Civil Societies Between Difference and Solidarity
Rethinking Integration in the Fragmented Public Sphere

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In 1974, after twenty years of relatively successful struggles for the expansion of American citizenship, efforts that began with Black Americans and expanded to include other racial minorities and women, a scholar named Peter Adler (1974:369-371) concluded a widely used anthology called *Intercultural Communication* by offering a definition of 'multicultural'. Emphasising the 'psychoculturally adaptive', Adler portrayed a protean, ever-changing, integrative actor who had the desire and ability to put himself in the shoes of the other person in a relativising, cross-over, non-judgmental way. 'Multicultural man', he wrote, 'maintains no clear boundaries between himself and the varieties of personal and cultural contexts he may find himself in'. He is 'capable of major shifts in his frame of reference and embodies the ability to disavow a permanent character ... He is a person who is always in the process of becoming a part of and apart from a given cultural context. He is very much a formative being, resilient, changing, and evolutionary' (italics added).

Fifteen years later, delivering her Presidential address before colleagues at the Modern Language Association, the well-known feminist literary scholar Catherine Stimpson defined multiculturalism in a decidedly different manner. It means, she said (1992:43-44, italics added), 'treating society as the sum of several equally valuable *but distinct* racial and ethnic groups'. At that same meeting, the editor of the explicitly multicultural *Heath Anthology of American Literature* defended his textbook's race and gender organisation of literary materials by insisting, 'I know of no standard of judgment ... which transcends the particularities of time and place ... of politics in short' (Kimball 1992:75). In another scholarly presentation at the MLA, a Shakespearean scholar justified the need for a multicultural approach to literature by highlighting the boundedness of his own particular identity. Reading the work of a black woman author, he explained, 'I

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do not enter into a transcendent human interaction but instead become more aware of my whiteness and maleness, social categories that shape my being' (Kimball 1992:69).

These juxtaposed quotations suggest more than a shift in intellectual reference from Eriksonian ego psychology to Foucaultian power-knowledge. They indicate a sea change in social understanding. In the early 1970s, multicultural connoted compromise, interdependence, relativising universalism, and an expanding intercultural community. In our own time, the same term appears to be ineluctably connected, not with permeability and commonality, but with ‘difference’, with the deconstruction and deflation of claims to universalism, with the reconstruction, rehabilitation, and protection of separated cultural discourses and sometimes very separated interactional communities.

Radical advocates of multiculturalism propose that their particularistic identities are determinate of their actions and being. Promoting a fundamental reorientation of textbooks and pedagogy vis-à-vis the categories of ‘American’ and ‘race’, Molefi Kete Asante, chair of the Department of African-American Studies at Temple University, justifies Africanism on the grounds that, even for Black Americans, ‘our Africantu is our ultimate reality’ (in Schlesinger 1991:65). ‘The idea of “mainstream American”’, he writes, ‘is nothing more than an additional myth meant to maintain Eurocentric hegemony … “Mainstream” is a code word for “white” … One merely has to substitute the words “white-controlled” to get at the real meaning behind the code’ (1991:305). When Cornel West, the influential Black theologian and philosopher, reviews the effects that recent movements for equality have had on contemporary American academic life, he is more sensitive to paradox but, nonetheless, confirms the shift in mentality. ‘The inclusion of African Americans, Latino/a Americans, Asian Americans, Native Americans and American women into the culture of critical discourse’, he observes, has ‘yielded intense intellectual polemics and inescapable ideological polarisation that focused principally on the exclusions, silences and blindesses of male WASP cultural homogeneity’ (West 1993:584).

**Convergence between Radicals and Conservatives**

This discursive shift from an emphasis on universalism and inclusion to difference and separation seems a paradoxical response to the continuing progress that previously excluded and subordinated groups
have made vis-à-vis the core institutions of American society, a
progress that, while highly uneven and wrenchingly slow, is none-
theless amply documented in statistics about mobility, intermarriage,
occupational, and even to some degree residential segregation. What
is less paradoxical is that in the course of this transformation a highly
visible conservative intellectual reaction has crystallised that is far
more suspicious about the motives of multicultural activists than
skeptical sympathisers of the movement like Cornel West. Arthur
Schlesinger, Kennedy liberal and cosmopolitan thinker of an earlier
day, blames multicultural activists for reviving ‘ancient prejudices’
(Schlesinger 1991:15). Rather than seeing these thinkers as respond-
ing to continuing inequality and exclusion, Schlesinger claims that
they have actually reintroduced divisions where none existed before.
By ‘exaggerating differences’, he writes, ‘the cult of ethnicity ... in-
tensifies resentments and antagonisms’ (102), ‘producing a nation of
minorities [and] inculcat[ing] the illusion that membership in one or
another ethnic group is the basic American experience’ (112). More
strident neoconservatives denounce multiculturalism as itself a new
form of racialism, one directed against the white majority. Dinesh
D’Souza (1992:30) denounces ‘the new separatism’ and likens it to
defending the South African Apartheid regime. For Roger Kimball,
multiculturalism, ‘far from being a means of securing ethnic and
racial equality’, is ‘an instrument for promoting ideological sepa-
ratism based on ... differences’ (1992:82). Hilton Kramer attacks ‘the
new barbarians’ who have ‘already established as a standard practise:
the imposition of politics – above all, the politics of race, gender, and
multiculturalism – as the only acceptable criterion of value in every
realm of culture and life’ (1992:316).

In attacking multiculturalism as a new form of racial particularism
that denies universalism, the conservative critics of multiculturalism
go on to make an even more fundamental claim. They argue that this
movement has fundamentally undermined the solidarity that has
been the basis for American democracy. As Schlesinger sees it, a
once united nation has now been torn apart. ‘The cult of ethnicity’,
he decries (1991:112), ‘has reversed the movement of American his-
tory’, and he condemns it for ‘breaking the bonds of cohesion – com-
mon ideals, common political institutions, common language,
common culture, common fate – that hold the republic together’
(138). Kimball asserts that ‘what we are facing is nothing less than
the destruction of the fundamental premises that underlie ... a liberal
democratic polity’ (65).
The claim that multiculturalism undermines the cohesiveness of American society, indeed, the very existence of American 'society' as such, is potentially an extremely damaging ideological charge; after all, the construction of a fuller, more inclusive society is precisely what most of the emancipatory social movements of the last half century have been about. What is so perplexing is that some of the most important intellectual advocates of multiculturalism agree completely with their critics! They argue that the movements they defend are, indeed, destructive of the concept of an American community. Their normative ideal is a social system of insulated but equally empowered groups who, rather than experiencing some shared humanity and solidarity, would simply grant each other the right to pursue their distinctive and 'different' lifestyles and goals. I will examine this claim and criticise it on empirical, theoretical, and normative grounds. After doing so, I will propose an alternative, 'civil society' model of contemporary social systems, and I will indicate how such a model can cast the debate between multiculturalists and conservatives in a different light.

Recognition without Solidarity?

The most important theoretical articulation of the radical multiculturalist position is Iris Young's philosophical treatise, *Justice and the Politics of Difference*. Speaking as a feminist personally involved in the 'new social movements' of the 1970s and 1980s, Young sees American and, indeed, modern democracies as neither cohesive 'societies' nor real democracies. Rather, as Young explains it, modern democracies are composed simply of social 'groups'. These groups are defined by particularistic, primary identities – she mentions age, sex, race, ethnicity, gender, and religion – and they are always and inevitably organised in a hierarchical way, i.e. composed of 'social relations [which] are tightly defined by domination and oppression' (Young 1990:32-3). The groups that compose such a system are, implicitly or explicitly, engaged in endless and mortal conflict with each other, with the sole aim of enlarging the field for the expression of their identity interests.

On the basis of this empirical description of the contemporary social organisation, Young attacks the very idea of 'civic impartiality'. The notion of an impartial 'public' sphere, she asserts, 'masks the ways in which the particular perspectives of dominant groups claim
universality’, and, indeed, actually ‘helps justify hierarchical decision-making structures’. The most powerful among these structures is the modern state (107), whose discourse of universal reason – free and equal citizenship for all – provides a formally abstract but morally empty (100) legitimation for its strategy of excluding politically and humiliating emotionally the members of groups that are neither Christian, male, or white.

The universal citizen is ... white and bourgeois. Women have not been the only persons excluded from participation in the modern civic public. In Europe until recently in many nations both Jews and working-class people were excluded from citizenship. In the United States the designers of the Constitution specifically restricted the access of the laboring class to the rational public, and of course excluded slaves and Indians from participation in the civic public as well. (110)

The so-called ‘neutral’ state is not only empirically deceptive (114), Young claims, but ideologically pernicious, making it much more difficult to expose the primordial particularity that underlies domination and to provide for the oppressed an independent voice (116).

With the hope for neutral territory and common understanding ruled out, Young links justice instead to the full expression of particularity and difference. ‘The good society’, she writes, ‘does not eliminate or transcend group difference’ (163). On the contrary, ‘group differentiation is both an inevitable and a desirable aspect of modern social processes’. For this reason, justice ‘requires not the melting away of differences, but institutions that promote reproduction of and respect for group differences without oppression’ (47, italics added). Young argues that recent social movements should be seen in just this way. She reads them simply as emphasising difference and particularity – as identity movements in the contemporary social science sense – suggesting that the discourse of a radical, separatist multiculturalism is not only rational and morally legitimate but politically effective as well.

My problem with Young’s argument is not with its logical coherence but with its empirical validity and its moral status, which are inextricably interwoven. Does Young have a realistic theory of the culture and institutional life of contemporary societies? Of how social movements for justice actually work? I think not. Let us examine a claim that is the fundamental meeting point between the empirical and moral dimensions of her position. Recall that Young asserts that demands for the recognition of particularity, of difference, will result not simply in the ‘reproduction’ of difference but in greater ‘respect’
for them. She cannot, however, defend this proposition empirically or theoretically. Instead, she simply conflates political and moral assertions of the validity of difference with the empirical achievement of a newly positive social attitude of respect. Following are some examples of such conflationary reasoning.

By asserting a positive meaning for their own identity, oppressed groups seek to seize the power of naming difference itself ... Difference now comes to mean not otherness, exclusive opposition, but specificity, variation, heterogeneity. (171, italics added)

Asserting the value and specificity of the culture and attributes of oppressed groups ... results in a relativising of the dominant culture. (166, italics added)

When feminists assert the validity of feminine sensitivity ... when gays describe the prejudice of heterosexuals as homophobic and their own sexuality as positive ... when Blacks affirm a distinct Afro-American tradition, then the dominant culture is forced to discover itself for the first time as specific [and] it becomes increasingly difficult for dominant groups to parade their norms as neutral ... and to construct values and behavior of the oppressed as deviant, perverted, or inferior. (166)

These arguments seem at once morally sentimental and sociologically naive. At times, Young defends such propositions on the grounds that she is offering a dialogic, 'deliberative' approach to the achievement of justice: 'A selfish person who refused to listen to the expression of the needs of others will not himself be listened to' (106). But isn't 'selfishness' — the self-orientation produced by xenophobic, group-limited perception — exactly what Young herself has identified as the defining characteristic of contemporary social life? When socially marginalised and culturally polluted groups make claims for recognition and respect, can the simple assertion of these claims, in and of itself, change the minds of the dominant groups who have made them marginal and polluted? It seems highly unlikely that assertive argument could be so sufficient unto itself.

In this essay, I wish to suggest a very different position. It is not the mere fact of energetic positive self-identification, much less the simple demand for deliberation, but the construction of the social context within which claims for recognition are made that determines whether the negative understanding of social differences — 'stereotyping' in an earlier vocabulary — can be ameliorated or reversed. As Dilthey and Wittgenstein have taught us, statements about ourselves and others are interpreted and understood only in reference to a back-
ground of tacit assumptions. Speakers need to know what ‘language game’ they are involved in before they can properly interpret actions and statements made by the players. If we have different conceptions of the game, we will interpret the same statement differently; for all intents and purposes, we may as well be playing a different game. In contemporary societies, I will contend, the game is public life, and the rules for this game are established by the possibility of the very civic impartiality that Young denies tout court, that is, by the culture, institutions, psychology, and interactional structures of civic life.

'Ve should seek public fairness', Young asserts, 'in a context of heterogeneity and partial discourse' (112). Indeed we should! But the factual existence of heterogeneity and assertions of claims for its respect will never, in and of themselves, produce the kind of mutual recognition that Young seeks. Rather, it is existing public understandings, as articulated in the complex and interlarded relations of civil life, that valorize representations of heterogeneity in positive and negative ways. Young implicitly acknowledges this all important fact when she contrasts mere interest group pluralism, which in her view does 'not require justifying one's interests as right, or [as] compatible with social justice' (190), with what she lauds as the preferred politics of difference: 'A heterogeneous public, however, is a public, where participants discuss together the issues before them and come to a decision according to principles of justice' (190, italics in the original).

We are back to the civic impartiality from which Young tried so determinedly to escape and to the problem of the nature and scope of common values, the existence of which Young denies and the importance of which conservative critics of multiculturalism have tried so adamantly to assert. As Alasdair MacIntyre once asked, 'Whose Justice? Which Rationality?' What is it about the civic public that makes its very existence so important? Does the existence of a public or civic sphere in and of itself suppress or deny heterogeneity, as Young suggests? Must an impartial civil sphere necessarily rest upon the kind of undifferentiated, homogeneous, melted social values that conservatives recommend?

Rethinking the Public Sphere: Fragmentation and Continuity

Present day liberals and conservatives are partly right. There is a public, or civil sphere in the United States and in other democratic and
democratising nations as well. Yet, the radical champions of multiculturalism are also partly right, for the civil societies that exist in the present day, and even more so those of earlier eras, remain fragmented and fractured communities, solidary spheres that exclude all sorts of groups from their central cores even while they proclaim liberty and justice for all. What both sides in this argument seem to ignore, in other words, is that the existence of the public sphere is not a zero sum, all or nothing game. Civil society is a utopian ideal that has never been fully realised in any actually existing social system, and never will be. I wish to argue, in other words, that the failure to achieve a ‘full’ or ‘complete’ public sphere should not be seen as an admission of failure. On the contrary, it is the contradictions generated by the tension between the ideal and the real that produce the potentially liberating dynamics of contemporary life. This is precisely what is implied by the notion ‘fragmented public sphere’.

Let us define the civic public – what I will call for various reasons civil society – as a social sphere or field in which actors are constructed, or symbolically represented, as independent and self-motivating persons individually responsible for their actions, yet who feel themselves, at the same time, bound by collective solidarity to all the other individuals who compose this sphere. The existence of such a civil sphere suggests tremendous respect for individual capacities and rationality and a highly idealistic and trusting understanding of the good will of others. For how could we grant such a wide scope for freedom of action and expression to unknown others if we did not, in principle, trust in their rationality and good will? This trust in the good will of autonomous others is implied in the paradoxical proposition that the ‘free’ members of civil society are at the same time solidaristic with each other. Insofar as such solidarity exists, we ‘see ourselves’ in every other member of society. Imaginatively ‘taking the place of the other’, our actions become simultaneously self-oriented yet controlled in some manner by extra-individual solidarity. In this way, we act simultaneously as members of a community and as rational, self-willed, autonomous individuals. The emergence of this kind of civil realm supersedes but – and this ‘but’ is critically important – does not necessarily suppress more particular commitments we feel as members of primary groups. After all, if we were bound completely by kinship, neighbourhood, gender, racial, linguistic, or religious boundaries, we would be something less than ‘autonomous’ individuals and we certainly would not exhibit solidarity to the myriad of ‘others’ occupying the extended territories in which we live.
Such an idealistic vision of a civil social order has been a utopian aspiration of communities in different times and places, even while it has generated sharp tensions with other, more restrictive understandings that members of these communities have simultaneously held. As a normative ideal, this utopian vision has been promoted in one form or another by each of the great monotheistic religions, despite the cautionary restriction that members of any universalising religious community must first be committed to the same particular deity. We might think of the Athenian Republic as the first great effort to institutionalise elements of such an utopian ideal, despite the fact that access to the Greek public was, in empirical terms, incredibly restricted. We can see elements of this utopian civic public in many other places since. In the ancient parliaments of medieval kingship regimes we find striking civil elements in the political demands and conduct of the aristocratic élites; in what Elias called the 'civilising processes' that radically refined the manners and coarse brutality of medieval knights and courtiers; in the bureaucratic, formal, and homogenising legal apparatuses created by early modern Absolutist regimes; in the Renaissance city states, like Florence and Venice, which had vigorous, confrontational, publicly-orientated factions and discourse, and even elections, albeit of a highly stratified Republican kind.

None of these were 'real' civil societies in the modern sense (first institutionalised on a national scale in England, America, and France). In these nations, ambitious cultural revolutions created highly universalistic and egalitarian narratives and symbolic codes. Legal institutions formalised individual autonomy and responsibility, protecting free action and demanding reciprocity. In these nations, indeed, the civil sphere became so vigorous and expansive that accession to state power could not be legitimated without its blessing, which is one way to understand the significance of mass electoral systems and the enfranchisement of significant parts of the national populations.

With the glorious achievements of these democratic revolutions do we have the fully integrated and democratic civil societies that conservatives applaud and that radical multiculturalists attack as completely illusory? I think not. What we have is something in-between, something which might be called the first phase of the institutionalisation of civil society. For even in such historically unprecedented democratic societies as England, the United States, and France, civil society was realised only in a very relative and partial manner. It is important to learn to think about these restrictions in a dialectical
way, one which neither denies them nor denies the real (even if partial) existence of a genuine civil sphere.\textsuperscript{3}

One way of thinking about the restrictions on the institutionalisation of early civil societies is systematically, or functionally. In this framework, one may say that civil society remained only one sphere among others within a broader social system. English, French, and American societies were, and are, also composed of powerful and decidedly noncivil spheres. The family, religious groups, scientific associations, economic institutions, and geographically bounded regional communities produced different kinds of goods and organised their social relations according to different ideals and constraints. Families, for example, were bound by love and emotional loyalty, not civil respect and critical rationality; they were organised, moreover, in highly authoritarian relations, not only between parents and children but between husband and wife. The same can be said for the market relations that defined early capitalism, which emphasised efficiency rather than fairness, competition rather than solidarity, and, once again, hierarchical rather than egalitarian forms of respect. Religious organisations were similarly vertical in their organisation, despite the significant horizontal relationships engendered in Protestant sects; they were committed to the highly élitist and exclusionary principle that only those born within a faith, and among these only those specifically called to God, were to be fully respected and obeyed. Scientific communities manifested this exclusionary élitism — around truth rather than salvation — although they were even more associational and collegial internally.

These noncivil spheres did not simply sit outside the boundaries of civil society and conduct with it a courteous and respectful exchange, as the social theory of early liberalism imagined and as contemporary conservatives would so much like to believe today. On the contrary, they invaded civil society from its very inception, interpenetrating with it in systematic and fateful ways. The qualities, relationships, and goods highly valued in these other spheres became translated into restrictive and exclusionary requisites for participation in civil society itself. For example, familial patriarchy expressed itself in the widely held belief that women were not autonomous, rational, or honest enough to participate in the public sphere. The force of capitalist economic institutions encouraged the belief that failure in the market sphere revealed a parallel incompetence in democratic life, hence the long-standing exclusion of the propertyless from full electoral participation and the polluting stereotypes about the irrationality and even animality of the 'soot cov-
ered classes'. It is easy to see the conversion of religious into civil competence in much the same way: only members in good standing of certified and dominant confessions could possess the conscience, trust, and common sense required for civil society itself.

But the utopian promises of civil society were also fractured for what might be called historical reasons, not just systemic ones. Civil societies are not some abstract, free-floating space. They exist in real historical time as part of political regimes that are founded by conquest, immigration, and revolution. The founders of societies manifest distinctive primary, or 'primordial', characteristics, qualities of race, language, religion, and origins. In the historical construction of civil societies, therefore, one finds that the primordial qualities of these founders are established as the highest criteria of humanity, that they are represented as embodying a higher competence for civil society. Only people of a certain race, who speak a certain language, who practice a certain religion, and who have immigrated from a certain part on the globe – only these very special persons actually possess what it takes to be members of our ideal civil sphere. Only they can be trusted to exhibit the sacred qualities for participation.

The difficulty for liberal social theory, and for the participants in these 'actually existing civil societies', is that these contradictory dimensions of formally democratic social systems did not, and do not, express themselves in a transparent way. On the contrary, these contradictions were hidden by constitutional principles and Enlightenment culture alike. Social systems were divided into public and private spheres. In the former, civil and democratic principles prevailed. In the latter, the private spheres, people were relatively 'free' to do what they liked, to whom they liked, and in all sorts of decidedly undemocratic ways. In the famous essay Kant wrote in 1784, 'What Is Enlightenment?', he made this distinction the very basis of his defence of autonomous reason itself. In the public sphere, Kant insisted, all men are enabled, indeed mandated, to challenge authority in the name of autonomy and to act according to the principles of universalism. Yet when these same men are in their private spheres – in the church, the business organisation, the family, the army, or the state – they may not be allowed to exercise these civil rights and they do not have to allow others to exercise them in turn. On the contrary, they must obey noncivil authorities in a highly subservient way and have the right to demand obedience to their own commands.

While this private-public distinction served after a fashion to protect the civil sphere from complete affixation, it also testified to its
profound limitations. For the public world was not nearly so shielded from the vagaries of the private worlds as Enlightenment and constitutional thinking proclaimed. On the contrary, the functional and historical particularities expressed in private life, as I have suggested, invaded and distorted the understanding of civil life – culturally, institutionally, psychologically, and in interactional practices of everyday life. Jews may have been allowed to practise their religion in the privacy of their homes – although sometimes they were not – but ‘Jewishness’ carried such a stigma that Jews were also excluded from most of the central institutions of public life. The same contradiction of the purported universality of the public sphere applied to other supposedly private categories, like race, gender and sexuality, ethnicity, class position, religion, and physical location.

Implications for Contemporary Debates

What are the implications of this model of the fragmented public sphere for our earlier discussion? It suggests, contrary to radical multiculturalists like Young, that an impartial civil sphere does exist in some Western societies, indeed, that it has enjoyed a real existence for hundreds of years. It also means, contrary to conservatives’ polemics, that the civil sphere’s promises of autonomy, solidarity, equality, and justice have never been fully realised. Civil society is not and has not been integrated, cohesive, and substantially solidary – not at all! Conservatives are deeply mistaken in their suggestion that today’s demands for multiculturalism threaten to sidetrack a great success story by introducing disintegrating, nasty particularities, that they are fragmenting a society that, until recently, had exhibited high levels of solidarity and integration. The theory of the fragmented public sphere would seem to suggest, on the contrary, that multicultural demands for recognition of particularity – even when such demands have fundamentally misunderstood what the basis of such recognition might be – are merely bringing to public attention debilitating departures from universalism that have been corrosive of civil society from the very beginning of its modern form.5

If this proposition is true, much of our thinking about contemporary race and ethnic conflict, in the United States and elsewhere, must be recast. Multiculturalism may actually be a new form of social integration, one that, rather than denying universalism, has the potential to realise it in an historically unprecedented way. Left and Right view
the recent emergence of multicultural discourse, institutions, and practises as marking the end of civil society. It may actually be the case, however, that it marks the beginning of a radically different, more ‘advanced’ model of civil integration, one whose tenets, still barely visible, will provide the framework for conflicts about the possibilities of justice for decades, even centuries to come.

NOTES

1. This essay is indebted to a series of discussions with Maria Pia Lara. An early version was presented at the University of South Florida, Tampa.

2. ‘Civil society’ is today a highly contested term in the social sciences and philosophy. My own approach, like Arato and Cohen’s (1993), follows the Hegelian rather than the Marxist usage, especially as the former has been modified and elaborated by Durkheim, Parsons, and especially, most recently, by Habermas and other theorists in the critical neo-Kantian tradition. (For an excellent review of Habermas’ foundational contributions to this recent discussion, and to the critical problems it entails, see Calhoun 1992.) In my own approach, further, I wish to emphasise less the Tocquevillean role of voluntary associations – so prominent, for example, in Robert Putnam’s work – than the role played by the sociological structures and processes that create broad societal solidarity – symbolic codes, institutions of communication and regulation, forms of public interaction, and social movements. See Alexander and Smith (1993) and Alexander (1996).

3. In the following, I am trying to reconceptualise the important insights into the restrictions on formal equality in early democratic societies which have been generated in feminist, Marxist, and race-oriented discussions. See, for example, Landes (1988).

4. To avoid any misunderstanding, let me affirm that primordial qualities do not exist in and of themselves. Qualities are constructed as primordial rather than being objectively so. Primordial qualities are those which form the basis for the ethical in Hegel’s sense, for communalisation in the Weberian. Any human or social quality can be treated in a primordial manner, although certain characteristics have repeatedly received such treatment in the course of history.

5. Edward Said’s critique of radical multiculturalism is relevant in this regard:

Victimhood … does not guarantee or necessarily enable an enhanced sense of humanity. To testify to a history of oppression is necessary, but it is not sufficient unless that history is redirected into intellectual process and universalized to include all sufferers … Great anti-authoritarian uprisings made their earliest advances, not by denying the humanitarian and universalist claims of the general dominant culture, but by attacking the adherents of that culture for failing to uphold their own declared standards, for failing to extend them to all, as opposed to a small fraction, of humanity. (Said 1992:187-88)
REFERENCES


