Eisenstadt and Curelaru (1976:180) begin their masterful analysis of the structural-functional school of sociological theory with the following admonition: "Despite many claims to the contrary, especially by opponents, the structural-functional school was neither uniform nor unchanging." Indeed, they warn that there emerged "within this school, many internal controversies, disputes, and 'openings.'" These words should introduce every discussion of structural-functional theory. They are an acknowledgment, by one of the most distinguished "functionalists" of our time, of the need for revision which is experienced by even the most representative and able members of every great theoretical tradition (see Alexander 1981). As such, they provide the key for evaluating Eisenstadt's contributions to functionalism and for evaluating the functionalist tradition more generally. They are also vital to a proper understanding of the relationship between this tradition and others.

In this paper we propose, first, to identify the kinds of "openings" that Eisenstadt created within the functionalist school. After doing so, we will trace how his revision of social differentiation theory, in particular, creates an opening toward developments within a tradition often considered to be antagonistic to functionalism—symbolic interactionism. This opening, we believe, allows critical elements of Eisenstadt's revisionist theorizing to be expanded significantly. This expansion, we will argue, marks the beginning of "neo-functionalism," the emergence of a self-critical strand of functional theory that seeks to broaden functionalism's intellectual scope while retaining its theoretical core.

I

Every great social theory is ambiguous on certain critical points, and Talcott Parsons' was not less so than others. On the most general and presuppositional level, Parsons' theory at its best was motivated by a genuinely ecumenical ambition, articulating a frame of reference that synthesized idealist and materialist modes of analysis, allowing each independent but only partial determination of action and order. Using a sophisticated functionalist model and a complex yet precise conceptual scheme, Parsons defined culture, society, and personality as analytically differentiated systems, a notion that mandated interpenetration but which also legitimated conflicting aims. He also applied these general theoretical orientations to the social system itself, arguing that it, too, is composed of internally differentiated systems which, while analytically interchanging with one another, can be powerfully at odds. After specifying equilibrium and integration as significant yet merely analytical points of reference, Parsons dedicated much of his empirical analysis to tracing the process of differentiation and separation among actual historical groups and institutions, a process often produced by conflict and often producing conflict in turn.

Yet this ecumenical ambition was cross-cut in Parsons' work by a more sectarian and reductionist strand of analysis (see Alexander, 1983, chs. 6–9). While the ecumenical strain of Parsons' analysis embraced the materialist segments of Weber's work, and through them certain crucial aspects of Marxism, the more one-dimensional strand of his writing was largely confined to exploring the implications of Durkheim and Freud. In this Durkheim-Freud reduction, the normative-evaluative dimension of personal orientation—which exerts moral control, among other things, cognitive-instrumental orientations and acts—is said to control such orientations and actions not just in the analytic sense of morality as normatively regulated order but substantively, i.e., in the moral interest of collectivities and societies as a whole. Inevitably coupled with this reduction is Parsons' redefinition of "institutionalization." In the ecumenical strain, institutionalization is defined simply as the intersection of often conflicting demands from the systems of personality, culture, and society. But in the Durkheim-Freud reduction the disjunction created by the autonomy of the social system drops away: institutionalization becomes the internalization by personalities of common value patterns (e.g., Parsons 1951:36–45). This idealist reduction of presuppositions and models, in turn, corresponds to an empirical reduction. If normative regulation is to be taken as collectively moral, and if the problem of scarce social resources drops away, then the differentiated subsystems in society will surely exchange resources in a reciprocal and mutually supporting manner. Moreover, equilibrium becomes not just an analytical reference point for the analysis of social process but a description of the empirical status of that process itself.
II

It is at the reductionist strand of Parsons' legacy that Eisenstadt has always taken aim. A loyal student, he has for the most part carefully camouflaged his departures, avowing as recently as 1976 that Parsons' "heavy systemic emphasis" indicated no normative deviation or anti-conflictual tone (Eisenstadt and Curelan, 1976:182). Yet, the evidence of a vast subrosa revisionist effort is not hard to find.

In his little-known but extremely interesting and extraordinary introduction to Max Weber on Charisma and Institution Building, a piece which ostensibly placed Weber squarely into the Parsonian camp, Eisenstadt insists that in functionalist theory values are viewed as the disruptive foundation of personal and collective struggles for fulfillment (1968:42). And in The Political System of Empires, a work which brilliantly translated Weber's theory of patrimonialism into functionalist language—even while, as we will later emphasize, "Weberianizing" functionalism in turn—the challenge to Parsons' reductionist strand is omnipresent. Parsons' interchange model is now cross-cut by the "ecological" dimension of stratification (1963:69-93; see also, Eisenstadt, 1969); the differentiation of this model is viewed as creating problems and not simply or even primarily as adapting to them (ibid., 224); the differentiated parts of this model e.g., the political system, are conceived as producing not just complementary but dominating institutional forces of their own, e.g., as in Eisenstadt's discussion of the early bureaucracies (1963:273-299); the "generalization" of such differentiated systems and their media of exchange is defined simply in terms of institutional autonomy and independent power rather than in terms of symbolically-produced, morally, and fundamentally integrative legitimation (1963:18-20); and the processes that result from such differentiation and generalization are analyzed in terms of their contentiousness and the struggles which they involve, rather than primarily as forms of re-equilibration (ibid., 304).

Clearly, it was the ecumenical and incorporative dimension of Parsons' work that Eisenstadt took most strongly to heart. Rather than attempting to defend the fortress-like distinctiveness of the Parsonian corpus against all critics hither and yon, Eisenstadt expanded the theory to encompass the critics' best points. For classical theorists, this pertained primarily to Marx's emphasis on struggle and class, which Eisenstadt sublated into his broader theory of differentiation and ecological segmentation (1971), and to the instrumental aspects of Weber's political analysis, which he incorporated into a more muscular, multidimensional theory of interest group exchange (1963 and 1968).

For contemporary theorizing, this ecumenical ambition was most relevant to the reified and radically incomplete theories of conflict, exchange, and symbolic interaction. Far from merely dismissing Homans, Eisenstadt (1971b) dwelled not on the inadequacies but on the insights exchange theories generated about the concrete and processual aspects of what Homans called subinstitutional behavior. Rather than emphasizing the analytic inadequacies of instrumentalist conflict theories, Eisenstadt (1965:1-68 and 1976:245-295) used them to expand and make more systematic his investigation into the inequalities generated by allocation and by the merely formal aspects of legitimation. And while criticizing the individualistic dimension of symbolic interaction, he tried, at the same time, to utilize its insights to expand his understanding of the communicative and contingent aspects of interaction processes and rule behavior (1976:273-277). What a more strictly analytical and purely critical approach might have legitimately called the residual categories in these traditions—e.g., Homans' discussions of distributive justice—Eisenstadt called "openings," and rather than decrying the fragmentation of contemporary sociology he tried to document what he described as the "broadening" of the sociological tradition.

Though Eisenstadt's early work, for example from Generation to Generation (1956), represented functionalism in almost a pure form, his revisionist impulses began to manifest themselves soon after. They were rarely explicit; more typically, they took cover behind a subtle combination of the functionalist framework and formulations and models from competing traditions. This should not be surprising. The same pattern is evident in the revisionist efforts of other great students—in those Marxists who combined their master with Hegel and Freud, in those Durkheimians who melded their teachers' theories with Simmel and Marx (Alexander 1982: chs. 9, 10).

The main points in Eisenstadt's revision of Parsons are the following: an emphasis on process and innovation, on the role and the significance of interests, the omnipresence of conflict, and the disruptive aspects of culture. In his early revisions, these challenges were articulated by an extraordinary "Weberianization" of functionalist theory. On the one hand, The Political System of Empires (1963) demonstrated how Parsons' theory could unravel the often confused relationships between class, state, and religion in Weber's monumental theory of political modernization. Yet, at the same time, this work demonstrated another ambition: to use the antithetical emphases of Weber's theory to push the functionalist framework in certain distinctive directions. Eisenstadt firmly linked, for the first time, the differences of instrumentalist conflict theories, Eisenstadt (1965:1-68 and 1976:245-295) used them to expand and make more systematic his investigation into the inequalities generated by allocation and by the merely formal aspects of legitimation. And while criticizing the individualistic dimension of symbolic interaction, he tried, at the same time, to utilize its insights to expand his understanding of the communicative and contingent aspects of interaction processes and rule behavior (1976:273-277). What a more strictly analytical and purely critical approach might have legitimately called the residual categories in these traditions—e.g., Homans' discussions of distributive justice—Eisenstadt called "openings," and rather than decrying the fragmentation of contemporary sociology he tried to document what he described as the "broadening" of the sociological tradition.

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The introduction of economic classes into func-
tionalist theory comes naturally from this emphasis on different concrete groups: the boundary relations between functionally differentiated subsystems can now be seen as social relations between different groups, and the kinds of groups which articulate the "adaptive function" are, at least in early periods, economic classes (ibid., p. 120 and ch. 8, passim).

From this innovation, Eisenstadt could powerfully extend a class theory in turn, for he demonstrated that the development of different economic classes is related not just to economic development but to the level of social differentiation. Indeed, Eisenstadt developed in this work a systematic, historically specific theory of group development in each functionally differentiated subsystem, and upon this basis he articulated a detailed theory of social, not just economic, contradictions for the imperial period. This theory specifies, for example, that the great communist revolutions of the modern period have been triggered not by forms of property but by dominant political relationships which could not escape the contradictions of an imperial bureaucracy (on this point, see also Eisenstadt 1966:67-74 and passim).

Whereas these earlier revisions were couched in the language of Weber, Eisenstadt's later revisions were most conspicuously articulated in the theoretical language of Shils. Shils' center/periphery theory, on the one hand, allowed Eisenstadt to make even more concrete and subtle his earlier concentration on the interest relations that govern exchanges between political and extra-political groups. At the same time, he powerfully sublated this theory by defining the "center" in a more pluralistic and Parsonsian way, systematically linking it to differentiated spheres in the social system. Yet Shils' broadening of the charisma concept proved still more important, for it enabled Eisenstadt to give a more innovative and disruptive twist to Parsons' theory of culture. Eisenstadt could use charisma to open Parsons' value conceptualization to the more mercurial qualities of sacredness. This allowed him to establish a fateful dialectic: while, according to Shils' broadening of the concept, charisma is omnipresent, it can only be produced by specialized actors and specific and discrete aspects of the social structure (1968:xii-xlilii).

The narrow access to sacred power, then, must somehow be responsive to the "quest" for participation in the symbolic order by the population as a whole. Eisenstadt then concludes that "the quest for participation . . . does not necessarily constitute a focus of consensus—it may easily become a focus of dissension, conflict, and change" (ibid., xliii). On this foundation, he can formulate a new theory of the relationship between functionally differentiated groups, in which the terms of exchange are set not only by a group's dominating interest or relation to an overarching symbolic order but also by its capacity to create and crystallize broader symbolic orientations and norms (ibid., p. xxxix; also, Eisenstadt's Shilsian recasting of Weberian revisions of functional theory in his introduction to the paperback edition of *The Political System of Empires* [1963 (1971)], pp. vii-xxii).

Eisenstadt's efforts to revise functionalism may be said to have reached theoretical maturity in two different forms. The first is his theory of institutionalization, which he developed in the 1960's in various papers and made more detailed in book-length treatments over the last decade. The second was a more metatheoretical conceptualization of the relation between social order, social systems and culture, and social change, a formulation which came to fruition in his work with Curelaru, *The Forms of Sociology*, in 1976. We will consider the latter theory first, not only because it supplies a framework for Eisenstadt's more specific considerations of institutionalization, but because this institutionalization theory will provide an effective link to our discussions in the latter part of this essay.

From the perspective of his intellectual development, Eisenstadt's *The Forms of Sociology* is a richly revealing work, for he and Curelaru developed an analytic history tracing sociological theory from the classical figures to the present and made claims for social-scientific knowledge's steady advancement and accumulation. Although this analysis erred badly in its approach to science, it proved extremely useful for Eisenstadt's developing sociology. It allowed him to look "forward" from classical theory to functionalism, and in this way to argue for the advances Parsons' made, while also allowing him to look "backward" from more contemporary debates to Parsons' functionalism and to argue that these later developments have responded effectively to real shortcomings in Parsons' work. The final chapter in *Forms*, "The Broadening of the Sociological Tradition: Some Preliminary Indications" (1976:347-375), marked the first time that Eisenstadt theorized explicitly from a perspective outside of functionalism, and presents, in addition, the most abstract and purely theoretical statement he has ever made. This chapter, like so much of Eisenstadt's work, makes difficult reading, but close examination reveals that it systematically reformulates Eisenstadt's ad hoc and implicit functionalist revisions and the equally camouflaged openings he earlier made to the pre-and post-functionalist traditions. This systematic theory, therefore, marks one of the principal starting points, the beginning of "neofunctionalism;" it must be understood both in relation to the ambiguities of Parsons' original work and to Eisenstadt's own agenda for ecumenical revision. 1

While the fundamental elements of Parsons' synthesis remain, Eisenstadt forcefully integrates them, in this concluding essay, with a focus on process, groups, interest, conflict and cultural disruption. The potential for disorder and conflict, he maintains at the outset, are rooted in the very givens of human nature. The genetic code of human beings is an open one; it must be arbitrarily structured by symbolic forms and technical organization. Yet this very act
of structuring produces an openness to change and disruption, for the details of symbolic forms and instrumental techniques cannot be determined in advance: they unfold only in concrete interaction. This openness, in turn, creates powerful anxieties about the randomness and changeability of people’s goals and activities, about the control of personal impulses, about the scarcity of valuable resources, and about the duration of human life itself (ibid., 352). Given the human tendency toward symbolization, such anxieties become transcendentalized, giving rise to various forms of cultural expression like religion, philosophy, science, and art. Yet these uncertainties also give rise to organizational effort and conflict. Because the distribution of human labor is not genetically coded, this conflict becomes, in its most general expression, a struggle over the division of labor. More specifically, it is a conflict over three different kinds of organizational indeterminacies: (1) the indeterminacy of solidarity relationships, i.e., “the lack of specification of the range of actors who are admitted to a situation—that is, of the boundaries of interaction and of criteria of participation [i.e., membership] in it;” (2) the indeterminacy of power, i.e., “the lack of genetic specification of universal or general human goals and of goals that can or should be sought by participants in any particular situation;” (3) the indeterminacy of wealth, i.e., “the lack of fixed specification of the range of access of different actors to the major resources which are being produced, exchanged, and distributed” (ibid., 354).

These overwhelming contingencies, Eisenstadt believes, make the development of mutual trust the central issue for all human societies. It is to pursue this end that societies develop organizational frameworks and mechanisms to regulate the division of labor, and detailed symbolic codes that can structure the situation in accord with more general given cultural concerns. Yet there is by no means a perfect fit between the meaningful obligations and codes which societies develop and the organizational frameworks and mechanisms that regulate the division of labor. This tension between structures that develop to promote trust has the effect, therefore, of assuring that trust cannot be maintained, for this tension produces new symbolic codes that transpose the felt inadequacies of the division of labor into critical ideologies which emphasize the disorder and arbitrariness of organizational life. Moreover, because these critical codes must be defined concretely in each instance, differences soon develop among carrier groups which exacerbate the tensions.

In this unsatisfactory situation, Eisenstadt argues, groups of actors will seize access to critical resources and positions, and will promulgate rules that support their own perspectives and interests. Such rules, inevitably, will often seem arbitrary, coercive, and unjust to members of society outside of these groups. The group conflict which ensues will be fought on the following grounds: hierarchy vs. equality, effectiveness vs. legitimacy, authority vs. solidarity, exploitation vs. justice, and spontaneity vs. control.

It is in response to such conflicts that there emerges in all societies detailed ground rules that control not only symbolic interaction but also access to valued resources. These ground rules form the “deep structure” of society, and they are set up and maintained by conscious and unconscious coalitions of different types of “entrepreneurs,” or institutional innovators. These coalitions seek to control the flow of resources, symbolic and material, which are crucial for determining the structure of society. Eisenstadt’s conclusion to his metatheory is as dialectical as the arguments which compose it: while the establishment of ground rules “copes with the problems of social order, it does not solve them; it only transposes them to a new level” (ibid., 369).

Since this metatheory formalized notions which had evolved over the entire course of his work, it should not be surprising that Eisenstadt’s more specific theory of institutionalization fits securely within it. By institutionalization, Eisenstadt means, in the first place, the process by which organized, “societal described” behavior is established (1964a:235). But he also uses the concept to refer to the movement of specification from general, background conditions to specific and concrete social arrangements, i.e., to “the processes by which the various predispositions engendered in given structural, cultural, and organizational settings, are taken up and crystallized into specific organizational and symbolic patterns” (1956 [1971]:xlvii, italics added). While this second meaning emerges more directly from Eisenstadt’s attention to contingency and social process, both definitions refer to the problem of social change. It is from within his empirical and theoretical studies of social change that Eisenstadt issues this fundamental challenge to the reductionist strands of Parsons’ work. It was, after all, the idealization of Parsons’ own theory of institutionalization—his failure sufficiently to recognize the “social” disjunction between personality and culture—that undermined the original functionalist theory of order and made it appear to be antagonistic to the processes of social change.

Parsons identified social change and, more particularly, social differentiation, with general processes like value generalization, adaptive upgrading, and inclusion. Although references to the specific causes of differentiation can be found throughout his work, most of the time Parsons was content with the general designation of “strain.” What he was more interested in was differentiation’s effects. He described these effects very precisely, but these descriptions—like his descriptions of the processes of differentiation themselves—remained for the most part highly generalized (for an important exception, see Parsons 1971: ch. 4, passim). Equally significant, these descriptions of effects assumed that the processes of differentiation which responded to the initial strain would, in the last instance, reestablish equilibrium.

Eisenstadt’s position on the effects of differentia-
tion could not be more different. "Recognition of the integrative problems that are attendant on new levels of differentiation," he insists, "constitutes the main theoretical implication of the concept of differentiation" (1964b:377, italics added). He also differs emphatically with Parsons on the relevance of causes. While in the following Eisenstadt (1964:375) purportedly is discussing only "elder evolutionary models," it seems clear that he also has Parsons' own model in mind: "Very often [such models] confuse ... general tendencies with the causes of change." Eisenstadt quite clearly believes, in other words, that the integrative problems which differentiation produces can be understood only if the causes of differentiation are specified in a concrete and systematic way.

The process of differentiation refers to tendencies that societies have, when certain background conditions are present, to respond to social conflicts or abrupt disruptions by developing more specialized structures. Yet, even if such responses occur, Eisenstadt believes, social conflict and disruption may not be resolved: "The emergence of a solution, i.e., the institutionalization of a social order congruent with the new range of problems, is not necessarily given in the process of differentiation" (1964b:378). The key to understanding why the process of differentiation may not "solve" the problems—resolve the strain—which in some sense caused this differentiation in the first place can be discovered only by seeing the following: the process of differentiation is actually activated by factors much more specific than the general strain that causes social disruption. Tendencies to differentiation are activated, Eisenstadt insists, "by the occupants of strategic roles within the major institutional spheres" who "attempt to broaden the scope and develop the potentialities of their respective spheres" (ibid.). He puts the matter more succinctly at a different point: "These things are done by people who are placed in or attempt to achieve strategic positions and who aspire to certain goals" (1964a:245).

The fact that newly differentiated structures are established only by groups acting in their "self-interest" explains why the institutionalization produced by social change can in turn produce new problems of its own. To maintain the structures they have established, Eisenstadt believes, these entrepreneurial groups will make "continuous attempts to mobilize resources from different groups and individuals, and to maintain the legitimacy of the values, symbols and norms of the system" (ibid., 246). Such efforts, however, will obviously "affect the positions of different groups in the society, giving rise to continuous shifts in the balance of power among them and in their orientations to the existing institutional system and its values" (ibid.). Because differentiation is carried out by particular groups, and because the maintenance of newly differentiated institutions depends upon resources which can only be acquired from other groups, the differentiation process inherently produces group conflict. "Most groups within any society or collectivity," Eisenstadt insists, "tend to exhibit some autonomy in terms of their attitudes toward any such institutionalization and they vary greatly in the extent of their willingness or ability to provide the resources demanded by the [new] system" (ibid., 246). The groups most unwilling or unable to supply the needed resources, moreover, will develop organizations and ideologies even more antagonistic to the newly dominant group's demands.

Differentiation, then, actually may "facilitate the development and 'maturation' of certain inherent tendencies in the structure and orientation of key groups ... which may then develop beyond the basic premises of the system" (ibid.). Differentiation, in sum, is a process beset by "contradictions." Though it responds to an initial conflict, development of a new institution often leads "to the depletion of the resources necessary to maintain" it and may, indeed, create forces which "seek to create a new institutional system" altogether (ibid., 247).

In the course of the last decade, Eisenstadt's analysis of this institutionalization process became in crucial respects more culturally sensitive and precise. In part, this further reveals the influence of Shils, but, more significantly, it indicates the response that Eisenstadt made to the structuralism of Levi-Strauss. This response takes seriously the autonomy and internal systematicity of "codes," but it relates them much more forcefully than structuralism to the level of the social system itself. In this later work of Eisenstadt's, the carriers and promoters of differentiation become also the creators and articulators of distinctive cultural languages (1976:250ff). These codes are linked (1973:119-130) to the complex conceptual scheme articulated in The Forms of Sociology, to the levels of organization and symbolic specificity, to the antinomies around which conflicts are formed, and to the concrete and detailed ground rules that Eisenstadt lays out. Eisenstadt has also tried to identify "rules of transformation" which govern the relationships between the different levels and kinds of institutionally-specific codes.

Though Eisenstadt's study of codes is still far from completion, the general impact of his increased sensitivity to cultural life can still be assessed. While "socializing" the purely cultural emphasis of structuralism, Eisenstadt's work now stresses, at the same time, that in certain historical periods possibilities exist for a direct, supra-institutional relationship between socialized personalities and symbolic patterns. In the process of institutionalization and change, he suggests, this relationship creates possibilities for social disruption as significant as the more purely socially-generated tensions described in his preceding work (1973:132--33, 325--327). The existence of such a direct relationship also means that periods of disruption and transformation will be permeated by episodes of ritual behavior, and such ritualization makes societies even more dramatically open to change.
This strand is collective behavior. Indeed, Eisenstadt has recently argued (1978) that the impact and independence of cultural codes actually makes them the single most powerful creator of revolutionary transformations. Although this presents a dramatic change from his earlier, more purely political theory of revolution, it represents an expansion of explanatory emphasis rather than a change of type. The multidimensional character of his general theory, which he inherited from Parsons along with his ecumenical ambition, allows Eisenstadt’s “cultural turn” to enrich his earlier writing on institutionalization rather than contradict it.

III

In this section we indicate how some of these openings in differentiation theory can be extended by linking them with developments in one branch of the symbolic interactionist tradition. While contemporary interactionism suffers from an astructural and individualist bias, it contains, nonetheless, a strand that can be seen as “open” to the analysis of institutional and structural change. This strand is collective behavior. The interactionist approach to collective behavior overemphasizes its emergent character, yet the end point of such unstructured behavior is held to be structure itself. Anti-structure is said to lead to structure, while structure itself is never considered in a systemic way as a thing-in-itself. This paradox appears in Blumer’s (1951 [1939]:214) early statement on the area, which recommends that social movements “can be viewed as societies in miniature, and as such, represent the building up of organized and formalized collective behavior out of what was originally amorphous and undefined. In their growth a social organization is developed, new values are formed, and new personalities are organized. These, indeed, constitute their residue. They leave behind an institutional structure and a body of functionaries, new objects and views, and a new set of self-conceptions.”

But can structure simply “appear” out of collective behavior in an automatic way, unaffected by any surrounding, i.e., structural environment? Wouldn’t the products of earlier collective behavior affect later episodes in turn? It is the attempt to develop this line of reasoning that leads back to Eisenstadt’s work. Anti-structure and structure can be combined if neofunctionalism is systematically related to one strand of the theory of collective behavior. Early students of collective behavior described the crystallization of these new institutional and cultural orders as the invariable outcome of developments purely internal to a social movement. This is clearly evident in efforts to construct a “natural history” of all social movements, which assumed that movements traversed a series of stages culminating in the realization of new institutional frame-works. Blumer identifies, for example, the stages of social unrest, popular excitement, formal organization, and institutionalization. In the latter stage the movement “has crystallized into a fixed organization with a definite personnel and structure to carry into execution the purposes of the movement” (Ibid.:203; also see Edwards, 1927; Hopper 1950).

More recent analyses of collective behavior have moved away from the simplistic natural history approach and, in contrast, have emphasized the contingent nature of movement development (Turner, 1964:123–5; Turner and Killian, 1972:252–5; Jackson et al., 1969). Arguing that movements do not invariably move through a set of fixed stages, these interactionists have sought to identify the conditions necessary for movements to develop and endure. Ironically, it is this very increased emphasis on contingency that has opened up the possibility for connecting the collective behavior approach to more structural concerns, for once the institutionalization of a social movement is seen as problematic, it is seen also to depend on a variety of social and cultural conditions.

The major theorists of this later collective behavior tradition, Turner and Killian (op. cit. 245–425), write, for example, about the tension between competing value, power, and participation orientations within movements; a movement’s success in generating material and ideological support from the community; the public response and the reaction of social control agents to the movement; and the strategies and tactics of the movement’s leadership. The relation between these conditions of collective behavior and Eisenstadt’s innovations in the functional tradition are clear and unmistakable. As we have summarized these above, they include an emphasis on process and innovation, on the significance of group and individual interests, of conflict, and the disruptive aspects of culture. If the continuing emphasis on contingency in this later collective behavior perspective is taken as illuminating a level of empirical analysis rather than as articulating a systematic theory, then it clearly complements some of these neo-functionalist concerns; the later theory’s openness to impinging structures promises, in turn, to elaborate and complete neo-functionalism’s more structural emphasis.

Yet there are substantive, not just analytic reasons for seeking to combine neo-functionalism theory with this strand of interactionism, for the phenomenon of collective behavior seems to embody much of what differentiation theory conceives of as modern life. With the differentiation of a “public sphere” in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, and the increasing impingement of the periphery on the centers, collective behavior became an increasingly important vehicle for aggregating and articulating societal demands; it also became an ever more important mechanism for introducing change in a continuous, self-regulating way.

In the following discussion, we suggest how key
concepts developed by these later students of collective behavior—communication and a sense of injustice, the public, countermovements and general movements—can extend the subjective, voluntaristic, and conflictual elements of Eisenstadt’s theory of social differentiation and change. Our theoretical argument is illustrated with examples drawn primarily from political development in the early United States.

Strain and the Sense of Injustice

We have shown how Eisenstadt’s approach to strain makes several important advances. First, he replaces a broad and often vague notion of strain with a reference to specific tensions generated by particular groups and their interests. In doing so, he allows that general strain and disequilibrium is not enough: institutional entrepreneurs must emerge to identify this dislocation with some positive personal gain. Strains, in other words, do not “reveal themselves”; they must be defined before they can be acted upon. This definition will depend not just on material position but on contingent cultural sensitivities, and will develop in an atmosphere of contingent conflict between individuals and groups.

In interactionist terms, Eisenstadt is suggesting that strain is a product of communication and collective definition. If a strain is perceived, and an individual or groups want to act on it, proposed remedies require the cooperation of others. Institutional entrepreneurs must “persuade” others, then, that an important social problem exists which deserves immediate attention. It is upon these processes of definition and persuasion that interactionist accounts focus (Blumer, 1971; Spector and Kituse, 1977:73–96).

If strain is to precipitate collective action it must be transmuted into a “sense of injustice” (Turner, 1969; 1981:18–19). The simple recognition of systemic problems or perceived threats to a group interest is rarely sufficient to generate sustained collective mobilization oriented to institutional change. Eisenstadt believes there must also exist a sense of cultural disruption or possible disruption. Interactionists like Turner and Killian (op.cit.:259) allow us to put the matter more precisely: if differentiation is to occur, these conditions must be defined as unjust. For example, the development of the first mass political party in the United States is an important instance in American history of institutional differentiation. Yet it did not occur simply because the traditional mode of selecting presidential candidates—the Congressional Caucus—broke down. It depended, in large part, on mass mobilization supporting a new party structure, a movement that depended in turn on a deep felt sense of injustice. This sense of injustice emerged from the widespread belief that the Adams/Clay-Jackson presidential election was decided by a “corrupt bargain” in which Clay exchanged his electoral votes for assurances that he would be appointed Adams’ secretary of state. This “deal,” it was widely believed, enabled Adams to secure the presidency even though he had considerably fewer popular votes than Jackson (Dangerfield, 1952:331–45; 415–35).

Eisenstadt is aware that, even beyond these considerations, students of social change must consider additional historically-specific and contingent conditions. Once again, interactionists provide more systematic explication. While enduring strain or perceived injury to group interests is a necessary condition for the emergence of a sense of injustice, it is not sufficient (Turner and Killian op. cit.:259–68). Other conditions must exist: the presence among those directly or indirectly affected by the strain of an established communication network, a viable group identity, and an embryonic subculture; an established (often, high status) group which legitimizes and supports the growing sense of injustice; an “independent” intellectual stratum which effectively articulates a sense of injustice; and the identification of an “oppressor” or “culprit” who appears to benefit from and is deemed responsible for existing conditions. To the degree that these conditions are combined with a recognized and enduring systemic strain, the more likely it is that a sense of injustice will be articulated and diffused, and the more likely that movements oriented to differentiation or de-differentiation will arise.

For Eisenstadt, “institutional entrepreneurs” are both the cause and effect of such a successful response to strain. He portrays such movers and shakers, furthermore, as both interest-seeking and culture-creating elites. The interactionist usage of the concept of “ideological primary groups” seems to sustain and elaborate this understanding, though, typically, it relates primarily to the normative rather than structural dimension. As Marx and Holzner (1977:426) put it, ideological primary groups “focus the energies of their members on the construction and legitimization (through consensual validation) of a shared symbolic apparatus that publicly interprets a problematic or incomprehensible reality and invents (or defines) it into existence.” Given the affective support it generates and the high degree of control at its disposal, the ideological primary group is particularly effective when movements not only fuel a sense of injustice but also when they aspire to restructure members’ identities vis-à-vis other collectivities. Such groups, for example, have been a conspicuous feature of the movement toward more universalist structures that has been generated by the contemporary women’s movement (Cherniss [1972]).

Finally, Eisenstadt insists that whatever the success of group formation, differentiation will meet opposition from the outside. Reactive groups may be insulated from the social positions in which strain is most intense; they may be beneficiaries of the existing social arrangements and fearful of alterations; or they may simply be convinced that certain deprivations or inconveniences are an inevitable part of life and that little good is done by unnecessarily
stirring up discontent. Eisenstadt is aware of such reactive possibilities. What remains is to link this focus, as interactionism does, to the problem of collective definition. If reactive groups are successful in convincing others that serious deprivations do not exist, then the process of differentiation will be inhibited. The problem is conceptualized by interactionism as follows: the development of a widespread sense of injustice is typically opposed by other groups and collectivities which, for a variety of reasons, deny that the existing institutional order is a source of legitimate grievance (Hall and Hewitt, 1970). These groups often attempt to defuse the growing sense of injustice by attributing the expansion of discontent to a small group of self-interest agitators or outsiders (Blumer, 1971; Spector and Kitsuse, op. cit.).

In sum, Eisenstadt’s recognition of the subjective and contingent dimensions of strain suggests that our understanding of this concept and its relation to differentiation can be advanced by considering strain in conjunction with a sense of injustice and by viewing both as, in part, the products of communication, collective definition, and definitional conflict. Eisenstadt’s revision of functionalist strain theory suggests a basis for linking “objective” strains and contradictions to processes of collective redefinition. It is such redefinition processes, interactionists believe, which are essential if “objective” conditions are to be recast as so inequitable and unjust that they legitimate the collective mobilization necessary for social differentiation and institutional change (Zurcher and Snow, 1981:469–472).

RESPECIFICATION AND THE PUBLIC

Eisenstadt’s description of the symbolic activities of institutional entrepreneurs presents another area where the interactionist emphasis on collective redefinition can extend neofunctionalist thought. Eisenstadt argues, we recall, that the establishment of social institutions is the product of creative individuals or groups who not only procure and exchange resources, establish organizational frameworks to implement collective goals, and mobilize support, but who, in addition, exhibit a heightened sensitivity to order-giving, charismatic principles. Innovating groups are pressed by their own special needs for contact with the sacred and by the necessity, as well, of demonstrating to their potential supporters the vital connection between the new institution they are bringing to life and fundamental dimensions of the cultural order.

Yet, while Eisenstadt notes some of the situations in which a generalized sensitivity to the charismatic is heightened, he does not fully explore the contexts or mechanisms through which connections between a burgeoning institution and broader symbolic orientations are established. His suggestion that it is a coalition between institutional entrepreneurs and representatives of various collectivities which “selects” the ground rules of social interaction and establishes the institutional specifications of those rules should be followed up, particularly his remark that this coalition acts “in special institutional-ritual, legal, and communicative frameworks” (Eisenstadt, 1978:33; also, Eisenstadt and Curelaru 1976:364–7). A more detailed examination of such contexts and mechanisms is especially crucial because institutional entrepreneurs are often not charismatic individuals—Eisenstadt invokes here Shils’ attenuated sense of the term. They are not, therefore, able to compel compliance by virtue of extraordinary personal qualities. Instead, they must either borrow the aura of charisma or generate new and more compelling specifications of accepted cultural codes. The interactionist treatment of publics indicates one context through which such “borrowing” and “respecification” occurs.

Differentiation theory explains how an independent public comes into being (Parsons 1971, Prager, 1983), but it is theories of collective behavior which explain how the public actually works. Presupposing constitutional guarantees for freedom of association, expression, and publication of opinion, the public is conceptualized by interactionists as an emergent collectively engaged in extended public discussions and debate (Turner and Killian, op.cit.:179–198). It is precisely through such discussion, one may reason, that groups establish the connection between an emerging institution and basic cultural beliefs.

The structure and process of public, then, is of vital concern for the neofunctionalist theory of change. Public discussion, interactionists observe, is conducted by two opposing factions, with each faction being assumed by others to represent the position of an established, usually larger group. Despite this perception, however, it is the debates and arguments within the public which provide a basis for new strategic groups and coalitions (Blumer, 1948; Shibutani, 1966:37–40). Each public develops a rudimentary division of labor between an opinion leader and those who support him. These leaders may be drawn from persons of established prestige and reliability, but they may also be chosen because they personify certain values or are known to be closely associated with a charismatic person (Turner and Killian, op. cit.:202). As a public debate endures, disparate issues become solidified into a single matrix, and the legitimate alternatives on an issue are successively narrowed (ibid.:192–3). It is in the course of this consolidation and simplification that public debate becomes “generalized” in the sense that Eisenstadt and other functionalists use this term to imply the heightened symbolic and charismatic importance of the debate. In this compacted and generalized phase, the meaning of abstract cultural codes and their relation to concrete practices are addressed. Established practices and institutional forms not previously considered in relation to fundamental structuring principles can now be scrutinized for possible inconsistency (Blumer, 1978:27–30; Gus-
field, 1979); if they are delegitimated, institutional entrepreneurs can publically argue that new structures are better able to preserve basic principles in turn. This, indeed, is functionalism’s “value respecification” by another name, though it is a more detailed and systematic conceptualization.

One elaboration of the interactionist treatment of publics has identified three types of publics in which this connection between emerging structure and charismatic principle can be made (Colomy, 1982:103–110). The connection is most explicit when the institution itself becomes the topic of public discussion. Opponents of the new institution deny that it faithfully represents the community’s code, arguing, for example, that if it is allowed to persist the community’s sacred traditions will be subverted. While the intent of those who initiate such discussions is to discredit and publically embarrass the innovators, the attacks usually afford the entrepreneurs an opportunity to respond at a similarly generalized, “all or nothing” level. In these responses, entrepreneurial groups may associate themselves with contemporary or historical exemplars of a society’s transcendent order. By so identifying themselves with a charismatic figure, they may contend that the institutions they propose are designed to reserve at all costs the traditions such charismatic figures struggled to attain.

The second type of public context makes the object of discussion the entrepreneurial groups and individuals themselves, not the institution they seek to create. While the intent of those who initiate such discussions is to discredit and publically embarrass the innovators, the attacks usually afford the entrepreneurs an opportunity to respond at a similarly generalized, “all or nothing” level. In these responses, entrepreneurial groups may associate themselves with contemporary or historical exemplars of a society’s transcendent order. By so identifying themselves with a charismatic figure, they may contend that the institutions they propose are designed to reserve at all costs the traditions such charismatic figures struggled to attain.

Finally, the developing institutional framework can become linked to a still broader discussion about the fate and future of the entire community. In such a debate the new structure is treated as prototypical of a general movement away from established principles, a reactive position that engenders counter-arguments which seek to demonstrate that the same structure actually is vital if cherished traditions are to be sustained.

All three types of publics, we might note, were deeply involved in the differentiation of the American mass party structures we mentioned earlier. On the reactive side, the new parties were condemned as cancers on the social order; the men instrumental in constructing the new organizational frameworks—particularly Van Buren and the leading members of the Albany Regency—were castigated as self-interested, untrustworthy, licentious and greedy; and, the emergence of party was treated as symptomatic of America’s declension from the sacred legacy of the founding fathers. On the innovative side, party structures were championed because they performed essential functions for the political and social order; leading institutional entrepreneurs defended their actions by declaring their personal identification with such charismatic figures as Jefferson and Madison; and it was widely contended that new parties were essential to revitalize the sacred principles of the “revolutions” of 1776 and 1800 (Wallace, 1969; 1973; Hofstader, 1969).

This integration of neofunctionalist and interactionist understandings may be clarified further by returning, once again, to Eisenstadt: such communication processes can never be separated from the ideal and material interests of the factions involved. Because the innovative groups as well as their reactive opponents aspire to gain the support of other groups in the community, the manner in which they connect their arguments of cultural concerns is bound to have a “strategic” dimension. Arguments are often made with particular subcommunities in mind, and every attempt at cultural respecification is sensitive to the sub-community’s various interpretations of a society’s cultural codes. The task of making a convincing connection between the proposed structure and a subcommunity’s interpretations of a basic organizing principle stimulates entrepreneurial groups to modify their original conception of the structure. In order to make this proposed structure palatable to important constituencies, compromises are often introduced which, in effect, combine new elements with established institutional arrangements. More generally, if new ideas are to be combined with divergent but enduring interpretations, the “creativity” of institution-builders is constrained. Ideas that cannot be linked to the community’s fundamental codes are unlikely to generate sufficient support. The ability to make this connection, of course, is also partly dependent on the talents of the entrepreneurs themselves.

In summary, then, Eisenstadt argues that differentiation is partially the product of the “symbolic” activities of institutional entrepreneurs. If they are to successfully institutionalize new structures, entrepreneurial groups must link emerging organizational frameworks to new or established cultural codes. The interactionist treatment of the public provides a useful analytic tool for examining a key area where such entrepreneurs seek legitimation and where their efforts are contested. This discussion brings us to our final substantive discussion. Eisenstadt insists that conflict can be both cause and a by-product of differentiation. This proposition can be further developed by drawing upon the analysis of what interactionists call countermovements and general movements.

CONFLICT, COUNTERMOVEMENTS, AND GENERAL MOVEMENTS

In contrast to more benign versions of differentiation theory, Eisenstadt’s analysis of differentiation emphasizes conflict and opposition. Most of his discussion is historical and focuses on the more autonomous policy. Our purpose here is to generalize this discussion and, simultaneously, to make it more analytically differentiated.
In modernizing societies, where public spheres are institutionalized and where peripheries impinge substantially on the center, social differentiation, as we noted above, usually involves social movements. Interactionists have consistently observed that social movements mobilized for change stimulate the opposition of vested interests, which organize into countermovements. Countermovements can impede the effectiveness of initial movements, prompt substantial modification of the initial movement's program, and/or generate intense polarization within a society (Mottl, 1980; Turner and Killian, op. cit.:317–21; Lo, 1982). These varying outcomes, all of which inhibit differentiation, depend not only on the relative balance of movement and countermovement resources but also on such considerations as the intensity of the original strain which gave rise to the initial movement, the strategic skill of leaders, the level of relative general public support, and the response, if any, of social control agents.

Two aspects of this movement/countermovement dynamic have special theoretical interest. The first obtains when the relationship between the initial movement and countermovement assumes a competitive form. If the initial movement appears to have considerable support and resources, countermovements which initially arise to defend the existing institutional and normative order may often adopt elements from the program and goals of the original movement. In this way, as Turner and Killian (op.cit.:318) point out, a countermovement attempts to utilize for its own ends some of the generalized discontent and also to force the opposed movement to focus on the most extreme portions of its original program (also see Lo, op.cit.:119). Yet by coopting elements of the initial movement's program and advocating changes in the normative order which were originally opposed, the countermovement actually promotes the institutionalization of new, more differentiated structures. Competitive countermovements, then, often are transformed into agents of social change.

Once again, early American political development provides a dramatic example of this phenomenon. The first attempts to construct differentiated mass party organizations, which made the civil service less ascriptive and created a more inclusive policy, were undertaken by Democratic leaders, especially by Jackson and Van Buren. The incipient Whig leadership vigorously opposed these organizational and normative changes, particularly the extension of egalitarian standards to political leadership, and it sought to mobilize a large constituency in defense of traditional, deferential patterns. This adherence to conventional patterns of authority involved the repudiation of populist egalitarianism, and for this reason was largely responsible for the Whigs' inability to compete effectively against the Democrats for political office. By 1840, important elements of the Whig leadership decided not merely to adopt but to improve the innovations introduced by the Democrats; the presidential campaign of that year marked the first genuine institutionalization of mass political parties, and the ascendancy of the egalitarian style as the unquestioned mode of political leadership (Marshall, 1967; Hofstadter, 1969; Wallace, 1969).

At the same time, however, the acquiescence of countermovements often has a "strategic" character; in this case, the institutionalization of new levels of organizational and normative differentiation masks continued opposition to new forms. This is especially true if acquiescence follows upon a "split" in the ranks of the countermovement, with one faction arguing for accommodation and a pragmatic acceptance of "new realities," another for shunning the desertion of principle and tradition. In any case, opposition to new forms of differentiation may persist even after new institutions appear to have become firmly entrenched. That opposition may resurface and assume significance in later episodes of differentiation or deinstitutionalization, as Eisenstadt notes, for example, in his discussion of counterrevolutionary groups in Revolution and the Transformation of Societies (1978:41–42). In the American case, the civil service reform movement emerged in part as an attack on the mass party and the "corruption" it promoted. This movement in the further differentiation of administrative structures, yet it was initiated and led by descendents of the "Conscience Whigs," men who had always eschewed notions of party loyalty and discipline because of their general antagonism to the differentiation of the mass party system itself (Hofstadter, 1962:172–196; Blodgett, 1966; Josephson, 1938:158–170; 345–365; 374–384).

Another aspect of the movement-countermovement dynamic which deserves serious consideration stems from Blumer's (1951 [1939]:199–202) distinction between general and specific movements. General movements refer to broad cultural drift, to gradual but significant changes in value orientations which supply a common formula for many varied, goal-oriented movements. A specific movement, by contrast, possesses organizational structure, is oriented toward a program, and provides a sense of identity for its members. Often goals and programs of distinct specific movements are derived from the broader cultural orientations of the same general movement. Indeed, insofar as similar cultural themes pervade specific movements, their adherents and the public at large often recognize them as constituent elements of a "cultural gestalt," as sharing a similar orientation and as promoting compatible goals.

This interactionist conceptualization promises to extend and elaborate certain key elements of differentiation theory. In a period of intense historical change, opposing general movements often emerge. These general movements give rise to an array of specific movements and countermovements, each "set" battling for, and against, differentiation in an array of institutional spheres. Students of Jacksonian America, for example, have discovered that behind the discrete conflicts over differentiation in the polit-
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2. In this analysis we focus on publics and social movements and do not examine how more “elementary forms” of collective behavior, such as crowds or panics, affect institutional change.

3. John Wilson (1973:332–363) argues that as social movements persist they become more routinized and structurally differentiated. He does not, however, explicitly link the origins and development of such movements to the subjective, voluntaristic, and conflictual elements of neo-functionalism or, indeed, to the symbolic interactionist treatment of collective behavior. Our discussion attempts to articulate these links in a detailed and systematic fashion.

4. In our view, Turner and Killian’s Collective Behavior (1972) is among the most comprehensive and, surely,
the most thoroughly interactionist treatment of the field. With regard to the latter point, it seems clear that Turner and Killian’s “emergent norm” approach is more consistent with the basic interactionist tenets about the character of social action than is, for example, Blumer’s depiction of “circular reaction” (Turner, 1964:128–32). For this reason, we employ Turner and Killian’s text as the most authoritative interactionist treatment of collective behavior.

5. There is a significant parallel between our analysis and the one presented in Neil Smelser’s Theory of Collective Behavior (1962). Like Smelser, we seek to demonstrate how functionalism can be extended through the examination of non-institutionalized conduct. Despite this shared intention, however, our theoretical strategy is somewhat different. Whereas Smelser sought to incorporate the analysis of collective behavior within the functionalist paradigm, we hope to show that functionalism can be enriched by opening itself to some of the insights generated by another sociological tradition.

6. Nahinny (1962) introduced the notion of ideological primary group into sociological discourse. Marx and Holzer broaden the scope of the concept considerably by examining it from an interactionist perspective.

7. Jeffrey Prager’s forthcoming work on the public in a macrosociological context promises a fundamental reworking of this discussion, articulating clear links between functionalist and interactionist treatments. Our analysis has been strongly influenced by discussions with him.

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