psychological controls, controls which can be established only through an excruciatingly long process of socialization. Because this process makes heavy demands on the individual for ego autonomy and self-denial, alienation is always a possibility, and, with it, a return to the security of group-oriented, particularistic morality (Weinstein and Platt, 1969:Chapter 7; Parsons, 1954:298-322).

Instrumental structuralists link economic freedom to separating economic modernization from private property. For normative thinkers, freedom depends upon separating cultural modernization from the debilitating effects of particularistic morality and psychological regression, from structural constraints that produce the in-group/out-group morality of ethnic and religious war. Instrumental structuralists study the processes by which the democratic state gains autonomy from the economy and the uneven relationships between political and economic sectors. Normative theorists study how "rational" or cognitive codes become differentiated from moral and expressive ones (Geertz, 1973:193-233), and they try to understand what the optimum balance should be between each kind of cultural thinking. Should law, for example, be completely independent of religion? Should the cognitive science of the university be radically separated from other cultural concerns, like morality and art (Parsons and Platt, 1973:304-45)? Do professional ethics have to be oriented more toward technical, cognitive questions than moral ones; do they have to conflict, in other words, with civic morals (Durkheim, 1957/1900)? Instrumental thinkers study how the material aspects of social structure can overcome the individious aspects of stratification by promoting economic mobility and political pluralism. Normative structuralists, in contrast, locate the sources of equality in the interface between culture and socialization. Equality depends, in their view, upon the degree to which the unviersalistic and rational codes of education can penetrate the traditonalism and passivity of "family values," shifting the course of socialization to a path which emphasizes independence, rather than deference. The new emphasis on universalistic knowledge also creates the possibility for more collegial and egalitarian relationships within organizations (Parsons, 1971:86-121), since professional relationships based on achievement and skill increasingly supercede authority based on inherited wealth or arbitrary power. This increased equality depends, in their view, upon the continuing vitality of a solidarity that institutionalizes feelings of civil obligation (Alexander, 1980; Prager, 1982).

If instrumental structuralists demonstrate the impact on individuals of the material environment, normative thinkers just as forcefully indicate that action is regulated by moral structures which are internalized in indiviuals' personalities. Normative structuralism demonstrates, moreover, that a "social" approach to action does not necessarily have to neglect the contributions of the individual, the nature of his inner emotion, and the extent to which collective order depends upon his voluntary participation. Yet, this very attention to voluntarism also reveals the weaknesses in a purely normative view. If structure is taken only as normative, the impression is created that society depends entirely upon the voluntary acquiescence of its members, even if this acquiescence itself is mediated by internalized symbols. It ignores, in other words, the very real possibility that material structures can enforce an order, whether or not individuals participate or morally approve. Further progress in structural analysis depends upon the successful integration of these antithetical theoretical traditions and the various research programs which they have informed.

The Social-Structural Theory in Its Multidimension Form

Weber and Parsons both produced conceptualizations of social structure that moved beyond the dichotomous traditions to which they also contributed. Weber's best known multidimensional theory focuses on the notion of "legitimation" (1968:212-301). Weber described political power as embedded in a constant dialectic of belief and effectiveness. If power is accepted as subjectively legitimate, it has authority, not just strength. Since authority is a matter of belief, it must be linked to cultural codes, so there must be a relationship between the history of political development and religious evolution (Weber, 1968:439-517). The universalistic theology of monotheistic religions, for example, contributed to the emergence of impersonal, "rational-legal" norms of political legitimacy, and the rise of bureaucratic political structures contributed, in turn, to the evolution of more universalistic religions. Although Weber rarely made these explicit connections between religion and politics (see, e.g., Alexander, 1982c), his formal definitions point in this direction and the extraordinary catholicity of his historical investigations certainly supplies the material.

Where Weber did make the link between material and normative structure clear and explicit was in his discussion of social class. Weber (1968:468-599, 1946:267-301) accepted Marx's argument that the labor performed by different classes makes them more or less susceptible to different ideological orientation, but he insisted that any particular orientation must be viewed as the product of specific religious and cultural factors in the class' environment. He demonstrated, for example, that the political and economic ethics of urban strata vary greatly in different civilizations, and that the revolutionary ideology of the western bourgeoisie is as much a product of Judeo-Christian eschatology as it is of economic rationalization. It was just this multidimensional intention that inspired Weber's famous investigations into the relation between the Protestant ethic and the "spirit of capitalism." Walzer's (1965) more recent illumination of the symbiotic relationship between the rising English gentry and the alienated Puritan clergy which helped to trigger the English Civil War continued this multidimensional approach to structure, as did Bendix's (1964) discussion of the relationship between economic and religious factors in the modern proletariat's struggles for citizenship. Eisenstadt's recent studies (1978) examined how revolutionary transformation depends upon certain unique conjunctures of cultural development and political-economic conditions.

Parsons' multidimensional theorizing was inspired by Weber's, and in the most successful strand of his work, he combined Durkheim's and Weber's insights to produce a fundamental revision of social theory. Idealist and materialist thinking can only be transformed, Parsons understood, if social structures are viewed in an analytic, rather than a concrete, way. Every structure, no matter how apparently material or ideal, is actually a product of forces representing both kinds of pressures. For the social system, Parsons (see Parsons and Smelser, 1956) identified four primordial dimensions: the economic, concerned with maximizing efficiency and "means"; the political, focused on organization and "goals"; the solidary, representing direct emotional bonds and "norms"; and the pattern-maintenance, oriented to stable symbolic patterns and "values." Parsons called these four dimensions "subsystems," and he argued that each

is in a continuous interchange with the other three. The state, for example, needs economic resources, but it also needs the legal legitimation and cultural meaning provided by norms and values. If the state is to receive these "inputs," however, it must produce the kinds of "outputs"—political decisions—that the other systems need. From this perspective, the state can be seen as the single, concrete product of a number of different analytic dimensions, although it combines these dimensions with its own particular goal.

By conceptualizing reciprocity and conflict between the ideal and material dimensions of society—indeed, their symbiosis and fundamental interpenetration (cf. Munch, 1981)—Parsons transformed the dichotomous orientation that has polarized and diminished the social-structural approach. Smelser (1959) used the interchange model, for example, to show how factory reorganization in the early phases of industrialization created social crisis because of the way it affected family relations; he indicated, further, that this disruption was resolved by political developments, as well as by changes in solidary groups. Eisenstadt (1963) used interchange, on a more informal level, to formulate the complex interrelationship of religious rationalization, economic development, normative evolution, and political leadership which created the first great bureaucratic empires. Easton (1965) utilized interchange in an implicit way in his effort to build a systemic portrait of political life, interweaving material demands and cultural support.

Although Parsons did not always do so, it is clear that this interchange model can subsume his insights that normative structure represents the interpenetration of culture and personality. The most important product of this synthesis is his conception of the "generalized media" of exchange, which represents his most direct response to the bargaining model of instrumental individualism (cf. Munch, 1983). When people confront each other in interaction, Parsons asked what kind of sanctions they have at their disposal. He identified four "media" of exchange—money, power, influence, and value commitments—each of which can be seen as a product of one of the four subsystems of society. On one hand, individuals manipulate these sanctions in an instrumental and self-interested way to gain their ends; on the other hand, each of these sanctions is a complex product of the larger exchange between institutions in which interaction is embedded. Johnson (1966) demonstrated that revolutionary change is always preceded by a gross deflation of the value of legitimate power sanctions, so that political leaders can no longer bargain effectively for their ends. Smelser (1971) also focused on power, showing how political corruption represents the degeneration of the power sanction created by an overreliance on money in relation to influence, value commitments, and political power in the interchange process.

Prospects and Problems of the Social-Structural Approach

I began this essay by arguing for the significance of nonempirical assumptions in social science and by suggesting that "paradigms" combine general philosophical assumptions with a variety of more concrete research programs. By differentiating the problems of action and order, I defined four fundamental kinds of general orientations. After discussing the advantages of the individualistic models (namely, their recognition of the centrality of individual

volition in modern societies), it was suggested that structural approaches were more realistic, if often more complicated, ways of conceptualizing the sources and consequences of individual acts. I then discussed a number of different research programs which have been undertaken from within each of the structuralist traditions—the instrumental and normative—focusing particularly on their investigations of the scope of freedom in modern society. Although the clear advantages of an instrumental approach to collective order were recognized, it was argued that normative structuralism could more effectively incorporate the important, voluntaristic emphasis of individualistic theory. Yet, if instrumental structuralism is too deterministic, normative structuralism is too voluntarist. I suggested, in conclusion, that a more successful approach to social structure would combine elements of these dichotomous traditions into a multidimensional whole. This, it seems to me, is the principal challenge for structural analysis in sociology.

It would be satisfying to report that a movement toward such an analytically sophisticated model of structure is underway, but this is not the case. There are, of course, some developments in this direction. I have mentioned already the work of Eisenstadt (1963) and Smelser (1959, 1971) within the Parsonian tradition. Geertz's (e.g., 1973) writings have promised an even greater extension of Parsons' advance, for they are more closely in touch with the newest developments in cultural theory without in any way sacrificing a social-system base. Yet, Geertz's (1980) most recent monograph fell far short of this promise; it reintroduced the dichotomy of structure and meaning even while it claimed to transcend it. Within contemporary Weberian sociology, Schluchter (1981) systematically pursued the multidimensional course which Bendix (1964) earlier laid out. Despite the great turn toward subjectivity in contemporary Marxism, only Habermas (e.g., 1975) seriously began the dismantling task which a noninstrumental critical theory would presume (though see also, in this regard, Gouldner, 1976).

There is clearly no necessary historical progress toward more multidimensional forms of theorizing. The two great progenitors of this approach, Weber and Parsons, both produced highly ambivalent work: their theories were subject to internal pressures which produced strains of purely mechanical and purely voluntaristic theory, respectively. Indeed, after Parsons' relatively brief period of dominance during the postwar period, critics seized on the weaker points in his synthetic efforts to proposed Parsonian idealism and Weberian materialism, either as models for new forms of one-dimensional theorizing or as justifications for continuing standard reductionistic practices. Much of the revival of Durkheimianism, moreover, follows a similarly reductionist path.

The last decade, then, has witnessed a return to more exclusively instrumental and normative work. This can be seen in the reinvigoration of orthodox Marxism (e.g. Wright, 1978; Zeitlin, 1974) and the prestige of cultural structuralism and hermeneutics. There has also, in the name of greater "specificity" and "realism," been a return to more purely individualistic models. Collins' work (1975, 1981) paradoxically exemplified these recent trends. On one hand, actors confront each other as mechanical exchangists, struggling against one another within highly structured situations with unequal material resources. On the other hand, Collins acknowledged that these structures rely on voluntary behavior

that is nonrational. To reconcile these pressures, he described actors as motivated by emotional profit-seeking, undeterred by normative conditions as such; the external environments of polity and economy create cathartic needs that ritualize social relations in mechanical, almost ethological, ways.

Yet, even if the structural paradigm were much more consistently multidimensional, certain theoretical problems would remain unsolved. These problems refer, once again, to the real achievements of individualistic theorizing, which the collectivist tradition has not yet fully addressed. Despite the progress that normative theory made by incorporating personalities into its notion of the "social," the problem of "voluntarism" remains partly unresolved.

Collectivist theories have not found ways to successfully incorporate historical specificity and temporal contingency. The first problem occurs because structuralist theory, in both its instrumental and normative forms, tends to focus on the systemic qualities of different kinds of social roles: "lawyers" have certain kinds of ethics, "workers" engage in expected patterns of conflict, the "middle class" is conservative (or liberal), "intellectuals" are always radical. Indeed, the very notion of "class" carries with it the quintessential properties of this generalizing, systemic analysis. Whether applied to material structure, as in Marxist or Weberian studies of the middle class, or to normative structures, as in the study of intellectuals, "class analysis" implies a trans-historical and cross-cultural similtude that often camouflages the true empirical situation. To the contrary, when we look at actual history, we see, for example, that depending upon the particular development patterns of each nation, middle classes and intellectuals have behaved in highly variable ways: both have been conservative and both have been radical. This historical specificity in the discussion of economic classes is the whole point of Weber's work on urban strata (1968:1212-374, 1946:267-301); yet, it has been only fitfully absorbed by later Weberians (for an important exception, see Lacrois and Dobry, 1977 and hardly recognized by Marxists. This anti-Weberian rigidity is equally apparent in the "new class" studies by normative structuralists, for example, the analysis of intellectuals by Parsons and Platt (1973:267-302). Gouldner's later work (1979) combined instrumental and normative forms of such "class analysis," insisting that intellectuals—because of structural circumstances which are both normative and material—have a uniformly critical ideology and will inevitably be the basis for progressive historical change. Yet, numerous historical studies have shown this is hardly the case (for Germany, see Ringer, 1969; and Herf, 1981; for England, see Wiener, 1981). The point is not that the individual members of economic or cultural "classes" are not subject to social-structural constraint, but that the particular structures must be understood in historically-specific and contingent, as well as in systemic, ways.

The second problem refers to the promise of the future, rather than to the effect of the past. The virtue of structural theories is that they illuminate the constraints that limit individual action, and the better the structural theory, the more effectively it organizes these external constraints in a systematic way that makes empirical sense. The problem, however, is that the more a structure appears coherent, the more it appears to be ruled by reified, naturalistic laws which are self-contained and inviolable, and while the former property is desirable and true, the latter is not. The continuity of social systems is at every moment

dependent upon human action: this is the seminal insight of the individualistic tradition. The imperatives of social structure are probabilistic; they are always open to the possibility, no matter how remote, of reversal or revision.

The most widely discussed implication of this obdurate fact is a renewed concern with incorporating aspects of individualistic theory into collectivist work, the so-called micro/macro connection (e.g., Knorr-Cetina and Cicourel, 1981; Collins, 1981; Giddens, 1976, 1979; Alexander, 1984a). Yet, there is another implication which has not had nearly as much attention. This concern with contingency returns, once again, to the significance of history, for it opens the analysis of social structure to the importance of critical events.

The analysis of critical events, like the attention to historical specificity, must balance attention to contingency with an appreciation for social context. This challenge has, in fact, recently drawn the attention of theorists in different structural traditions, though it has hardly ever been the object of continuous concern. More than a decade ago, Thompson (1963) criticized orthodox Marxism for its mechanistic and nonhistorical approach to revolutionary class consciousness, arguing that classes should be seen as "made" by actors through a process of ongoing social interaction, rather than as the mechanical reflection of economic development. In the Parsonian tradition, Eisenstadt (1978) tried to utilize notions of individual negotiation to study periods of social creativity, developing the idea of "institutional entrepreneurs." (For an analysis of this tendency in Eisenstadt's work, see Alexander and Colomy, 1984). But the most fertile work which has been done on such social creativity is Turner's symbolic anthropology. Drawing on the theory of *rites de passage,* Turner (e.g., 1974) argued that social crisis often creates liminal periods of "anti-structure," periods during which role differentiation gives way to expressive community, and societies reformulate or reinforce their fundamental orientations through more or less open-ended rituals. Turner's approach to contingent ritualization must be refined and systematically related to the more traditional concerns of structural analysis (e.g., Katz et al., 1981; Alexander, 1984b).

In an ironic way, therefore, social-structural theory continues to be bound by the issues that individualistic theory has raised. Structural analysis must evolve so that its emphasis on constraint will reformulate the conditions of voluntarism, rather than completely eliminate it. This involves two different kinds of tasks. First, externality and constraint must be defined symbolically, as well as materially, for only in this way can the actor be viewed as producing social order and not just responding to it. Second, the conceptualization of these symbolic and material structures must be historically specific and, equally important, must be conceived in a manner that recognizes the continual possibility for their fundamental reformulation. These tasks should set the research program for structural analysis for years to come.

REFERENCES

Alexander, Jeffrey C. 1980. "Core solidarity, ethnic outgroup, and social differentiation: a multidimensional model of inclusion in modern societies." Pp. 5-281 in Jacques Dofny and Akinsola Akiwowo, eds., National and Ethnic Movements. Los Angeles and London: Sage Publishers.

_____. 1982a. Positivism, Presuppositions, and Current Controversies. Theoretical Logic in Sociology, Vol. 1. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

_____. 1982b. "Kuhn's unsuccessful revisionism: a rejoinder to Selby." Canadian Journal of Sociology 7(2):66-71.

_____. 1982c. "Max Weber, la th'eorie de la rationalisation et le Marxisme." Sociologie et Socie't'es 9:33-43.

_____. 1984a. "The individualist dilemma in phenomenology and interactionism: toward a synthesis with the classical tradition." Forthcoming in S.N. Eisenstadt, ed., The Micro-Macro Link. London: Sage.

_____. 1984b. "Three models of culture/society relations, with special reference to the Watergate crisis." Sociological Theory: (forthcoming).

Alexander, Jeffrey C., and Paul Colomy, 1984. " 'Institutionalization' and 'collective behavior': points of contact between Eisenstadt's functionialism and symbolic interactionism," in Erik Cohen et al., eds., Social Dynamics: Essays in Honor of S.N. Eisenstadt. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.

Almond, Gabriel, and Sydney Verba. 1963. The Civic Culture. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Press.

Aron, Raymond. 1969. "Social class, political class, ruling class." European Journal of Sociology 1:260-81.

Azarya, Victor. 1978. Aristocrats Facing Change: The Falbe in Guinea, Nigeria, and Camergon. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Baran, Paul A., and Paul M. Sweezy. 1966. Monopoly Capital. New York: Monthly Review Press.

Bell, Daniel. 1973. The Coming of Post-Industrial Society. New York: Basic Books.

Bellah, Robert M. 1970. Beyond Belief. New York: Harper and Row.

Bendix, Reinhard. 1964. Nation-Building and Citizenship. New York: Doubleday.

Bottomore, T. B. 1974. Sociology as Social Criticism. New York: Pantheon.

Braverman, Harry. 1974. Labor and Monopoly Capital. New York: Monthly Review Press.

Coleman, James. 1966. "Foundation for a theory of collective decisions." American Journal of Sociology 71:615-27.

Collins, Randall. 1975. Conflict Sociology. New York: Academic Press.

_____. 1981. "On the microfoundations of macrosociology." American Journal of Sociology 86:984-1014.

Deutsch, Karl. 1963. The Nerves of Government. New York: Free Press.

Domhoff, William. 1967. Who Rules America? Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.

Douglas, Mary. 1966. Purity and Danger. London: Penguin Books.

Downes, Anthony. 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper and Row.

Durkheim, Emile. 1938/1983. The Division of Labor in Society. New York: Free Press.

_____. 1958/1896. Socialism. Silver Springs, Col.: Antioch University.

_____. 1951/1897. Suicide. New York: Free Press.

_____. 1973/1898. "Individualism and the intellectuals." Pp. 43-57 in Robert N. Bellah, ed., Emile Durkheim on Morality and Society.

_____. 1957/1900. Professional Ethics and Civil Morals. New York: Free Press.

_____. 1961/1903. Moral Education. New York: Free Press.

_____. 1915/1912. Elementary Forms of Religious Life. New York: Free Press.

Easton, David. 1965. A Systems Analysis of Political Life. New York: Wiley.

Eisenstadt, S. N. 1963. The Political System of Empires. New York: Free Press.

_____. 1978. Revolution and the Transformation of Society. New York: Free Press.

Garfinkel, Harold, et al. 1981. "The work of a discovering science construed with materials from the optically discovered pulsar." Philosophy of Social Science 11:131-58.

Geertz, Clifford. 1973. The Interpretation of Cultures. New York: Basic Books.

_____. 1980. Negara: The Theatre State in Nineteenth Century Bali. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Giddens, Anthony. 1976. New Rules of Sociological Method. New York: Basic Books.

_____. 1979. Central Problems in Social Theory. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Goffman, Erving. 1959. Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. New York: Doubleday.

_____. 1961. Asylums. New York: Doubleday.

Goldthorpe, John H., and David Lockwood. 1963. "Affluence and the British class structure." The Sociological Review 11:133-63.

Gouldner, Alvin W. 1976. The Dialectic of Ideology and Technology. New York: Seabury.

_____. 1979. The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class. New York: Seabury.

Habermas, Jurgen. 1975. Legitimation Crisis. Boston: Beacon.

Halevy, Elie. 1972/1901-04. The Growth of Philosophic Radicalism. Clifton, N.J.: Kelley.

Herf, Jeffrey. 1981. "Reactionary modernism." Theory and Society. 10:805-32.

Hobbes, Thomas. 1962/1651. The Leviathan. New York: Colliers.

Homans, George C. 1961. Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World.

Johnson, Chalmers. 1966. Revolutionary Change. Boston: Little Brown.

Katz, Elihu, Daniel Dayan and Pierre Motyl. 1981. "In defense of media events." Communications in the 21st Century. New York: Wiley and Sons.

Knorr-Cetina, Karen, and Aron V. Circourel, eds. 1981. Advances in Social Theory and Methodology: Toward an Integration of Micro-and Macrosociology. London: Routledge.

Kuhn, Thomas. 1962. The Structure of Scientific Revolution. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Lacroix, Bernard, and Michael Dobry. 1977. "A la recherche d'un cadre the'orique pour l'analyse political des classes moyennes." Extrait des Annales de la Facult'e de Droit et de Sciences Politique Fascicule, 14.

Lakatos, Imre. 1969. "Falsification and the methodology of scientific research programmes." Pp. 91-196 in Lakotas and Alan Musgrave, eds., Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. London: Cambridge University Press.

Lévi-Strauss, Claude. 1966. The Savage Mind. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Levy, Marion J. 1949. The Family Revolution in China. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Lindbloom, Charles E. 1977. Politics and Markets: The World's Political-Economic Systems. New York: Basic Books.

Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1963. The First New Nation, New York: Doubleday.

Lipset, Seymour Martin, et al. 1956. Union Democracy. New York: Free Press.

Lipset, Seymour Martin, and Reinhard Bendix. 1959. Social Mobility in Industrial Society. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Marcuse, Herbert. 1964. One Dimensional Man. Boston: Beacon.

Marx, Karl. 1963/1844. "Economic and philosophic manuscripts." Pp 61-219 in T.B. Bottomore, ed., Karl Marx: Early Writings. New York.

Merton, Robert K. 1973/1942. "The normative structure of science." Pp. 267-278 in Merton, The Sociology of Science. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Michels, Robert. 1949/1911. Political Parties. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press.

Miliband, Ralph. 1969. The State in Capitalist Society. New York: Basic Books.

Mills, C. Wright. 1959. The Power Elite. New York: Oxford University Press.

Moore, Sally, and Barbara Meyeroff, eds. 1975. Symbol and Politics in Communal Ideology. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

Moore, Sally, and Barbara Meyeroff, eds. 1977. Secular Ritual. The Netherlands: Van Gorcum.

Munch, Richard. 1981. "Talcott Parsons and the theory of action. 1. The Kantian Core." American Journal of Sociology 8:45-76.

_____. 1983. "From pure methodological individualism to poor sociological utilitarianism: a critique of an avoidable alliance." Canadian Journal of Sociology 8:45-76.

O'Connor, James. 1973. The Fiscal Crisis of the State. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Parsons, Talcott. 1954. Essays in Sociological Theory. New York: Free Press.

_____. 1964. Social Structure and Personality. New York: Free Press.

_____. 1969. Politics and Social Structure. New York: Free Press.

_____. 1971. The System of Modern Societies. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.

Parsons, Talcott, and Edward A. Shils, eds. 1951. Towards a General Theory of Action. New York: Harper and Row.

Parsons, Talcott, and Robert F. Bales, eds. 1955. Family, Socialization, and Interaction Process. New York: Free Press.

Parsons, Talcott, and Neil J. Smelser. 1956. Economy and Society. New York: Free Press.

Parsons, Talcott, and Gerald M. Platt. 1973. The American University. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Pitts, Jesse. 1974. "The hippies as a counter-meritocracy." Dissent 21:304-16.

Prager, Jeffrey. 1982. "Equal opportunity and affirmation action: the rise of new social understandings." Research in Law, Deviance, and Social Control 4:191-218.

Radcliffe-Brown, 1952. Structure and Function in Primitive Society. Glencoe, Il.: Free Press.

Ringer, Fritz. 1969. The Decline of the German Mandarins: The German Academic Community, 1890-1933. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Sahlins, Marshall. 1976. Culture and Practical Reason. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Schluchter, Wolfgang. 1981. The Rise of Western Rationalism. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Seidman, Steven. 1983. Liberalism and the Origins of European Social Theory. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Selznick, Phillip. 1957. Leadership and Administration. New York: Harper and Row.

Sewell, William H., Jr. 1980. Work and Revolution in France. London and New York: Cambridge University Press.

Shils, Edward A. 1975. Center and Periphery: Essays in Macrosociology. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Simon, Herbert A. 1964. Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organizations. New York: Macmillan.

Skocpol, Theda. 1979. States and Revolutions. London and New York: Cambridge University Press.

Smelser, Neil J. 1959. Social Change in the Industrial Revolution. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

_____. 1971. "Stability, instability, and the analyses of political corruption." Pp. 7-29 in Alex Inkeles and Bernard Barber, eds., Stability and Change. Boston: Little-Brown.

Thompson, E.P. 1963. The Making of the English Working Class. New York: Knopf.

Treiman, Donald. 1977. Occupational Prestige in Comparation Perspective. New York: Wiley and Sons.

Turner, Victor. 1969. The Ritual Press. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

_____. 1974. Dramas, Fields, and Metaphors. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

Walzer, Michael. 1965. Revolution of the Saints. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University.

Weber, Max. 1946. From Max Weber. New York: Oxford University Press.

_____. 1968. Economy and Society. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Weinstein, Fred, and Gerald M. Platt. 1969. The Wish to Be Free. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Wiener, Martin. 1981. English Culture and the Decline of the Industrial Spirit: 1850-1980. London and New York: Cambridge University Press.

Wright, Erik Olin. 1978. Class, Crisis, and the State. London: New Left Books.

Zeitlin, Maurice. 1974. "Corporate ownership and control: the large corporation and the capitalist class." American Journal of Sociology 79:1073-119.