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TITLE: HOW ROOT METAPHORS STRUCTURE MEANINGFUL LIFE BY

MEANS OF EMOTIONS: THEORY AND EMPIRICAL ILLUSTRATION FROM

THE SPHERE OF ACADEMIC ETHICS[1]

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Abstract

The article is dedicated to the development of the cultural sociological theory of metaphor. Metaphor has been recognized in the "strong program" of cultural sociology as a means of performance which allowed the building of cultural explanations of such events as the trauma of the Holocaust, and Obama's political success. This paper aims to contribute to these arguments by means of expanding the definition of metaphor beyond its interpretation as a certain type of proposition. This expansion is based on elements of the theories of metaphor of Paul Ricoeur, Max Black, Steven Pepper, George Lakoff, and Mark Johnson, and connected to the Durkheimian theory of the sacred, with a stress on the role of collective emotions. Metaphor is thus seen as one of the key cultural structures which implicitly or explicitly shapes perception, imagination, thought, and action. To illustrate the productivity of the theory, the paper examines how revealing the conflict of powerful educational metaphors allows the building of a counter-intuitive cultural explanation of the wide spread of plagiarism in university students' essays.

Keywords: metaphor, the sacred, emotions, uncertainty, authorship, plagiarism

The Structuring Power of Metaphor and the Role of Emotions

The power of metaphor, in its particular influence exerted over individuals, has been the focus of attention for philosophers, sociologists, anthropologists, and psychologists for many decades. Extending beyond the limits of rhetoric and later by linguistics and semiotics, set by the Aristotle's renowned definition, metaphor became not merely a particular type of proposition but was considered to have an ability of structuring perception, imagination, and thought. Moreover, neither semiotics nor linguistics nor rhetoric are capable of showing the emotional component of the metaphor's influence on the individual. However, this is the component which is most significant when we consider metaphor's effects. This paper

considers the possibility of the cultural sociological interpretation of the metaphor as a special symbolic mechanism to connect cultural symbols with certain aspects of social interactions by means of emotions.

Taken in a narrower sense – as an explicit concept and form of speech – metaphor has been successfully integrated in the apparatus of the "strong program" of cultural sociology. Thus, Jeffrey Alexander has shown how Holocaust became a universal symbol by means of becoming a bridging metaphor connecting this unique event with universal evil (Alexander, 2004). In his later works, he has shown how the metaphor of celebrity thrown in the course of the McCain political campaign eventually became detached from its initial intentions and became a powerful rhetorical tool of Obama's success (Alexander, 2010). In both cases, the central role of collective emotions in the effects of metaphor is shown.

The importance of the emotions for social life is depicted by Durkheim in his sociological theory of knowledge and in his theory of the sacred, and fully unfolded in his later works (Durkheim, 1973 [1912], 1995 [1914]). The conscious life consists of distinctions which become meaningful only when they are bound with the emotional experience of a special kind. These emotions are of the special kind because of two circumstances. First, they are social by origin, e.g. produced in the social interaction. Secondly, they are extraordinarily intense, thus distinguishing them from the individual experience. The sequence of the second from the first is the heuristic Durkheimian presupposition, one of the foundation of his theory.

In the realm of moral feeling, any cultural distinctions would be senseless were they not testified by emotions. Empirically, it means that morally-colored actions (that is, actions not neutral from the moral point of view) bring about strong emotions. This becomes evident in the case of the deviation from moral prescriptions. The same state of affairs is found in the sphere of aesthetics; beautiful and ugly are not

mere semiotic codes attributed to observable objects of corresponding labels. This distinction is based on emotionally definite meanings. The very existence of the beautiful and the ugly as "cybernetic tokens" does not explain the striving for one of these extremes and disgust for the other, the emotionally intense admiration for the beautiful and not least the intense emotion of aversion from the ugly. It may seem that the logical is not connected with the emotional, but Durkheim's reasoning allows for a different inference. Logically valid operations are not the realizations of an arbitrarily set system of distinctions. They impel themselves to any common-sensual individual[2]. The convincing power of logical proof and the depicting of mistakes in the procedure of the inference are connected with the emotions which only seem to be non-necessary or complementary. In short, *meaningful life is emotionally marked off*[3].

Cultural Sociological Concern: Connecting Meanings with Social Interactions through "Effervescence"

Why is this so important for cultural sociology? The investigation of social life meanings as the basic formula of this research program presupposes the sociological deciphering of the mechanisms connecting the two parts of this formula, "meaning" and "social life". Were the

meanings added to the focus of the investigation without questioning their link to social life, we would get trapped in the semiotic perspective, which is limited to the study of the elements of the meaning space and their ties. In other words, the autonomy of culture is to be founded sociologically, not merely declared. There are collective emotions which, according to the Durkheimian heuristic hypothesis, allow us to connect cultural meanings on one hand, and social interactions, social structure, spatial organization of the community and many other aspects of social life, on other hand.

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[2] In his earlier works, Durkheim paid special attention to the fact that the insanity and crime became distinct only in course of the history (see, for example, Durkheim, 1933 [1893]).

[3] That's why we can consider only human life to be meaningful, but animal life, which also is not unaware of distinctions, is alien to the realm of meanings.

Addressing the Durkheimian theory is justified by the fact that he faced a very similar task. The central notion of his theory – society – is not clearly defined, and thus, problematic. As Robert Bellah points out, to comprehensively define the Durkheimian concept of society, it is necessary to explicate the entire social theory of the classic (Bellah, 1973: ix). At a first approximation, the concept of society reveals two different meanings; a set of social morphological facts, and the collective representations as the *sui generis* reality. The former refers to what is currently known as a social structure, while the latter accords to the notion of culture. To integrate these two notions into one entity named "society", we need serious reasons. Durkheim solves this problem using the sociological theory of the knowledge which ties social interactions and social imagination together. This theory offers a set of principal mechanisms by which the collective reality, a *sui generis* existence, irreducible to the reality of the individual life and ever surpassing it, becomes meaningful. The subjects of that theory are sacred subjects which are sensibly-supersensible entities. Only this way of thinking about the collective reality makes it viable. This is the way the two meanings of the Durkheimian notion "society" reintegrate.

The productivity of these mechanisms is brought about by the social interaction which, being particularly intense, generates the special kind of emotions which thrust themselves towards the observer as something crucially different from ordinary ones. Thus, there emerges a special kind of opposition – the sacred/profane, which constitutes shapes, and reinforces the emotional grid of meaningful life. It corresponds to the opposition of the individual and collective reality as well as forms of collective interaction. Sacred objects, referring to the elements of a meaningful life, are connected to particular emotional conditions and are thus themselves the potential sources of strong emotions and vice versa. Particular emotional conditions emerging from particular configurations of social interactions (ritual, fest, ecstatic practices, and special symbolic actions) can generate these sacred objects.

The theory of the sacred and the sociological theory of knowledge as the main results of the late Durkheimian program not only allow the resolution of such sociological tasks as "sociological justification of the culture's autonomy", but also create the resource for unfolding the entire arsenal of the methodological devices. When we, following Jeffrey Alexander, state that "education, politics, professional organization, morality and the law <...> should be studied in terms of symbolic classifications" which are "structured by the tensions between the fields of the sacred and the profane" (Alexander, 1992: 3), we are not merely pointing out this binary opposition as if in terms of good and evil, or white and black, but we depicting those social forces that hide behind this basic opposition. We point out the "emotional energy", appealing to Randall Collins' speculative but heuristically advantaging concept (Collins, 2004), which is latent under the meanings' distinction and could be realized in action under certain circumstances. In any concrete case then, we can explain the impact of this binary opposition over the social interaction course.

The sacred and the consequent symbolic mechanisms allow us to explain the way meaningful structures of social life are connected with the emotions they evoke, and consequently, with the actions they can provoke. And vice versa – those mechanisms facilitate the explanation as to how social interactions can bring about emotions which generate new meanings. The semiotic scene and the means of the analysis of meanings become replenished with the sociological dimension, which refers to the meanings of emotions, and actions and interactions with one another.

Enriching Metaphor with Emotional Dimension

In a quite similar way to the semiological method of analysis, we should enrich metaphor with an emotional dimension. It was Paul Ricoeur who challenged such a plain treatment of the metaphor. He has shown that separating metaphorical mechanisms from peculiar emotional effects leads us to miss how metaphor actually works. Those effects are usually referred to in the field of psychological theory of perception and imagination, but according to Ricoeur, we have to find a way to include those concepts and take them into consideration. In such a way, he came to see metaphor immanently combined with emotions, iconicity, corporality and imagination.

For example, to say "Policemen are pigs" does not simply place the two objects in parallel and highlight certain similarities between humans and animals. It is also about a wild outburst and a subject of emotional reaction. Linguistically-oriented theories fail to explain such class of effects because they are issued from the transfer scheme. Certain features from one "system of associated commonplaces" (Black, 1962) (pig as a dirty animal) are attributed to an ethically oriented portrait of policemen. It partially explains the substance of the policeman-pig imagination, but doesn't explain its sharpness, the excitement it evokes, the constraint to react (positively or negatively), in a word, its emotional effect. The effect of metaphor is to be seen as a semantic innovation created by literal deviation (policemen are not actually pigs).

Ricoeur's innovation is that metaphor should not be treated as a deviation in its own right, but rather as a way of overcoming deviation; "The metaphor is not the enigma but the solution of the enigma" (Ricoeur, 1978: 146). Actually, Edmund Leach who had borrowed the metaphor of pigs and policemen from Mulder and Hervey, had already mentioned ambiguity as a special feature of metaphor (Leach, 1976). Max Black went further and suggested a kind of stereoscopic vision of the two subjects of a metaphor which tends to transcend the semiotic explanation. But it was Ricoeur who finally tied the emotional

effect of metaphor to a peculiar tension between its metonymical, literal sense, and its metaphorical one. Classical rhetoric, as he has shown, "only described the "effect of sense" at the level of the word while it overlooked the production of this semantic twist at the level of sense" (Ricoeur, 1978: 146). The real cause of metaphoric effect is its literal "semantic impertinense", (following Jean Cohen), which is resolved in metaphoric reduction and works as a new appropriateness establishment.

Metaphor and Uncertainty: Power of Transgression

The emotional power of metaphor stems from the uncertainty generated by the destruction of the semantic order. We are aware that policemen are not pigs, but by catching the sense of the new established metaphor we simultaneously accept this new vision. This ambiguity is intrinsic to the metaphorical mechanism. We never treat metaphor and its effects exhaustively, and if we deny that by perceiving metaphor, we are actually retaining the literal, metonymical sense. The tension between semantic order (humans are not animals) and a way to imagine that somehow it is true ("policemen are pigs") is an immanent feature of metaphor. For example, the expression "policemen are government officials" does not destroy any kind of order and is therefore emotionally neutral. On the other hand, "policemen are tables" does not evoke any emotions either, although it does not correspond with the order taken for granted. The reason is the same; it does not provide any kind of uncertainty because there are no metaphors which could establish any mode of imagination that it is true. Following Roman Jacobson, Ricoeur called this kind of speech strategy embedded by metaphor a "split reference", which means uncertainty in reference[4]. To move forward in an explanation implies to give an account of uncertainty.

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[4] Another non-metaphorical example of a split reference specified by Ricoeur is the abolishment of the everyday reference in fairy tales of Majorca by means of the story-teller's introduction "it was and it was not".

A sociologically grounded way to deal with uncertainty stems from the concept of the sacred. It was Mary Douglas who developed a useful theory that gave meaning-oriented accounts of uncertainty. A theoretical framework for the approach was provided by a late-Durkheimian project. Combining meaning structures, emotions, and social interaction, the Durkheimian theory of the sacred is the most appropriate base for such an inquiry. Following this course, Mary Douglas came to treat uncertainty as the fundamental source of danger in the widest range of social contexts, from religion to social movements, and from science to everyday life. Departing from Durkheimian "religious sociology," Douglas combines uncertainty with pollution in symbolical orders. To be impure or polluted means to violate symbolic order. By researching religious taboo analysis, ecological and economic discourses, routines of primitive and contemporary life and many other subjects, she has demonstrated that the most powerful (for example, dangerous, but also fascinating) things and ideas appear to be the marginalia of symbolic classifications (Douglas, 1966, 1975). The opposition to the pure and impure corresponds with the ambiguity of the sacred as its fundamental feature. It is not to be merged with the sacred/profane opposition. In fact, the impure sacred is a result of the prohibited confusion of sacred/profane binary opposition. Thus, a pure/impure dichotomy reflects the diachronic aspect in the symbolic realm.

Caused by the confusion or violation of symbolic order, uncertainty reveals itself by means of a strong emotional effect. The feeling of danger, fear, anger, abhorrence, and so forth, are empirical manifestations of such an effect. Still, following Douglas, uncertainty should not be seen as a completely destructive force. It contains kinds of creative forces of chaos by means of applying emotional power of desecration to the construction of a new order. It brings an order to Douglas's reasoning in line with Victor Turner and his work on the creative power of "anti-structure" and the liminal, ambiguous nature of "communitas" (Turner, 1969). In a similar way, Ricoeur's model of metaphor, getting emotional power from symbolic order, provides an idea of meaning which is created from the destruction of another meaning.

This formula brings us very close to the theory of violence and the sacred by Rene Girard (Girard, 2005 [1972]). Girard came to define violence as a fundamental and universal principle of "indifferentiation" – the destruction of the symbolic difference order. In turn, indifferentiating violence creates an ultimate kind of emotion similar to Durkheimian "effervescence", an intensity that provides a foundation for a new sacred/profane difference. New order creation is caused by the unstable nature of the undifferentiated state. Its legitimation emerges in the course of "mythical elaboration" (Girard, 2005: 67). Applying Girard's model to Ricoeur's reasoning of metaphor provides its representation of a complex of emotionally charged indifferentiating violence and metaphorical "mythical elaboration". The productiveness of such an approach stems from it providing clear criteria which allows one to analyze principles of narrative constitution[5].

The Durkheimian theory of the sacred, and the theories of Mary Douglas, Rene Girard, and Victor Turner provide a set of models concerning sacred/profane, pure/impure, desecration, uncertainty, pollution, indifferentiating violence, mythical elaboration, and more, which correspond to the principle of the autonomy of culture. By combining these models with metaphor, it is possible to move forward to the analysis of cultural patterns of social life, its relations, and the way it influences meaningful actions. To perform it, we need to make several more assumptions and these will be as follows. Metaphors can be mutually consistent and inconsistent (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). In the former case, they can be presented as sets originating in a more general "root metaphor" (Pepper, 1942). In the latter case, they constitute a conflictual relationship which can be specified in terms of symbolic models of indifferentiating violence,

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[5] The idea of such an inquiry is generally similar to the research methodology performed by Philip Smith (Smith, 2003) on narrations on guillotine.

desecration, and pollution[6]. The meaningful consistency of the given cultural pattern can be attributed to "root metaphor", or to a set of mutually consistent metaphors which render it intuitively obvious.

Towards Empirical Application of the Theory: Conflict of Metaphors in Education

I will present an illustration of the efficiency of the introduced research model via an analysis of the controversies of the perception of authorship in contemporary university life. Based on the special role of transgression as a symbolical model, my methodological strategy pays particular attention to subjects such as "failures", "errors", conflict of intuition, misconduct, breaches of the routine course of events, and so on. Thus, breaks in routine may reveal conflicts between the root metaphors of social life in a way similar to paraphasia revealing unobservable processes in the sub-consciousness in the framework of Sigmund Freud's theory (Freud, 1914 [1901]). Similarly, slips of the tongue in the speech of radio presenters, analyzed by Erving Goffman, discover how frames of social interaction work (Goffman, 1981)[7].

The crucial methodological point is that violation of the meaningful order structured by root metaphor is empirically detectable. The symbolic mechanism of such a response is the transgression; actions and their meanings, which are contradictable with respect to the root metaphor (the inconsistency case is discussed above), cause uncertainty and strong emotional responses such as anger, fear, abhorrence, and so forth. These are particular ways of marking conflict of metaphors in contemporary social life. One such

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[6] Thus, uncertainty resulted from indiffirentiating violence of metaphor towards symbolic order characterized by another metaphor (which is inconsistent with the former) can be treated as a second-order metaphorical effect. This idea of metaphors in conflict account are similar to Roland Barthes' explanation of myth as a "further sign" i.e. second-order signification (Barthes, 1972 [1957]).

[7] This efficient methodological line was triumphed by Anthony Giddens, who has summarized elaborations of Freud, Goffman, and others (Giddens, 1984).

example is a conflict of root metaphors in the educational field, which is rather typical, at least for contemporary Russia which is experiencing vast changes in its social life.

Generally, we recognize several sets of powerful, but mutually inconsistent metaphors in the educational field; "education as a commodity", "education as a functional social structure" (which, in turn, stems from organic metaphor in science), and a set of metaphors concerning classical scholarship and university life[8]. Thus, contemporary universities became a battlefield for mutually inconsistent metaphors, each of which tends to subordinate the whole academic sphere.

The problem is that, in fact, metaphors are unobservable; they are not given in perception. Fortunately, their conflict is. It is revealed by clear empirical markers. First of all, I mean violations of legal norms and typical negative emotional reactions. The interpretation of the latter leads to strong conflict between the actors' intuitions. Thus, the conflict of intuitions is a result, and therefore an empirically observable indicator of the metaphors of conflict. By analyzing it, we gain insight into the reconstruction of its foundations. I suppose this kind of inquiry to be one of important methodology in cultural sociology.

Illustration: Perception of Authorship and Students' Plagiarism

To provide an illustration of how conflict of intuitions reflects and reveals conflict of underlying root metaphors, I will focus on the problem of the perception of authorship in universities. The problem of plagiarism is typical for contemporary universities, which makes it worthy of investigation: the

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[8] As a matter of fact, it consists of a number of influential metaphors, which, in turn, are associated with different "classic" models of the university. According to the context, however, the differences between the "old" models are not that important, and the most powerful integrating metaphor is the metaphor of autonomy, mostly associated to the Humboldt university model.

prohibition against plagiarism in students' essays is unequivocal, strong and universally spread, but still often violated. The corresponding observations were undertaken in the course of my teaching in one of the leading Russian universities in Moscow during 2005-2007. I was examining essays of three undergraduate students' groups during my teaching obligations. Each group consisted of from 25-35 students. Those observations are illustrative and not representative, because (1) they would differ depending from university, academic discipline, and particular professor, (2) because the results of detection of plagiarism strongly depend from the conceptual and operational definitions of the phenomenon and the procedure of detection, and (3), the general number of cases is not large enough.

In the cases observed, the approximate proportion of essays containing at least singular fragments which could be treated as a plagiarism in accordance with its strictest vision amounted to 90%. The percentage of essays I defined as plagiarized, as consistent with the rigorous application of the university's statute, was in the range of 50-70% during the three years. Those results are generally corroborated by several international studies, and from all appearances, are not exclusive for Russia (see, for example, Lass, Bandurski, Swietlik, Tomczak, & Wengler, 2006: 90; Selwyn, 2008: 468).

Both markers mentioned above are present – a statistically significant amount of violations of requirements of university statutes, and a deep conflict in intuitions between norms violators and advocates which was revealed during arguments with violators during the discussions of marks. Thus, students often treated criticism against plagiarism in their works as redundant. Many of them would only admit to the justice of the accusation in cases where they downloaded the whole essay; that had occurred rarely. However, using unchanged or only slightly changed fragments of other texts as building blocks in the essays was often treated as a legitimate and wide-spread way of writing an essay. Students would often argue that if they used those fragments to build their own argument, there's no need to transform

them if someone else had succeeded to formulate this or that thought well. Thus, the underlying conflict of intuition dealt with the perception of the substance of the text, and not the justice of the taboo against the plagiarism as such.

Quantitative data is a significant marker needed to identify plagiarism as a problem and metaphor conflict as a fact. But it is the substantial analysis of intuitions which result from the conflict that allows the reconstruction of unobservable underlying structures of meanings. Both indicators allow a defining paradox of a strong contradiction between the implicit students' consensus and explicit university regulations. It is the Durkheimian theory of crime that sheds a light on this tangled situation.

Following Durkheim, definitions of crime posed in law provide a border between permitted and prohibited actions and are an important indicator of the type and condition of society (Durkheim, 1933 [1893]). The very sensibility of the law as to what is defined as crime is an unique feature of every community, reflecting synthetic ties between actions and sanctions which stem from moral foundations (Durkheim, 1974 [1906]). Vendetta which is treated as a virtue in most primitive societies came to be seen as a sin and a crime by the modern moral code. These differences concerning what is to be treated as normal reveal the basis of cultural reflection. Its source is to be seen in the *root metaphors of social life*. In a society of tradition which often imagines itself as a kind of organic unity, almost any violation is regarded as a direct insult, and even a hazard. Insults should be avenged and hazards should be repelled. Modern society, which is thought of by its members mostly (but not entirely!) as an aggregate of functional connections, provides quite another case. Vendetta seems to be an absurd atavism, something that is irrelevant and unfounded.

Presentations of the permitted and prohibited can be treated as indicators of social life root metaphors. Presentations of intellectual honesty do not provide an exception. What exactly are they referring to? What conclusions should we make? Students' plagiarism is very widespread. Following Durkheim, the prevailing practice should not be classified as a crime. The increasing prevalence of a particular practice which was once thought to be criminal is becoming perceived as the norm. There cannot be a society of criminals.

On the other hand, the prohibition of plagiarism is an essential part of any university statute. Let's reconstruct the dispositions in this conflict of intuitions. Student plagiarism indicates a particular style of thinking. It should not be confused with the notorious "dissolution of morals". This world-view does not imply the denial of the very notion of intellectual ownership. What is changing is the idea of what should be seen as a subject of ownership. Or, to put it another way, what is admitted to have a substance. Once in the past, every piece of gold was a unique thing. The modern banknote is equal to any other of the same denomination as well as its non-cash equivalent[9].

There is another example which is probably closer to the subject. When writing an official statement or office memo, even the most punctilious person does not hesitate to use non-original phrases pertaining to somebody else's authorship. Official paper design is a purely technical (instrumental) task. We use it as a means to reach a certain goal. How does this mode of activity differ from those practiced by a student exposed as a plagiarist? The question could be put another way. What is the substantive difference between an academic article and an official statement? An official statement does not contain any inner textual value because it is entirely directed towards a certain aim. It consists of the same words and

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[9] There is a parallel in the sphere of action. Following George Simmel, at the time before modern rationalization of social life, every single decision concerning buying, selling or exchange was intentional and unique. Today there is a great amount of typical transactions which is in fact non-reflected and unintended (Simmel, 1990).

governed by the same grammar as an academic article. But its meaning is ultimately derived from its effect[10].

An academic paper is governed by very diverse norms. The classical scholarship canon issued from a text is ultimately valuable in itself. Scientific research follows no other aims but those settled by the relevant knowledge. Furthermore, from the point of view of history, it was the exceptional value of ancient texts that premised classical scholarship. Tradition which constitutes itself upon texts of exceptional value unavoidably had to be included in the idea of the uniqueness of academic text under the conditions and context of modernity. There was just an accentuation of the legal protection of ownership resulting from the Enlightenment that temporarily separated this tradition from the contemporary plagiarism interpretation. To put it in a juristic manner, it is text (and not just the technology it describes) which is the subject of intellectual property in a framework of classical academic education. This is the general reason why plagiarism is absolutely taboo in the scientific and academic spheres.

Authorship Sacred and Profane

The idea of the value of the text in science is inherent in those university models which are issued from the idea of the ultimate value of knowledge. It was the idea of absolute and static truth which governed medieval European universities. This fundamental guideline defined canons and the substance of university life. Humboldt universities are based on scientific investigation as an eternal and endless exploration. Both cases governing the principle of academic activity are important with respect to the knowledge sphere.

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[10] There is a parallel between the discussed means-ends governing principle and the technology sphere referring to Martin Heidegger's famous opposition of the meanings of the Rhine as a great river, an anthem by Friedrich Hölderlin and as a component of a hydropower plant (Heidegger, 1977).

The modern usage of the term 'authorship' has primarily juridical connotations. For instance, we tend to mention authorship when arguing about plagiarism, copyright, and intellectual property protection. Still, those routine and mundane subjects are hiding a world-view and an even more sacred meaning. Sergey Averintsev has shown, that in its ancient origins, the notion of "authorship" stems from the religious-magical notion of "authority". Both categories are going back to the Latin verb *"augeo",* specifying "activity which is par excellence peculiar to gods as sources of initiative: "increase", "facilitate", but also mere "commit" – to bring something into being or to reinforce the cogency, value or potency of something that already exists" (Averintsev, 1994). Thus, we came to see authorship as a fundamentally unordinary form of charismatic agency.

The later divergence of the two notions had not weakened the substance of the authorship category, but ultimately reinforced it. By separating the meaning of authority from the religious notion of authority, it has lost the fluidity and transferability which are typical for magical contagion, although in substitution, it has acquired features of uniqueness and originality. As a result of this divergence, the authorship has gained the character of a "magical sign of literary ownership" (Averintsev, 1994), emphasizing the singularity of creative action. Specified features make the authorship consistent with classical university models.

The fundamental tendency that governs contemporary educational systems leads towards another root metaphor; "education is a commodity". The regulatory principle of this case lies beyond the education sphere as well as the knowledge realm as such. The very substance of education has been transformed; instead of a cognition activity, it is becoming a commodity. Following Karl Marx, this metamorphosis

could be called a commodity fetishism in education[11]. The outline of the conflict between value oriented university models and the instrumental rationality of "economcentrism" corresponds with substantial/formal rationality opposition introduced by Max Weber (Weber, 1978 [1922]).

Economy metaphor's expansion into the knowledge sphere starts as soon as the educational process substance and the logics of its inner cultural matters appear to be subordinated by the purpose which is external in respect to it. It takes place as students turn into clients and the educational process turns into the mobilization of the means of investment. Being transformed into mere statistics, educational activity loses its value. Hence, the substance of knowledge activity loses its uniqueness as well. Following this symbolic process of the change of the underlying metaphors, the uniqueness of text is becoming unwarranted and irrelevant. The reason is that the copyright subject is not to be seen in the very text, but rather in the "technology" and as a problem-solving recipe provided by the text. As a consequence, an authorship conception and the nature of the text have changed dramatically.

It can be concluded that the conflict of intuitions concerning plagiarism results from the metaphorical change in the education field. Metaphors construct the system from the inside, define its inner meaning structure and order social relations in the sphere of education. The organization of the educational process, qualifying requirements, professor-student relations, statutes and syllabuses, and even the graduates' gown and cup stem from the academic's sphere root metaphors. The prohibition of plagiarism as a sacred rule of the classic university culture of our day increasingly contradicts the cultural logic of institutional changes in the educational field.

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[11] It should be noted that in a sense it could be possible to treat education as a commodity more than ever before in that it is paid for. But even so, commodity relations do not penetrate the education sphere from the inside and do not impose its logics upon it.

Truth is not a derivate of the form of the statute[12]. Truth is highly emotionally charged, deeply rooted in cultural meanings, and embedded in root metaphors. Speaking sociologically, there is more than one truth in the question of plagiarism in our times; the old truth of academic culture, and the new one not yet articulated, live and are gaining strength in the truth of commodity metaphor.

Conclusion

The "strong program" in cultural sociology builds explanations of social life by the means of the revealing of cultural structures (Alexander & Smith, 2003). Those structures can take different forms, from the binary codes shaping the public perception, or to the genres of narratives governing discourse. Metaphors – both usual metaphors as mere figures of speech, and root metaphors as complex constructions underlying perception, imagination and thought, should be seen as one of the core types of cultural structures.

To understand how metaphors shape discourse, it is necessary to take into account an emotional dimension. Metaphors strongly affect people's minds because of their emotional concern. Paul Ricoeur was the first who gave a plausible explanation of the emotional power of metaphor. He assumed that it is the tension between literal and metaphorical meanings that provides metaphors with the ability to affect people to such a large extent. Putting this argument in the context of Durkheimian cultural sociology, I argue that it is power of the transgression, (i.e. disturbing the purity of the borders between the sacred and the profane), that stands behind the ability of metaphor to affect social life.

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[12] Durkheim provided a way of sociologically sophisticated reasoning on the notion of truth in his lections on the pragmatism in 1913-14 (Durkheim, 1983).

Seeing metaphor as a cultural structure is very promising methodologically, because it allows the building of cultural explanations in a wide range of empirical issues. As an illustration, I have examined the issue of university ethics, using students' plagiarism as an example. This case is worthy of interest, since on the one hand, the prohibition against plagiarism is explicit, strong, and universal among academia, while on the other hand, this is a norm which is very often violated. This violation is usually attributed to the availability of the means of plagiarizing based on the possibilities which the Internet gives to the students. I argue, however, that this is not the case, because when examined closer, we deal with the deep conflict of intuitions between teachers and many of the students. Illegal practices in fact are legitimate, and violators often perform them without seeing themselves as guilty.

To solve this puzzle, I have tried to reveal the cultural structures which stand behind this conflict. Those cultural structures are three influential root metaphors in education; "education as a commodity", "education as a functional structure", and the set of metaphors of classical scholarship. Conflicts between the first two factors with the third gives a clue to understanding the cultural reasons and drivers of what is happening in the sphere of academic ethics in contemporary universities. The reason for violating the rules is not only for the enjoyment of the benefits of crime, but rather different understandings of the concept of authorship and the substance of the text. Classical scholarship draws on the absolute value of unique text. New metaphors, such as neo-liberal economic metaphor, draw on seeing the text as a mean for some external goal (for example, solving an instrumental task). This implicit cultural difference in ways of building images of education underlies explicit academic conflict. This example illustrates that enriching the apparatus of cultural sociology with the notion of root metaphor and the theory of emotional drivers of metaphor does not only benefit theory, but is also able to provide counter-intuitive empirical results.

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