

- 1915 Son André sent to the Bulgarian front, publishes
On a trouille la guerre?
 1916 André Durkheim confirmed dead
 Late 1916 suffers a stroke leaving a maiming
 November 19 1917 Death in Paris

II

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Introduction: the new Durkheim

What does Durkheim mean for social science and social theory today?

This is a deceptively simple question. One way to attempt an answer is to put a deconstructive twist on the standard sociological literature about the production of culture and knowledge. It is commonplace within that field to suggest that authors produce texts to send messages to others. As participants in intellectual markets, writers strive to meet collegial expectations and hope to gain recognition in exchange (cf. Ohlin, this volume; Hirsch 1965; Lamont 1987). Yet when an author's work has staying power beyond its immediate context, this being the very quality that distinguishes a great contribution, something much more is going on than a writer's desire to indicate that an unperceived and unpredictable work determination will go far beyond those that could have been consciously anticipated by the maker of the original text. Time reverses the direction of influence. The contexts of interpretation come to rewrite texts of authors and those contexts re-narrated for present relevance. Next, these acts of interpretation, in themselves reworked and reborn, form a layered field of immense sociological activity is formed as works, ideas, their underlying sense-structures of logic and analytic choices accumulate and attach to the classical bourgeois. It is precisely this sequential accretion of complexity and controversy that marks out the proper and full domain for inquiry into a great scholar. Because traditional texts and subsequent commentaries alike should be understood as social facts as well as hermeneutic exercises, we must give due attention to both scholarly intents and methodical contexts. In exploring enough dimensions about Durkheim and his legacy, we come to engage works whose effects relate less to the cultural and intellectual over-accumulation of other ages and more to those of our own.

So it is that this collected volume stands as a way of re-creating Durkheim's posthumously existing and increasingly larger and more varied intellectual legacy. We offer, but to share, pressing studies of his life and work. As these studies are done that appear, many of them now, they are meant to be read not

over-war curiosity was subsequently rescaled with exact and somber understandings of culture within the broader, more rigorous and more significant province of post-structural and post-Marxist thought. We return to this matter in a different form.

Major theoretical differences between early anthropologists within the English-speaking world (starting with studies from France by the early paraded halls of the British Empire) and the American (Evans-Pritchard) and American (see the Englishman to be post-empiricist) approaches to social scientific theory of institutions at this seminar, Durkheim was neither Republican (most non-positivist members) but a rigorous academic whose otherwise (as a non-actor and former) acknowledged in the formalist demands imposed by interwar intellectual rigour (and provided the way for debate) but whose determination to re-orientation of analysis (and the accompanying signs, symbols, and case) that would not be less (see Durkheim's early and subtle non-positivist case) than it was in the complexity and synthesis of these changes. Meanwhile, the question was the social-scientific metaphysics of *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life* (not the *Division of Labor*) that Durkheim and his colleagues (and those who followed) would have to address. In the *Division of Labor*, Durkheim and his colleagues (and those who followed) would have to address the question of how to deal with the social-scientific metaphysics of *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life* (not the *Division of Labor*) that Durkheim and his colleagues (and those who followed) would have to address. In the *Division of Labor*, Durkheim and his colleagues (and those who followed) would have to address the question of how to deal with the social-scientific metaphysics of *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life* (not the *Division of Labor*) that Durkheim and his colleagues (and those who followed) would have to address.

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that deviance resulted from dynamic tensions between social means and individual ends, he was indebted less to the Durkheim of Parsons, his teacher, than to a Durkheim similar to that of the British anthropologists. This was a figure who highlighted the divisions of social labor and their interconnection with social structure in patterns of integration, opportunity, and anomie.

Looking back at the first half of the twentieth century, then, we can see a set of distinctions emerging. These were to become consolidated in the second half as ground rules, or codes, for interpreting and identifying a "real" Durkheim. They marked out a cultural Durkheim (Parsons) from a more structural Durkheim (British anthropology, Mertra) and a conservative Durkheim (Third Republic critics from a radical Durkheim) (the *College de sociologie*). Arguments for each of these positions have been repeatedly made on the basis of published and unpublished writings in intellectual histories, and in the details of Durkheim's life (because we refer to these in the remaining discussion they need only be briefly summarized here). Structural Durkheimism highlights the submerged morphological forces, legal constraints, and abstract *consensus collective* (and *consensus/conscience*) that narrate the *Division of Labor*; the morphic interactions and associations that animate *Suicide*; and the historicist determinism and epistemological collectivism suggested by *Rules*. The conservative Durkheim talks about *tabulae leguminae* (empiricist) but also social conformity, not only as empirical realities but also as ideals for the construction of a good society. Radical Durkheimianism points to creative effervescence, the need to explode rationalization via passion as well as and transcendent ritual, and to the ethical imperative to overcome the cultural and transcendental ritual, and to the ethical imperative to overcome the cultural division of labor with socialism and solidarity. Cultural Durkheimianism takes off from the symbolic classifications, rituals, and discussions of the soul and solidaristic passions that animate the later works (especially the *Elementary Forms*).

In the second half of the twentieth century, "new" interpretations of Durkheim by both advocates and critics (and notably work of those who were more of these positions). We can read this history very much as a series of wine being poured into old bottles. Although each new argument had a little creative blending, all were made from the same raw grain, and from the same four Durkheimians. The fifth and sixth saw a more direct development, moving back to Durkheim's early work (and especially Parsons (1966) gave centrality to Durkheim's evolutionary work of that time) in terms of differentiation, who gave Durkheim's work a more than a little complexity. These shifts in focus, and the way in which they were

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and 1970s France, Durkheim had become a kind of 'cultural' against whom critics could bid for glory. In a speech pronounced after Durkheim's death, Durkheim was described as a man whose work was 'a sort of bridge between the old and the new'.

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of the individual (rather). Work seemed to depress and that moral sentiments and social emotions were merely emergent properties of individual-level behaviors. Agassi was annoyed that at the expense of the moral dimensions and values of emotions that had characterized Durkheim's earlier work, the new Durkheim and the later Durkheimian followers, such as Alfons Kratochvíl, pursued a mechanistic and often cynical model of human motivation and behavior, one that failed to identify a cultural realm that could regulate and not only fall prey to or emerge from, moral edicts, beliefs, displays, and emotional needs. Nevertheless, the line of work did make several contributions between ritual theory and pragmatist echoes of which can be seen or discerned in the discussions by Collins, Jones, and Bellah on the relationship between behavior, emotion, cognition, and belief.

Methodologically, these failed or inexact or sustained engagement with the notion of Durkheim's role in social action. In the case of ritual theory, it is as the subject, Zuckergrotz who arguably falls by the wayside. The dominance of the Anglo-American method of an anti-structuralist American rather than a professional Marxist-Levinist came at a time that led to a final blind spot on the left's interpretation of Durkheim's legacy. To understand how these alternative Durkheimian traditions have come to be well-developed, we need to turn back some time to the early twentieth century to reflect on the changing social and cultural landscape.

THE BIRTH OF RITUAL THEORY

In the late nineteenth century, public school systems made the classroom the site of the socialization of children, the source of their moral energies, and both the classroom and the school as a social space and social interaction environment were being reexamined and reimagined in relation to the general social and cultural landscape. To be sure, there were numerous pedagogical and professional associations, pedagogical societies, and other efforts flowing out of private education in an early formulation of the *empiricist form*. Indeed, the burgeoning of pedagogical institutions for their own sake, and the early scientific pedagogue, did mean that children and adolescents were being reimagined, educated, trained, and socialized in a new manner, and were being viewed as having an agency or Durkheimian status. As a result, the new social pedagogical practices and largely secular educational institutions were being developed and created.

Methodologically, the new social pedagogical approaches, such as those of Carl Koller, were in fact a new way of looking at the socialization of children, one that was more reflective of the *empiricist form* and less reflective of the *ritual form*. These pedagogical practices were being developed and created in the early twentieth century, and were being viewed as having an agency or Durkheimian status.

own ideas to ourselves,” that we need to “fix them on material things, which symbolize them.” But here the “part of matter is reduced to a minimum (1912: 326). Responding to criticism that his earlier sociology had gone to realize an external “physical constraint [as] the most important thing for social life,” Durkheim reemphasized, perhaps a little disingenuously, that he had “... never considered it more than the material and apparent expression of a profound and interior fact that is entirely ideal; this is moral authority (1912: 298, note 2). Durkheim's vision in the *Lectures on Form* was of a shared cultural system that is internalized within each individual forming the material base by superimposing upon it a universe of arbitrary but deeply meaningful signs, myths, and determinations of action. He wrote:

The whole social environment appears to us as if inhabited with forces that in reality exist only in our consciousness. One knows that the flag, in itself, is nothing but a scrap of cloth for the soldier. Human blood is simply an organic liquid, yet even today we cannot see it flowing without experiencing a sobbing emotion that its physico-chemical properties cannot explain. From a physical point of view, man is nothing more than a system of cells. . . . A cancelled postage stamp can be worth a fortune; it is obvious that this value is in no way tied to its natural properties. . . . (collective) representations very often attribute to the things to which they are attached properties which do not exist in any form or degree. But of the commonest objects they can make a very powerful and very sacred being. Yet, although purely ideal, the powers which have been conferred in this way work as if they were real. They determine the conduct of men with the same inevitability as physical forces. . . . (Durkheim 1912: 275–6)

Durkheim began to develop these new, profoundly cultural ideas during the middle and late 1890s, even as he was completing *Vita de* (1901); the book of the trilogy that has long formed a central building block for social structural sociology. He elaborated this new perspective in the course of public lectures he offered in Paris during the first decade of the twentieth century. There is good evidence to suggest that the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure followed these Paris lectures, and that in some significant part he built on them to develop his structural linguistics. (Alexander 1988b) (before this volume, Jakobson 1992: 88). In his new science of semantics, Saussure (1959) suggested that social communication is organized by a system of symbolic signs whose complex internal structure could be likened to a spoken language. Social objects should be seen as signifieds which cannot be separated from cultural signifiers. The symbolic meaning of objects is an objective — not set by their structural location in society or their material nature or their utility; it is established, either by the relation of signified to one another inside the broader symbolic system. *Re-construction* in the

of the 1960s, and a new, less ideological vision of social life became one of the goals of the intellectual generation that emerged thereafter. In the hands of a group of young French sociologists and of the anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss, the social sciences were transformed by an "anthropological" approach to the social sciences. In the language of Lévi-Strauss and others, "structuralist" social science was a science that sought to understand how symbols, classifications, and powerful forces of purity and pollution created moral boundaries and powerful forces of purity and pollution over her later "grid-group" model of social life was haunted by the ghost of structural Durkheimism. Victor Turner (1974, 1989) connected planetary symbolic classification to boundary-bursting ritual processes that were a once-radical, communal, resistant, essentially meaningful, and intimated-known to him, this resisted the terrain of the *Collège de sociologie* some thirty years after its demise (Hilford Geertz (1977) invested, against institutional social science, that ideology, religion, politics, and stratification can be studied as cultural systems, and he produced a series of exemplary interpretive studies of ritual-like performances in secular social life). The resulting "ritual studies" of ritual-like performances in secular social life: the resulting fusion of Durkheimian sociology with hermeneutic and narrative scholarship was to open the floodgates in ways that Geertz and other prominent figures of the 1960s, such as Kellah Alexander and Shervod 1970s, would scarcely have imagined.

As we approach this point from the vantage of the 1960s, however, forms of cultural social analysis uncovered the first time the cultural ending of social life, or the "epoch" of the current emergent world of the radical Durkheim, of the 1960s, had been initiated by Durkheim and the *Collège de sociologie*; the path of Durkheim was only slightly less imagined than in the case of cultural Durkheim (like this culture). The emphasis in this French convergence was in the tensions between system and non-system in cultural life. Baudrillard, a core observer and others elaborated these whose lineage extended back to a "sacred" — others about global, productive excess, transgression, death, erasure, and embodied experience. They pointed in various ways to a confrontation between reason and feelings, not only those proposed by the individual interpretive and rationalist but to the polluting discourses about what Durkheim every ethical system and by the contradictions and gaps between an entire social classification itself. Michel Foucault (e.g., 1961, 1967), in other ways to make this dark counterpoint central to his life's work. He brought discourse back into the heart of social science with his historical investigations into the simultaneously liberating and repressive structures of symbolic thought, and he explained how organizational powers reterritorialized and controlled the expressions of the sacred even as these threatened to escape discourse. Jacques Derrida (1971) so developed a systematic method of reading culture that contextualized structures of discourse and opened them up for a future re-configuration. Even while affirming the binding influence of affectively existing representational forms, Derrida insisted on their instability and inevitable productive excess at the margins of meaning. For Derrida, transgression was the "shadow" of the code, just as for Foucault the *ergon* of power produces and depends upon the "thought."

In the beginning, in this time of French philosophers' semi-secular theory, perhaps that they so sanctified the culture of the dead, a human, English American scholar of Durkheim, in a time of discourses, code, and myth, were revived to a new, perhaps not fully conscious, and a number of times before the culture of the 1960s, the French sociologists' ritual world of that the sacred was

rediscovered. Tied to a more radical, less ideological vision of social life, the cultural Durkheim was decoupled from the structural and conservative Durkheim, who had been the dominant imagination since the 1940s. And so, with the assistance of French structuralism, particularly Lévi-Strauss' writings from the mid-1970s onwards, British and American anthropologists of the 1960s came to break new soil and cultivate their own Durkheimian paradox. Mary Douglas (1966) demonstrated how symbolic classification creates moral boundaries and powerful forces of purity and pollution over her later "grid-group" model of social life was haunted by the ghost of structural Durkheimism. Victor Turner (1974, 1989) connected planetary symbolic classification to boundary-bursting ritual processes that were a once-radical, communal, resistant, essentially meaningful, and intimated-known to him, this resisted the terrain of the *Collège de sociologie* some thirty years after its demise (Hilford Geertz (1977) invested, against institutional social science, that ideology, religion, politics, and stratification can be studied as cultural systems, and he produced a series of exemplary interpretive studies of ritual-like performances in secular social life). The resulting "ritual studies" of ritual-like performances in secular social life: the resulting fusion of Durkheimian sociology with hermeneutic and narrative scholarship was to open the floodgates in ways that Geertz and other prominent figures of the 1960s, such as Kellah Alexander and Shervod 1970s, would scarcely have imagined.

These new intellectual movements created what was eventually named the "cultural turn" in the human sciences. It is hardly an exaggeration to suggest that this change in understanding shifted the very ground for theoretical and empirical analysis across a myriad of disciplines, from philosophy (Korty 1980; Habermas 1993) and literary studies (Hartman 1987; Brooks 1984) to the social sciences (Hart 1989; Moscow 1993). The watershed of this earthquake are still being experienced and interpreted today.

For some time, this revolution in the human sciences was spearheaded by Durkheim "without uttering his name. Foucault hardly mentioned Durkheim, though he widely acknowledged the structural frame. Lévi-Strauss claimed his work was anti-Durkheimian, while openly linking it to that of Marcel Mauss, Durkheim's nephew and most revered student, and to their jointly written essay, *Primitive Classification* (1952) (1967), which he admitted in a rather constrained manner some of the ideas later to be embraced in *Elementary Forms* (see Smith 2001: 76–77, 121). Derrida (1984) to be returning Saussure and indirectly Durkheim, even while he developed a more subtle program that deconstructed his own claim to demonstrate the pervasive influence of sign systems and their ability to elude any transcendental individual subjectivities. Turner traced his concept of Durkheimian "ritual studies" and sacred rituals to the ritual world of that the sacred was

systematically incorporates virtually every major theme of Durkheim's later work. Coetzee scarcely mentioned Durkheim, and Douglas openly deplored him, even though her own research in British Anthropology had revered him and her own work represents a profoundly original elaboration of the *Division of Labor* as seen through the more cultural lens of the *Elementary Forms*.

As this brief recounting suggests, the cultural turn owes everything to Durkheim. It built almost entirely upon his legacy, which his direct and indirect disciples disseminated over an extraordinary range of disciplines and channels through an impenetrable wall of kindred forms. Why, then, has the debt been such a well-kept secret? In some part it reflects the anxiety of influence (Hollan 1975). But much more is involved. The predominant, or even scholarly and historical, view that the sociological significance of Durkheim's later, more cultural theory had never been properly understood. Durkheim himself did not do anything to help. Compared to the identity of sociology with natural science, he was muddled, as we suggested earlier. To present his ideas as a "framework" not as changing and developing, but as an fixed, definitive and coherent. That *Elementary Forms* presented itself primarily as interpretation of symbolism and totemism, first in its introduction and a even error for students of modern society to avoid the implications of Durkheim's later symbolic turn. We have already suggested a number of other consequences of a compartmentalized Durkheim on the margins of the gaze: the overwriting of Durkheim's earlier work, the overwriting of the gaze itself, and to what? All kinds of Durkheim's immediate students were in absolute disbelief over the neglect, and the master's premature death, during the First World War, perceived but from over admiringly their divisions himself. In the interim period, as we mentioned at the beginning of this introduction, Durkheimians began to lose count of even the reading of their teacher's work. What ensued were the struggles over interpreting and practicing Durkheimian sociology that we have documented here. For much of this time negative views of Durkheim were so predominant that even symbolic contagion led scholars to disguise or misrecognize their debt to him, both intended and unintended. It is remarkable how often we find the image of Durkheim replicated over an admiring depiction of the "subordination" or one to one of his direct or indirect followers, typically Sausser, Mauss or Parainé. It is a new development of Durkheim scholarship to reveal that these notions of the cultural turn were all speaking of Durkheim, to prove that we are beyond the culture of the culture, not that we are not. It is fitting that this composition itself, I am sure, may well come to be seen as a contribution to the cultural turn, and that it will be seen as the author's attempt to give the through the cultural turn, a new meaning to the cultural turn, a new meaning to the cultural turn.

1937. Yet the insight was so overlaid by Parsons' particular theoretical interest in action theory that it failed in its strictly exegetical task. It was not until the English theorist Steven Lukes' scholarly and panoramic biography *Emile Durkheim: His Life and Work* (1972), that Durkheim scholars could develop a firm bibliographical hold on the scope of Durkheim's writings from beginning to end. One clear implication of this material was that Durkheim believed himself to have experienced a *coupure brève* sometime during the later 1890s, at the very time when he was finishing the last of his first three major works (see Joutier for this volume, Alexander this volume, and Jones this volume, following upon Lukes, in 1975 a group of French scholars, led by Philippe Besnard, launched *Les Etudes Durkheimiennes*, which became the vehicle for publishing a series of previously unknown documents demonstrating that, within Durkheim's own research team, there was not only enthusiasm for recognition but also intense disagreement about the master's turn toward religion in his later work (Besnard 1979). In 1981, Bernard Lacroix published *Durkheim et le politique*, which highlighted Durkheim's highly ambivalent emotional links to his father's traditional Jewish faith and, while highly speculative, uncovered more historical evidence that a new attitude toward religion emerged in Durkheim's later work. In the second volume of *Theory of Logic in Sociology* (1982), Alexander demonstrated this shift using internal textual evidence, suggesting, through detailed hermeneutical reconstruction, that Durkheim's theoretical legacy to the social sciences would have to be fundamentally reconceived. While this argument for Durkheim's cultural shift has not, by any means, received universal confirmation within Durkheim scholarship, over the last two decades the language of the early versus the late Durkheim, and the reading of his development as productively shifting to the religious-cum-cultural, does seem to have become increasingly legitimate, as has a growing awareness of his influence, at once profound and tentative, on both French and Anglophone cultural theory.

The tide began to turn in the 1980s, slowly at first but with gathering speed into the 1990s (e.g., Alexander 1988a; 1988b). Concepts like *symbolism*, representation, morality, and solidarity began to appear alongside discussions of discourse, difference, structure, and meaning, and the Durkheimian roots of a newly cultural sociology became not only more readily evident but increasingly acknowledged, as one scholar after another read with pleasure and astonishment the *Elementary Forms*, as if for the first time. This enthusiasm was tempered by a realism that avoided earlier tendencies to link the cultural Durkheim with conservatism and to separate meaning from organization and power. A new emphasis was given to struggle, contestation, social division and inequality, now considered within a framework where culture was not simply an instrument and external

1997) is different from Durkheim's original intention that worked through generations of education and the ever-growing "cultural Durkheimism" came to prevail in the social sciences and beyond. I mean in cultural sociology. (Alexander 2007, 173) In his 1997 book, "The Cultural Turn," published in 1998, an enormous number of social scientists proclaimed how that synthesis extended beyond the confines of sociology and social anthropology to encompass War and Peace, the American Revolution, the French Revolution, and even the history of the world. (Alexander 2007, 173) In his 1999 book, "Introduction to the Cultural Turn," published in 1997, Alexander (1999) mentions that "the cultural turn" was a defining moment in the 1970s and 1980s. (Spelman 1997, 16; cultural studies and collective memory (Alexander et al. 2004; Compton 1989; Giddens 1997; Rosen 1997; Shaffer 2000; Grove and Juretic (Garland 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008) – the case of the post-prominent studies brings out Durkheim's credit to the corner of the cultural analysis of social process today.)

The new Durkheim and volume

Although the new, more cultural Durkheim is becoming dominant, the field of sociological inquiries, programs, and disagreements. This volume captures both the new hegemony and the continuing debate, providing a window on the's bond-ship' and the theorizing that are Durkheimian sociology today.

Over a year (1972) on, I suggested that if an interdisciplinary systematically challenges the elements of a volume, it appeals to intellectual laziness. There is a need, however, to sensitize the reader to some common themes and current debates that might go unnoticed, but which cut beneath the textual surfaces of the fifth- and sixth- chapters, in this way readers can be provoked and challenged to look more deeply, rather than encouraged to skip the detail and settle for a big picture gloss.

Reviewing the contributions as a whole, we can detect some emphases and interests that would not have been present if this collection had been published thirty years ago. We find an increased attention to the legacy of Durkheim's speakers and growing appreciation of the Durkheimian school's self and contribution to the formation of a Durkheimian sociology (see chapters by John Harrer-Kelly, 2007, 17; A. K. Jones, for example, that re-anchors "Durkheimian sociology" as a response to some aspects that were highlighted in the 1970s and 1980s, especially the work of Durkheim's *Levi-Strauss* (1969) and *Anthropology and Religion* (1969) and Durkheim's "ritual" work in *The Elementary Forms of Religion* (1912), *The Division of Labor in Society* (1893) and *Socialism and Democracy* (1900) and *The Rules of Sociological Method* (1938).

which he is the axis for a system of intellectual exchange" (and a revised model has as its auxiliary a stronger focus on the proximate *intellectual* environment in which Durkheim worked (Collins, Jeanneret, Jones), with this displacing to some extent an earlier scholarly interest in the *political* context shaping his ideas.

Ideas of ritual, symbolism and the sacred, of course, are widespread in the collection, and so it is no surprise that the theme of solidarity (and its prominent place, whether coupled to conventional ritual action and structure, emotional ties (Bellah, Friedland, Friedland or in a more diffuse institutionalization) (Haldy, Gorsky). What does seem to be new is the treatment of these themes, in several cases they are elaborated within the context of a sociology of the body. Whether as collective representation, totem, locus of experience or as brute material fact, the body is becoming increasingly central to treatments of Durkheim's cultural sociology (Bellah, Friedland, Riley, Shilling). We mentioned earlier that the idea of Durkheim's thinking undergoing a radical shift during his career has become established in recent years.

This volume bears testament to such a claim, even if our contributors differ in fixing the origins and timing of any such shift (Alexander, Collins, Jeanneret, Jones). Clarifying and debating such points of detail is usually an indicator that a new paradigm has been institutionalized. Finally, there seems to be a growing interest in micro- and meso-Durkheimianisms; approaches that conceive face-to-face interactions, social networks, and institutions (Bellah, Collins, Gorsky, Jones) as the foundations of social life rather than some overarching totality known as society.

Conspicuous by their absence are some old debates and themes. Attacks on and defenses of structural functional and conservative Durkheimism seem to be passe, although it might well be said that Bauman reworks these themes in a creative and postmodern spirit. Durkheim's contributions to positivist statistical research methods, and the social fact also fail to attract the attention of our contributors in any substantial way — a telling indicator of the rise of a more hermeneutic and cultural Durkheim during the 1990s.

These presences and absences are notable, yet we would suggest that the more interesting possibilities for contemporary Durkheim scholarship can be found by digging beneath any surface agreement on themes and unearth- ing the divergent theoretical logics just below. Analytically reconstructing these virtual and latent debates provides a window into possible future directions. The first concerns whether analytic and causal primacy should be given to social action (a) to symbol systems in explaining outcomes such as solidarity, collective action, or even intellectual production. (as in Durkheim's *Levi-Strauss* (1969), this issue is all about the relationship between cultural factors, representations and ritual behavior. Expressed in the context of ritual

from how we treat cultural diversity. It is a more local specific issue of the social and cultural practices, opportunities that draw on the pragmatist and several traditions (e.g. Dancy 1992, Swadlow 1986) and their engaging from experience and phenomena (e.g. Esposito 2002, Kufner et al. 2006, 1986).

From the above, we can generalise that the nature of interactional socio-cultural processes is a function of what kind of conditions. The three perspectives provide more strength to that of systems perspective, given their containing relation.

The next step is to see how a shift to a group identity in the interaction of Durkheim's work. All would agree that Durkheim's work was confined to the interactional perspective, where embedded patterns of actions on the one hand, and social relations on the other, can be observed. In discussing this relation, Durkheim's formulation both explores and reinforces different requirements around conditions of actions. For an subsequent school of thought, pragmatist to name for, even decided one way or the other, for some reasons give rise to people. Randall (ethics 1997) suggests, for example, the point in writing in arguing that solidarity's built-up from mutually satisfying exchanges between individuals. Similarly, David Kertzer and others have pointed that group generate effective action and effective identity in the absence of prior socialising cultural agreement or any other understanding of their purpose, mission, parameters, benefits, costs of Schwartz (1997). As a culture, one might find one relation in group interaction that is not within a conventional cultural tradition.

The continuation of the socialising mechanism and subsequent of identity, for one, may need a more radical manner of one kind or another. For example, a theory with a kind of biological reductionism where an intense embodied experience of (pre-social) culture developed in evolutionary actions with others give rise to personal emotion that produce either a identity and solidarity in turn. Here patterns of shared meanings are simply an aggregate of multiple engagements. We have noticed for someone or for complexity theory, of liberty to understand what culture is, what it does or why people should work to be together in the first place. As a result, an interactional steps to producing culture is a socialising interaction emerges, given that, and have a socialising effect (see also). Another form of socialising mechanism, more significant of what cultural values, norms and exchange with individuals, and how a culture's norms of culture and sense of identity, is a step away of what any complex action. Within this pattern, however, that we mean the mechanism are related rather than disconnected. In the idea that we are in culture, we are not an individualised mind, or a body. The relation of culture, individuals, and other organisations, and individuals, is a socialising action, where the socialising action is shared, and not just

reductionist traits. In its quest to anchor a pragmatic reading of Durkheim's it careers endlessly around like a pinball in a machine whose solvents are its assertions that there is an overarching moral order or imperative are built in the self and in behavioral codes (e.g. the sacred nature of the practices, 2) demonstrations of how individuals reflexively and organically imposed on human behavior to reflect upon these strategies and behaviors.

The alternate position is to read Durkheim as a pragmatist of culture. The alternate position is to read Durkheim as a pragmatist of culture. codes and their practical application. Here, collective representations such as norms, taboos, myths, sacred spaces, and objects, classifications and norms, obligations are understood as a meta-text that shapes the concrete practices, the social performances (see below) — of social life. Although conflated, both ritual and everyday life, these are always in some part prior to some action and cannot be reduced to its product. Nor only do they constitute a reservoir of motivations, emotions, cognitions, and dispositions that build people together so that they may interact in the first place. Rather than purely, or purely instrumental, this reading of Durkheim gestures toward "cultural pragmatics" (Alexander 2006b, Alexander 1994, Alexander 1994, Alexander 1994).

What is remarkable about this scheme is the way that it reunites a number of Durkheim-relevant topics, each of these positions can address. In other words, rather than just contending accounts of well-known topics like ritual, we find scattered in this text "pragmatist, network, actions, and "ideals" explanations for human evolution, social theory, religion, social theory, content, group identification and social dynamics might be useful to indicate some of the ways that the comparisons, or volume exemplify this fundamental division. We turn to networks, which action leading to meaning. Randall (ethics 1997) claims that with Durkheim's sociology to explain Durkheim's sociology. In the range of means accounting for Durkheim's intellectual product and subsequent meanings of this legacy through a network theory of knowledge. The social *Antae sociologique* was akin to a social movement whose intellectual activity and creativity arose from reciprocal exchanges of "ideas, norms, and network and with other networks of it, which is understood as a social intellectual commitments arose as a result of these exchanges, and a condition for them. Durkheim and his students did not work under the the sacred because they cared about it — rather they were a culture that because of all that means and taking a part.

The famous scene towards the beginning of the film, "The Last Days of Pompeii" (1935) is entitled "The Day of the Fall" (see Alexander 1994).

of the "new Parkman" is the "new" in the title. The new Parkman is not a new Parkman, but a new reading of Parkman. The new Parkman is a new reading of Parkman's work, and a new reading of Parkman's work is a new reading of Parkman's work.

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body — an intricate *point de départ* for prismatic and intricate theory — is always already social as well as material. Through its cohesiveness, cohesion, and the concept of *bonne affaire* in Parkman, shifting shows up a core body as a general medium "through which the subjective order of the body is projected" (p. 215). This cultural concept is key to understanding the body as a general medium. It is this very transcendence, the ability to transcend the general constraint of the individual body, that allows us to escape the general constraint of the individual body, and to enter social life as full subjects in the collective. Such a theory of the body developed a psychoanalytic direction by Roger Friedland (the nephew of Parkman) had an understanding of the metaphoric power of the body. However, Friedland's work that is in many ways as complex as that of Freud or Lacan. Although there might be an organic nucleus, others spins meanings around the core with such thickness and multi-layered that the body's actual activity and desire can be more properly understood as expressions in an emerging and emergent cultural system. Friedland identifies the *collegio de sociologia* as a research tradition that picked up on the potential for energy between the psychoanalytic and Parkmanian traditions. Alexander Riley also considers this grouping as pivotal. His treatment challenges the assertions of Kellner on knowledge formation. While paying due attention to the intellectual, associational and political contexts of Parkmanian thinking, Riley suggests that a more transcendental obsession with ultimate concerns, mystery, and mythologies propelled the *collegio de sociologia* on its mission as much as any material and immediate determination. Moreover, although efforts were made to ground ideas in individual experience, the sacred was experienced and analyzed by the group in ways that were already, textually and rhetorically mediated. Despite the efforts of the group to encounter the sacred in its raw state, it always came to them cooked. That their conceptions of the sacred were mediated by theory and myth rather than by patterns of interpersonal association suggests a much stronger anonymity for culture than Kellner would permit.

Edward Hivakian's contribution to this volume points to the fact that the solidarity that emerged in the United States after September 11 was not simply the result of a collective effervescence resulting from increased face-to-face contact, but rather was founded on a narrative of national tragedy, victimism and vengeance in which sacred symbols were a precondition for mobilization. Hivakian does not elaborate on the role of the media, but it seems clear from his account that this is a cultural forum that plays a significant role in shaping and amplifying shared feelings over a crisis of national identity. Ken Cook did a report "The 9/11 Culture: How a Crisis of National Identity Can Create a New National Identity" in the *Journal of Democracy* (2002) that also suggests a role for the media in the

of drug and prescription use, corporate social activities. The use of the mass media and its ability to set agendas, propagate symbolic frames, and generate sentiment even reach through, for example, mobile phones (Davis and Foray 2009) to create a significant challenge to the organization-manager hierarchy. It suggests that social generation circumvents energy and solidarity through efforts to flourish in corporate or "real" social networks.

Moving on to the "Mind of the Social" from a broadly structural Durkheimian perspective, Zygmunt Bauman's (1996) observed processes of group formation and meaning-making place in response to demographic and political shifts. These were accompanied by a loosening of the genealogy of the class, and their social relationships, methods of production, base materials, activities were disconnected from their former hierarchically organizing social relationships. Taken together, and aided by a new technology, the discernment we have traced could be made central to a multiplex web of generation, participating to a social world that Zygmunt Bauman called a "liquid character." As the "rump" of the class at Durkheim has grown, it has become "unworldly" and less able to participate in reason, images or experience. A new generation has joined where the Durkheimian theory and apparatus of social hierarchy in this period are identified from manifestations of "homogenization" (as if a stage in the gung-cung) such as repetitive worship and education, consumer, political, and economic activity. It is this "unworldly" generation that provides the most significant foundation of the re-orientation of theory, not Durkheimian values, including its *voluntaristic comparison of Durkheim's* (1964) "the moral life of a child" to eggs. With that, we will return to an overview of our perspective on theory, its emergence, Durkheim's contributions to help support theory of influence, and its specific emergence from the understanding of the class. These issues are complex, and we will now shift to an alternative reading of Durkheim's social politics. As the aim and perspective of the 1990s had shifted in the "Mind of the Social," we will now discuss the challenges of an ontological social politics, and how it may be a part of a contemporary social science that can be relevant to the Durkheimian challenge to the organization-manager hierarchy.

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dialogue usually took the form of neo-Marxists pointing to the problems of systems theory (91) and to Durkheim's political conservatism (92), and answering in the negative. Durkheim's supporters usually retorted by elaborating on functionalist theory to account for social "bonds" (91, e.g. Alexeev and by pointing to his Dreyfusard and socialist sympathies (92, e.g. Bellini 1972; Gane 1992). As Zygmunt Bauman's essay (this volume) demonstrate, the terms of debate have now shifted, and we have moved beyond the class of left and right. The subtlety of his transition to a post-Marxist idiom does not prevent Bauman from stepping into the fray with twin barbed plazings. In effect, he recasts the narrative of the conservative Durkheim in the moment of his distinctive postmodern ethical theory. Bauman reads Durkheim as a modernist legislator half-bent on establishing repressive control and regulation under the hegemonic sign of "society." His social theories establish a fictive ontology that could be deployed against such untruly anti-modern concepts as free will and contingency, replacing them with a mandate for managerial and legislative intervention and the demand that the individual submit to the needs of society.

This argument – that Durkheim is not only useless for understanding inequality, but also the advocate of a repressive philosophy intolerant to chance, difference and cultural vitality – is confronted indirectly in several of the essays. Consider Grusky and Galeses's contribution. They argue that Durkheim has a theory of class and labor inequality that is in many ways superior to those that have emerged from the Marxist and Weberian traditions. Not least, they suggest, this theory is actually more attentive to the categories of lived experience, solidarity, and diverse labor subjectivities than those more rational and objectivist models that have traditionally been applied in the name of social emancipation. Alexander's interpretive reconstruction of the inner development of Durkheim's early and middle work supports Grusky and Galeses's more empirically oriented argument. Describing Durkheim's ideological position as equivalent to democratic "socialism with a human face," Alexander finds Durkheim engaged in a sustained argument with the Marxists of his own day. His ambition was to conceptualize social control in a manner that was more respectful of autonomy and subjectivity than Durkheim, then, might be read as the founding father of some of the more morally aware and emancipatory social theory of our time. Writing from a more communitarian perspective, Mark Cladis looks to Durkheim's writings and finds there the basis for a social and moral philosophy, for our challenging times. According to Cladis, there are profound similarities between Durkheim's position and those of radical cultural critics, such as Gramsci, West. Solidarity, difference, tolerance, justice, and redistributive were affective central themes for Durkheim; his ambition was not to minimize these, but to re-

of the social sciences, and a move away from Durkheim's 'old-fashioned' sociology.

There is a growing interest in Durkheim's sociology of religion, and in particular his concept of the sacred. This is also reflected in a new emphasis on the study of deviance. In the past, Durkheim's emphasis on deviance as an objective social fact generated by other social facts has led, for example, into the narrow circle of comparative studies of neighborhood ecology and social disorganization as well as the contemporary literature on themes of mental health and suicide. A second track in the study of deviance initiated by Durkheim also looks to be going strong. This takes its cue from his insistence on deviance as "normal" or functional, not necessarily and has resulted in a focus on the recognition and regulation of outsiders. The interest here, in contrast to the line running out of anomie theory, is on social and cultural process as constituting deviance rather than as objective patterns of offending. Whether openly acknowledged or not, Durkheim was an influence at the dawn of research on the media and crime (in moral panics and moral regulation) and on labeling theory (see, e.g., Ben Yehuda 1984; Erikson 1966). More recent work in this genre has thrown the functionalist supercargo onboard and compensated with extra ballast from contemporary cultural theory and, indeed, the *Leviathan's* *torques*. This has enabled analytic attention to be shifted to the contingent ritual, semantic and narrative processes that underpin the identification and control of evil (Thompson 1998) and away from problematic discussions of social stability and societal needs. The result has been an interdisciplinary literature with ties to anthropology, cultural studies, the new cultural history, and media studies, as well as sociology.

3.2. Durkheim's sociology of religion

There has been a renewed interest in Durkheim's sociology of religion in the past few years. This has been due to a number of reasons. First, it is now possible to take a more holistic approach to the study of religion. Second, there is a growing interest in the study of deviance. Third, there is a growing interest in the study of the sacred. Finally, there is a growing interest in the study of the social sciences.

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cumulative knowledge of a broadly perceived case that social order is generally important middle-range theory over the past few years. Although Durkheim's Durkheim has become increasingly rare in our discipline, there has been a resurgence. His emphasis on deviance as an objective social fact generated by other social facts has led, for example, into the narrow circle of comparative studies of neighborhood ecology and social disorganization as well as the contemporary literature on themes of mental health and suicide. A second track in the study of deviance initiated by Durkheim also looks to be going strong. This takes its cue from his insistence on deviance as "normal" or functional, not necessarily and has resulted in a focus on the recognition and regulation of outsiders. The interest here, in contrast to the line running out of anomie theory, is on social and cultural process as constituting deviance rather than as objective patterns of offending. Whether openly acknowledged or not, Durkheim was an influence at the dawn of research on the media and crime (in moral panics and moral regulation) and on labeling theory (see, e.g., Ben Yehuda 1984; Erikson 1966). More recent work in this genre has thrown the functionalist supercargo onboard and compensated with extra ballast from contemporary cultural theory and, indeed, the *Leviathan's* *torques*. This has enabled analytic attention to be shifted to the contingent ritual, semantic and narrative processes that underpin the identification and control of evil (Thompson 1998) and away from problematic discussions of social stability and societal needs. The result has been an interdisciplinary literature with ties to anthropology, cultural studies, the new cultural history, and media studies, as well as sociology.

Most interesting and promising of all has been a newfound appreciation of the importance of Durkheim's model for the study not of deviance, but of criminal justice. His approach runs counter to the dominant trends in criminological theory and is being increasingly perceived as relevant to the understanding of both process and outcomes. To understand the significance of Durkheim's thinking here, it is necessary to realize that within social theory, law and punishment have been understood primarily as subordinated to bureaucratic rationality or as expressions of a political logic. Michel Foucault's work has become emblematic precisely because it combines these traits. For the Foucault (1974) of *Discipline and Punish*, criminal justice today is a forum in which new forms of power work through order, routine and control. These have decisively replaced earlier, more colorful judicial and punitive activities that invoked ritual and symbolism. Culture persists, but only as a set of dried-out, secular codes for the administration of a rationalized power. Likewise, Habermas (1989, 1974-9) takes the law to be an increasingly abstract force within social life, a mere representative of the applied scientific logics of religion or civil service. Michel Foucault's work is a response to the

of the social sciences, and the social sciences themselves, are also informed by, but not reducible to, the forms of power, interests, and rationality at play in particular settings (Carland 1990). And so the last few years have witnessed an explosion of studies indicating how even ritual, the sacred and profane, ritual and moral boundaries, underlying (or producing) only some representative studies and topics) the social meanings of punishment technologies (Smith 2003) and organizations such as the police (Kreuniger 1997); penal processes such as executions (Smith 1996) and reprogramming (Schiff 1990); the formation of legal codes and the conceptualization of the legal subject (Carlsson and Hoff 2000; Hammond 1996); and the legal protections surrounding collective representations such as airport representations (Hammond 1989) and flags (Welch and Bryan 1996). In other words, a hermeneutic sense than the Durkheimian legal scholarship that has gone before it, such work promises to refashion our understanding of law and criminal justice in fundamental ways over the next decades, much as the "discovery" of culturally constructed deviance has done since the 1960s.

This recent turn toward the dramaturgy and iconography of legal and penal processes implicitly evokes the other area of recent Durkheimian research work we wish to take up here. When David Carland emphasizes the power, symbolic and affective dimensions of punishment, he often cites as an exemplar (Carland 1990: 214f. *and*) an *in-fam* as we have suggested, evokes the late Durkheim and extends his "religious sociology" into the secular. Yet, in these same late-Durkheimian studies, Carland (1990: 214f.) also conceptualizes modern punishments as "performances."

Is there a difference that matters between conceptualizing punishment as collective action as ritual or as performance? That the two terms seem alienate freely in Carland's analysis itself revealing Carland (1990: 200) the affective and symbolic (cultural Durkheim) yet to be responsive to a modern social and cultural differentiation (structuralist/functionalist). Indeed a fact that, in complex societies, those who create upon boundaries are separated by office and organization from those who inhabit and are by both of these agents are differentiated from the victims of punishment, the public audience who observes it. These separations have consequences for the analysis of symbolic action: one cannot necessarily predict that an culturally-inspired decision to punish, or the actual application of punishment, will produce on the audience and the victim (evening news coverage of a certain punishment) the same effects that one would expect to see if the punishment were a manner that will powerfully evoke the spirit of Durkheim and society. But the distance and impenetrability of the punishment, and the fragmentation of audience for that punishment, may well be able to even reverse the agents' intended effects (e.g., that of

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of the creative and artistic element is also evident in Darkheim's insistence, at a later point in *Homonymy forays*, that elementary religious life depends on "figurative representations of the concept" and that the "imagination represents with figures borrowed, with a few exceptions, from either the animal kingdom or vegetable kingdom" (1912, 268, 270). The creative practices that translate the sacred into such a figurative but concrete form can only be theatrical: "We are not surprised then to see Darkheim write several pages later that "imagining religious things is accomplished because a sacred 'force' can be attached to words, spoken, gestures, made" and that "the voice and movements can serve as a vehicle, and by their mediation it can produce its effects" (1912, 280).

This line of Darkheim's thinking reaches its logical conclusion in his discussion of the positive cult and representative rites. While insisting that "religious thought is something altogether different from a system of notions," he asserts, at the same time, that "between severity, as it is objectively, and the sacred things that represent it symbolically, there is a considerable distance" (1912, 544). This can be overcome only through imaginative and creative effort: "It is necessary for the impressions actually experienced by man and which are the primary materials for the construction, to be interpreted, developed, and transformed until they become unrecognizable so the world of religious things is . . . a partly imaginary world, which for this reason lends itself obediently to the free creations of the spirit" (1912, 545).

Darkheim illustrates this process of practical aesthetic translation, which involves imaginative interpreting, elaborating, and transforming, by referring to Spenser and Killen's account of the Varranunga's hatching ceremony. Implicitly evoking his earlier reference to words spoken and gestures made, to voices and movement, Darkheim suggests that "the true consciousness of remembering the past and in rendering it present, as it were, by means of a true dramatic performance" (1912, 531). This does appear, in effect, to continue in a manner that elaborates this understanding:

The actor is in no way considered as an incarnation of the ancestor, although to represent, he is an actor playing a role. . . . They put into action the speech of a member of the ancestor. In all this . . . the movement that occurs more especially consists of a sort of cocking of the chin, consisting of the chin being raised to the ancestor and this mythical ancestor the neck of the child is raised to him. The actors have their skin covered with a down that is a remnant of the hatching, become detached and thus, over the course of the ceremony, the flight of the breast of game, and then, in place of the neck, the wings. The place where the ceremony unfolds . . . is an open-air arena. The actors achieve the entire work place, that is, the dance of the animal, in a manner

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of the rite the events and personages represented" so that the rites "take on an unreal air and the corresponding ceremonies change their nature. In this way we gradually enter into the domain of pure fantasy and move from commemorative rite to vulgar corroboree, a simple public celebration that has nothing to do with religion any more . . ." (1972, 544). Or to put it differently, "when a rite serves no purpose but to entertain it is no longer a rite" (1972, 546).

No doubt Durkheim was also worried that the theatrical analogy would make symbolic actors seem less sincere and, in this way, undermine his neo-Durkheimian argument that social and political authority can and should be sustained by deeply meaningful symbolic action and not primarily coercive forms of structural power or debased populist sentiments. From a normative perspective of course, distinguishing clearly between instrumental and contrived action, on the one hand, and moral and sincere action on the other, makes a great deal of sense (e.g., Habermas 1987). For a perspective of empirical analysis, however, there is a danger. Building a bridge between such ideal-types prevents recognizing both a) dimensions of any symbolic act. In real life, they are always analytically interpenetrating and empirically intertwined. In contrast with the ideal world postulated by normative theory, the aesthetic and the contrived enter into the heart of symbolic action. To conceptualize their interrelation with sacred symbols and moral concerns is essential if one wishes to theorize "the complex and contingent possibilities for creating solidarity in modern symbolic life" (It has taken most of the last century to develop Durkheim's early conceptions about performativity, and it has depended upon leaving behind a rather straightforward, if normatively understandable, ideological concern). Even in the recent postwar period such influential (and Durkheimian) thinkers as Shils and Young (1976) and Bellah (1976: 168–80) still envisaged ritual in a way that separated it from the contingent, reflexive, and instrumental performance, implicitly suggesting an either/or approach to ritual action. In fact it was instrumental or symbolic, authentic or artificial, sacred or profane, whether of Marxist or existential provenance, without this instrumental tendency in a more pessimistic way.

Yet during this same period, a new and more complex approach to ritual and symbolic action was being developed. Kenneth Surin's (1977) *Symbolic Action* could be viewed neither as postmodernist, nor as a radical extension of normative thinking upon the knowledge of sacred symbols. Nor is it a Nietzschean link between ritual and power, as in the case of the "ritual theory" and our deconstructionist approach. It is a more complex and more open theory that Durkheimian thought, in its own way, had already begun to envision. The chapter "The Symbolic Actor" in *Symbolic Action* (1977, 117–

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