Civil Sphere and Radicalization

A CONFERENCE HOSTED BY THE

CENTRE FOR CITIZENSHIP, CIVIL SOCIETY AND RULE OF LAW (CISRUL),

UNIVERSITY OF ABERDEEN

Friday 20th – Sunday 22nd October, 2017

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Conference description

Summary
Constitutional democracies by definition afford a range of opportunities for political expression including protest. Why, then, do some movements choose to engage in more radical forms of protest, such as civil disobedience, hacktivism and jihadi terrorism, and to what effect? Our conference will transform understanding of radical protest, first by cross-fertilizing existing debates through comparing species of radical protest, and second, by explaining radical protest not only in terms of the perceived inadequacy of existing institutional channels for dissent, but also and crucially, drawing on Jeffrey Alexander’s *The Civil Sphere*, in terms of the lack of response from the mainstream social movements which Alexander dubs the “civil sphere”. For Alexander, Northern media’s response to Martin Luther King’s civil disobedience shows how civil spheres can respond sympathetically to radical protest, recognizing a movement’s causes as “civil”. Our speakers will focus on the role of established civil spheres in producing as well as responding to radical protest.

Intellectual scope
Conference contributors will compare a wide range of cases of radical protest, bringing to bear a range of disciplinary perspectives, to consider and develop the following two theses:

1. Movements *choose* radical protest not only when institutions fail to respond to calls to change, but when there is insufficient support from a broader “civil sphere” (Alexander 2006) to secure these ends through institutional channels. Alexander’s focus was not on radical protest, but we will build on the chapter in which he argues that the US Civil Rights movement chose radical protest not only because state institutions were compromised, but because the broader civil sphere – including media – were unreceptive to their demands.

2. The *effects* of radical protest similarly depend on the response not only of state institutions but also of the civil sphere, which may reject the use of radical strategies or respond sympathetically, ultimately serving to broaden the civil sphere. Here, we build on the revealing contrast made by Alexander between two sets of organizations in the civil rights movement. The first, Martin Luther King’s movement, managed to secure solidarity of the hitherto-unresponsive civil sphere, by pitching its claims in the language of civil values. The other set of actors was movements such as Malcolm X’s and the Black
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Panthers, which were rejected by the civil sphere for their use of violence, in particular, and were as a result largely thwarted in their ambitions.

There are now a number of studies of radical protest, ranging from mass civil disobedience (Perry 2013) and the occupation of public spaces (Mitchell, Harcourt & Taussig 2013), to Maoist guerrilla warfare (Gudavarthy 2015) and jihadi terrorism (Khosrokhavar 2014). However:

1. Mainstream scholars typically base their assumptions on the US, Canada, France and Britain, and tend to treat “radicalization” as an unqualified problem, while critical scholars draw on and often idealize an equally small set of cases, such as Occupy and the Arab Spring. The conference will bring together scholars working on all these cases, in order to cross-fertilize the debates, and will include less familiar cases such as far-right nationalism in Eastern Europe, the English riots of 2011, and Mexico’s Zapatista movement, and the Colombian peace process. Speakers will be drawn not only from sociology but also anthropology (Stack), history (Petrie) and philosophy (Cooke).

2. Scholars have paid some attention to how radical protest gets sparked by movements rejecting or being rejected by state institutions, but much less to the crucial relationship with non-radical movements. Here we will build on Alexander’s approach to pose major new questions about the why and wherefores of radical protest. Can radical protest be explained not only by the inadequacy of institutional channels but also by the failure of existing civil spheres to accommodate certain movements? Does the success of radical protest then ultimately depend on how the established civil sphere responds to it? And to the extent that the civil sphere engages with radical protestors, could this be said to expand the civil sphere’s scope?

Implications for public debate
The rise in home-grown Islamic terrorism has made “radicalization” a concern of Western governments, which were already worrying about a much wider range of radical protest, including far-right movements, the Occupy movement, and indeed the UK riots of 2011. Across the world, the multiple transitions to democracy have brought new opportunities for legal protest, but many movements go beyond these legal opportunities, for example by blocking highways and occupying other public spaces, employing methods that may involve damage to property and even violence against persons. Governments have focused their efforts (and public funding) on how to reduce or contain radical protest.

To begin by treating radical protest as a problem may, however, obscure its often complex dynamics, and foreclose potentially progressive outcomes. The conference will contribute to public debates by aiming to understand a) why movements choose radical protest in the first place, going beyond a focus on the limits of institutional channels to consider the willingness of established movements to engage with their causes, and b) the broader effects of radical protest, including whether mainstream movements, while abjuring from radical protest, can be led to incorporate some of the values and demands of radical protestors.

Terms of participation in conference
There is no conference fee and lunches will be provided for all attendees. In return, however, all attendees are expected to read in advance all the draft conference papers, which will be available in early September. At the conference, speakers will only give a 5-minute summary of their written papers, leaving 55 minutes for discussion of each paper, thus it is essential to have read all the papers in advance. Non-speaker attendees should register with Eve Hayes de Kalaf (eve.hayesdekalaf@abdn.ac.uk) by 1 September in order to receive the draft papers. We also ask that attendees try wherever possible to attend the whole conference.
Friday 20th October

Introduction

9.30 Welcome

- Sir Iain Diamond, Principal of the University of Aberdeen
- Trevor Stack, Jeffrey Alexander and Farhad Khosrokhavar (co-organisers)

Theme 1. Radical Protest in Contemporary Europe: Jihadism and the Far Right and Left

Although public policy and much scholarship has focused on a single species of radical protest, we propose to juxtapose and examine the connections between the use of radical protest by Islamic jihadi groups including middle-class ones (Heins, Khosrokhavar) and far-right anti-immigration and anti-Islam movements such as France’s National Front (Heins). Luengo Cruz and Ihlebæk will then consider how such radical political forces are reported in the European media.

10.30 Farhad Khosrokhavar “Disaffected Versus Middle-Class Jihadists and the Civil Sphere”

Islamist radicalism and extreme right movements are efforts to substitute a more primordial community, or a Gemeinschaft, for a Gesellschaft. In that sense, their project is to replace the civil sphere as such — with the alternative of neo-Caliphate or neo-fascist ‘regulating community’ that will, in addition to projecting ethnic/religious criteria, be more directing over other spheres, e.g., economy, science, law, family, and less autonomous than the more pluralistic, more civil regulating community represented by ‘civil sphere.’ The domestic origins of radicalization are too often ignored in both lay and academic analyses of Islamism and terrorism. I want to emphasize that it is the failure of the civil sphere to incorporate fully — subordination of certain groups of immigrant origins, of certain religions (Islam in this case) — that creates the social conditions of radicalization. My work on the radicalization of Muslims in French prison is the best demonstration of this. Jihadism is the combination of an extremist version of Islam and violent action in its name. As an ideational system, it emerges from the explosive experience of Islamic intellectuals coming into contact with Western societies and modern imperialism. In Western societies today, its social roots lay in marginalization. The latter can be analyzed according to the types of social actors that are involved in it. One can distinguish two major types: 1–the “downtrodden” youth, mostly of immigrant families (second, third generations mostly), in France from the poor suburbs (banlieues), and in Great Britain from inner cities (the so-called “disaffected youth”). According to statistics gathered by American scholars (among them Sageman, Leiken…), most of the Jihadists from Europe came from lower class youth of migrant families. 2–the middle classes (mostly lower but also middle classes). Their number and proportion sharply increased since the civil war in Syria in 2013.

Expanding on these sources of domestic radicalization:

1 – The Jihadism of the “disaffected youth” is based on the sheer "hatred" of society, the latter identified with a miscreant group of people who actively or passively fight against Islam. This view is the denial of the civil sphere, at least in the self-perception of its actors who believe that there is no possible compromise with the Western society and, contrary to the “Muslim Brotherhood” version or even the “Fundamentalist versions” of Islam, totally reject any kind of “dialogue” with the “miscreant societies”. Their “hatred” based on self-victimization (all the doors are closed, we are mistreated as are Palestinians by the Israeli army, any uniform, be it the police man’s or the fire brigade’s is the sign of repression…) and on real stigmas (racism, Islamophobia) leaves no room for any kind of civil sphere. The image of the Self and the Others makes it impossible to initiate any “dialogue” and the only possible understanding is based on “truce” or cease-fire but not on real peace or mutual understanding. Long periods in Jail, racism against them, deeply internalized stigmas make their worldview radical, leaving no room for mutual understanding in their most extremist version. Once
they become “entrenched Jihadists”, there is no room for “negotiation” or any type of civil sphere. There is a decisionism on their part that has a very strong “Schmittien” characteristic: friend and foe are regarded in an utterly dichotomous way and violence becomes the only solution in their view.

2 – Jihadism of the middle class adult youth is not based on hatred. It is based on a “humanitarian” perspective in an ambivalent manner. It mainly rests on “outrage” and "indignation": how the Syrian “Muslims” are mistreated by the Assad Regime without any reaction from the West and what to do to rescue them from the claws of a gory regime? This view is based not on denial of the Civil Sphere but on a conception of a “subjective civil sphere” that is different from the existing one, which are utterly unable to cope with the situation.

3 – The Jihadism of the adolescents and post-adolescents: it is based on a “dream-world” that is postfeminist (the case of young girls), exotic and romanticized in a fashion that recalls a “dream sphere” rather than a full-fledged civil sphere. Still, some of its basic features are close to the subjective civil sphere, to be described and circumscribed.

11.30 Tea, coffee and biscuits

12 Volker Heins and Christine Unrau “A Mirror Image of Jihadism: European Anti-Immigration Movements and the Fracture of the Civil Sphere”

The paper makes two contributions to the globalization of Jeffrey Alexander’s cultural sociology of the civil sphere. Based on Alexander’s work, we begin by offering an interpretation of anti-immigrant movements in continental Europe. Taking the originally East German political movement “Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the West” (Pegida) and its New Right intellectual and political support as our prime example, we argue that this movement, which has strong ramifications across Europe, should not be seen as an effective opposition to Islamist radicalism, but rather as its tamer and (for now) less violent mirror image. Particular attention will be given to the figure of the intruder in narratives of the New Right: immigrants flooding and polluting the national realm, women entering male domains in the labor market, sports and the media, and sexual minorities being allowed to marry and adopt children. (Some of these discursive positions are, of course, shared by conservative Muslims, an ambiguity that was artistically exploited by the French writer Michel Houellebecq in his novel Submission.)

In a second step, an attempt is made to tease out theoretical implications from our case study for the conceptualization of civil societies in contemporary constitutional democracies. We develop a critical perspective that adds a new and darker layer to civil sphere theory by focusing on the dangers of exclusionary enthusiasm fostered by an increasingly fractured civil sphere.

Like progressive social movements, Islamophobic and anti-immigrant movements such as Pegida are best analyzed in cultural-sociological terms as creating new meanings and new forms of personal and group identity. Through idioms and narratives, these movements present themselves as standard-bearers of sacred values while others are represented in negative and polluted categories. However, the antagonistic language hides a number of analogies between Islamist and Western bourgeois forms of radicalization. We will explore both these analogies and their worth for understanding the future of the civil sphere in Germany and beyond. Following Farhad Khosrokhavar’s analysis, the chapter will analyze in greater detail five common conditions and characteristics of Islamist and anti-immigrant movements:

(1) De-institutionalization. Both forms of radicalization happen under circumstances in which the social power and popular appeal of established religious and political institutions (churches, political parties, trade unions etc.) has been considerably eroded. This is one of the reasons why Pegida took
off in East Germany before spreading westward. In addition, the death of the traditional left has left society defenseless against the forces of marginalization.

(2) De-Christianization / de-Islamization. Radicalization among young Muslims feeds on their religious rootlessness and lack of education. Something similar can be shown for the German Pegida movement whose followers invoke the idealized image of a Christian Europe without being, in their majority, members of any Christian church;

(3) Conspiratorial thinking. Both movements are radical not only in their ways of dividing the world between good and evil, but also in their belief that the functioning of the regulative and communicative institutions of the civil sphere can be attributed to a single organized will. A broad range of events including personal experiences of humiliation are explained in terms of the causal efficacy of some powerful group, which is hidden from public view. Nothing is as it appears, everything is interconnected, and nothing happens by chance.

(4) Masculine self-assertion. Like historical fascism, contemporary forms of reactionary radicalism are intimately linked to a crisis of masculinity. For some sections of the male population, this crisis is deepening with the enforcement of anti-discrimination policies, the push for LGBT rights and the rise of an increasing number of aspirational and committed women in society, many of whom outperform men. Against this trend, Pegida activists and movement intellectuals in Germany and France are celebrating manly “rage” and ancient thumos as drastic cures against an effeminate, humanitarian civilization. Paradoxically, this trend is not limited to male activists but includes at least some women.

(5) Wild utopianism. Key to understanding radicalization is the cognitive and affective transition from “limited” to “wild” utopias beyond the civil sphere. Like the idea of a revolutionary neo-Ummah, the far-right idea of a resurgent Christian Abendland or Kulturkreis exemplifies Khoroskhavar’s important concept of a wild utopia (utopie échevelée) unconstrained by pragmatic or moral considerations.

1.00 Sandwich lunch

2.00 Maria Luengo Cruz and Karoline Andrea Ihlebæk “Reporting on Muslim Immigration in Europe: Radicalization, Civil Repair, and the Democratic Values of Professional Journalism”

This paper will address the way in which journalism is currently handling Muslim immigration in Europe – in particular in its reporting on terrorist attacks – in relation to radicalization and the civil values of professional journalism. One of the main concerns of European leaders is the level of ideological polarization and radicalization among European publics, in part due to the ways in which people obtain information through ideologically polarized and even propagandistic media. The paper will look at whether European media are at present undergoing such a process of greater polarization, particularly in response to Islamic radicalism, and whether the democratic values of journalism are mitigating this process. Thus, our proposal aims to contribute to thesis 2 of the “The Civil Sphere and Radicalization” conference-book project, which highlights the effects of radical protest in the civil sphere, through exploring the media coverage and the public debate in the aftermath of certain terrorist attacks.

Drawing on the notion of the civil sphere, journalistic discourse on jihadi terrorism can be understood as bringing into play meanings and emotions related to two different sides of the civil sphere. One is the exclusion of a significant group from society, namely Muslim immigrants, and the sense of frustration and anger that it produces, which becomes a reservoir that feeds violent extremism as Farhad Khosrokhavar has recently shown for the case of Muslim communities in France. The other side might reflect, following Alexander (2006), the lack of response from mainstream civil institutions, including the media, to Islamic radicalism.
Khosrokhavar has recently underscored the role that exclusion plays in the process of radicalization and so-called “home-grown terrorism” in Europe which has resulted in violent actions directly associated with extremist ideologies. Khosrokhavar’s Radicalisation highlights the critical symbolic dimension of Islamic fundamentalism in Europe with regard to its embodying “not just a threat but also a betrayal vis-à-vis European identity.” As Alexander (among others) has argued, “not so much the racial but the ethnic and religious qualities of the new wave of immigrant outsiders [specially Muslim] have challenged the collective identities of Europe’s core groups in increasingly troubling ways.” According to Alexander, it is crucial for core European groups to open up to Muslim outsiders – in terms of their physical appearances, religious practices or political beliefs – in a way that goes beyond prevailing modes of assimilation that incorporate Muslim immigrants by leaving out stigmatized qualities. The struggle over more inclusive and democratic modes of incorporation is a social and political fight that certainly involves social forces and political institutions. Nevertheless, it is mainly a cultural struggle of broadening European cultural boundaries that involves the media as the communicative institution par excellence of the civil sphere.

Civil sphere theory emphasizes the existence of a “vital center” – that is, an overlapping network of democratically inclined persons and institutions that, despite some being on the right and some on the left, believe in the existence of a civil consensus and share the view that their national society, while far from being fully democratic, does nevertheless represent something worth maintaining, with the potential for ever more significant civil repair, and thus should not be discarded, as the most radical right-wing and left-wing critiques suggest. What “stops” the radicalization of societies? How do the institutions of the civil sphere prevent anti-democratic extremism? Critical here are the media’s collective representations of extremist events and the movements that provoke them. By applying civil sphere theorizing to journalistic responses to radical jihadism, the claim that will guide our paper is that the centre cannot hold unless journalism represents terrorism in a manner that can support the idea that there remains a vital centre in European societies. How do journalists respond to Islamic radicalism and to terrorist incidents in particular? To what extent do civil norms of professional journalism determine this response, even if they are mediated by left and right ideologies? Do journalists report these – and do the media report them – in a manner that suggests there remains a vital centre that these acts do not represent and cannot destroy?

We will try to answer the questions above by focusing on two recent case studies of the media’s representation of traumatic attacks perpetrated by Al Qaeda and ISIS in Europe: The Paris attacks in November 2015 and the Brussels attacks in March 2016. These cases represent peaks in the public debate on Muslim communities and Islamic radicalism, and they involved “home grown” terrorists from within European societies. Both cases happened at the same time as Europe faced the dramatic increase of refugees and migrants from Syria and Iraq. As such, they sparked national debates about immigration and integration policies, multiculturalism and national identities - in addition to the coverage of the specific terrorist attacks and the focus on and reaction to Islamic radicalization. We will compare and contrast the journalistic discourses around these two events in Spain, Britain and Norway. The country selection combines two different variables: media systems (the Mediterranean polarized pluralist model of Spain, the liberal model of the UK and the Norway’s North/Central European democratic corporatist model ) on the one hand and contrasting models of immigrant incorporation of these European countries on the other.

Drawing also on current research in media studies on mediating domestic extremism and disorder, journalistic storytelling and protest, and the role of emotions in media coverage of protests, the paper will pursue the following objectives:
1. To put forward an explanatory framework for understanding the intersection between ideological polarization and the civil values of professional journalism in relation to media representations of jihadist extremist actions and groups.

2. To explore journalistic storytelling of the leading newspapers from a broad political and ideological spectrum in Spain, Britain and Norway in the aftermath of terrorist events.

3. To determine the range of possible journalistic responses to Islamic radicalism, from support for anti-civil means such as military repression to more moderate positions that call for tolerance or greater equality.

We will look at the journalistic coverage and include the opinion pieces, commentaries and editorials to widen the scope to the more subjective position of the news organisations. The empirical work will consist of discourse analysis of leading national newspapers from opposing ideologies – The Sun and The Guardian in the UK, the Spanish dailies El País and El Mundo, and Norway’s biggest tabloid VG and national/regional broadsheet Aftenposten – during moments of peak media and public attention to the cases that will be considered.

3.00 Response by Peter Kivisto, followed by open discussion

4.00 Reception

5.00 Lecture: Jeffrey Alexander “Social Crisis and Societalization: Financial Crisis and Media Phone Hacking”

7.15 Dinner at Rishi’s, George St. for all conference participants

Saturday 21st October

Theme 2. Radical Protest and the Negotiation of Incorporation

The second session will start with a UK case, the 2011 English riots, but the remaining three papers will broaden the scope of the conference beyond Europe. All papers address how subaltern groups, marginalized or excluded by the civil sphere, respond to that exclusion, whether by going on the rampage as in the English riots (Tanaka-Gutiez); by playing to the civil sphere, as seen for example in non-violent self-discipline of the Black Lives Matter protest against police murders (Ostertag); in the case of the Zapatistas in Mexico (Stack), by staging an armed rebellion to highlight the exclusion of indigenous people and subsequently refraining from the use of arms and appealing to civil society; and in settler societies like Canada and Australia, demanding a measure of autonomy, either by employing radical protest to draw attention to their concerns, or at other times using the established codes of the civil sphere to negotiate incorporation (Woods).

9.30 Yasushi Xavier Tanaka-Gutiez: “‘We all came together that day’: The 2011 English Riots, Solidaristic Radical Protest and the Bourgeois Civil Sphere”

As the 2011 English Riots broke out in major cities around the country, Prime Minister David Cameron condemned the unfolding acts as ‘criminality, pure and simple’. While the mainstream media largely echoed Cameron’s view and most academic literature derided the riots as illegitimate acts of violence, this paper argues that the 2011 English Riots were a form of solidaristic radical protest enacted by a voiceless underclass.

Economically depressed and socially marginalized, the poorest communities in the country, circa 2011, found themselves unable to connect with the putatively inclusive instruments of civil society. Confronted with such precarious conditions, the underclass had no other choice but to engage in an uprising against a society that prevented it from civil inclusion. The 2011 English Riots were, therefore, a radical protest against the exclusive principles of a civil society; a protest that, for a moment, established the underclasses’ sacred conditions for civil unity.
The paper begins with a discussion that contextualizes debates surrounding the sociology of crime and deviance. This is followed by a closer look at two approaches within the scholarship on the 2011 English Riots, what I will term liberal analysis and radical analysis. The first approach is sympathetic towards those who were involved in the riots but deny that they were solidaristic. The second approach dismisses them as representative of a ‘post-political era’ of ‘depressive hedonia, vapid consumerism, and deep cynicism’ (Winlow and Hall, 2012: 467). Qualitative data inspired by Clifford Geertz is presented, challenging both positions for their normative stance that the riots were acts of criminal deviance. My data proves that the riots were acts of solidarity and exposes the causal explanations employed by liberal analysis as ‘thin’ while simultaneously uncovering the normative reductivism of radical analysis. The methodological section that follows details the qualitative research design and elaborates on the value of ‘thick description’ (Geertz, 1973) in analysing the riots.

Through qualitative methods including in-depth interviews, discourse analysis, and participant-observation, this paper focuses on policing, looting and the desire for solidarity in underprivileged London during the uprising. The section on policing highlights the regular brutality experienced by poverty-stricken Londoners, culminating in the killing of Tottenham local, Mark Duggan and on whose behalf the 2011 English Riots were set in motion. Interviews revealed reprehensible police practices that were both neglectful and life threatening. Regarding the riots, witnesses spoke of a police force that stood by as the violence escalated. As one Tottenham local stated, ‘Two police cars are now on fire and the police have just stood there and not done a thing. What they could have done at the time, they could have easily gone over there and moved them on when the boys put the rubbish in the car, no riots. They could have done something when they lit it, no riots! They could have stopped it ten times before it escalated and they didn’t.’ In general, those that I interviewed shared stories of an authoritarian police culture that had little regard for the safety of those they were meant to protect and at times deliberately placed innocent citizens in harm’s way. One interviewee told me, “They’d drop my friends of in Hackney, Wood Green. They’d drop them there because they knew that our area has war with those areas. So if he dies now over there, I’m like, listen if anything happens to you I’m going to tell that they dropped you over there, I saw when they put you in the van and they brought you there.’

The section on looting presents the case of rioters helping one another and sharing goods with fellow members of their community, thus proving the intracivil nature of the riots (‘In Wood Green there were a bunch of people outside JD, just handing trainers to random people, not for themselves, they were getting boxes and saying ‘what size are you? Size 11? Oh yeah, cool, I’ll give you these. You want Jordans? They’re yours.’ Boom.’) This section also analyses iconic consumer goods such as highly coveted sports apparel. The looting of such commodities reveals at least two facts. Firstly, the desperation with which the rioters wanted to be included into a consumer-driven civil society. Secondly, the exclusive nature of bourgeois civil society that is inaccessible to the underclasses. As one of my interviewees Franklin Boateng (aka ‘The King of Trainers’) emphasized, ‘“What these corporations don’t understand is that we are now in a society where these youngsters from a deprived estate want to be let in, but they don’t feel like they’re connected. These corporations aren’t celebrating the people that are buying the trainers, they are celebrating the way the trainers are being sold. So of course the youngsters are going to feel like “you’ve been feeding us with this all this time and taking my money and so I’m going to take my share from you when I steal, when I riot.” That’s when they thought, we got one back.’

Finally, the section on solidarity presents first-hand accounts of underprivileged Londoners who were either participants or witnesses of the riots. These testimonials substantiate the solidaristic nature of the 2011 English Riots, which gave a voice to the oppressed underclasses. As the political-activist and filmmaker Fahim Alam told me, ‘People ask me if I was fearful on the day. I felt the opposite. I felt really safe. I felt protected, I felt a brotherhood, I felt like there was a common identity between us. When the police were coming at us we were together, even the clothes we were wearing. There was a real sense
of solidarity on the streets. The concept of unity is often juxtaposed with love or non-violence. But you can unite in violence. It’s still unity, it’s still solidarity.’

By presenting the solidaristic character of activities that Jeffrey C. Alexander (2006) would consider “anti-civil,” this paper exposes the limitations of a civil sphere theory rooted in bourgeois liberalism and thus founded upon a classed, normative understanding of civility. Alexander’s theory as it currently stands limits itself to solidaristic enactments that are legitimated by a bourgeois liberal cultural structure. This paper, however, demonstrates that enactments such as radical protests carry their own sacred values even if they fail to align with those dictated by the privileged of society.

10.30 Stephen F. Ostertag “Black Radical Protests and the US Civil Sphere”

In the wake of the killing of Treyvon Martin, Michael Brown and other recent examples of violence towards black men and women at the hands of police and other security agents, the US saw a wave of contentious, radical protests around racism and police/state violence. Organized antiracism and resistance mobilizations emerged in the cities where specific incidents took place, and sprouted hundreds of solidarity movements in other cities across the country. In Milwaukee, Chicago, New Orleans, St. Louis and others black activists and their antiracism allies organized, marched and demonstrated for extended periods of time. Emerging early in these developments, BlackLivesMatter became a popular hashtag that people started to rally around, a collective representation that generated solidarity around the basic idea that we all should care about the lives of black and brown people in the US. However, as a broader movement of black consciousness and solidarity grew, reactionary counter movements emerged that worked to weaken and discredit racialized civil inclusion and repair. How might we understand the emergence of black radical protests within the context of the US Civil Sphere? How might new tools and capabilities of information communication technologies relate to the construction of black solidarity and a discourse of civil repair? How did reactionary movements and discourses respond to the emerging black consciousness and solidarity movements?

Using these questions to guide the following chapter, I propose three claims. First, I claim that BlackLivesMatter and the broader movement of black solidarity emerged in the context of ongoing racialized civil exclusion. Here, black injustices, stigmatization and other practices of civil exclusion are ignored, downplayed or otherwise insufficiently acknowledged and addressed by existing communicative and regulatory processes or broader public opinion. Second, and due to this lack of receptivity, I claim that movement activists and their allies took advantage of personal communication technologies (PCTs) and the framing, networking and distribution capabilities of social media to construct a discourse that 1) sought to demonstrate the excluded position of black men and women in the US civil sphere by highlighting the unfair and harmful treatment they experience at the hands of police (those who are supposed to protect and serve); 2) justify the need for civil inclusion through these examples; and 3) identify some possible regulatory changes that may institutionalized civil repair. Third, I claim that we can see how the US civil sphere seeks to maintain its whiteness through reactionary counter discourses that attacked the message of solidarity and civil inclusion associated with the BlackLivesMatter movement and the motives of movement activists and associated members.

In addressing the first claim, I situate the contemporary black consciousness movement within a broader context of communicative and regulatory processes that consistently neglect, stigmatize and harm black men and women in the US. Using a historical approach, I discuss the institutionalized agenda-setting and framing power of the mainstream news in the US, its implications for content on policing/state violence against black men and women, and role in maintaining status quo racial-power relations in the US. This allows me to illustrate the failure of the US civil sphere to properly and sufficiently recognize and respond to the civil exclusion of blacks in the US, and therefore the context within which radical black protests emerged.
In addressing the second claim, I explain how changes in digital communication technologies in the form of PCTs and cellphones allowed witnesses to capture pics and videos of police violence. These provided an “unfiltered” look that helped construct public opinion of blackness around sacred civil motives, and the police as anticivil in the motives of officers, the relationships they form with each other and related agents (e.g., news), and the criminal justice system more broadly as collective upholders of racism. This was key for mobilizing across cities, in building a more developed and activated black consciousness and sense of solidarity among blacks and others, and in eventually carving out some space in the mainstream press to discuss racism and racialized civil exclusion.

Finally, I address the third with a discussion of the AllLivesMatter and BlueLivesMatter campaigns as they engaged the BlackLivesMatter movement and its allies and supporters. Here, I explain how the AllLivesMatter movement emerged and sought to construct BlackLivesMatter as selfish and exclusionary to others—tacitly understood as whites—in their presumed care for only the lives of black and brown men and women. I then explain how the BlueLivesMatter movement arose and built two discourses, one that attacked and sought to discredit the claims of injustice among BlackLivesMatter and the other that sought to construct BlackLivesMatter as anticivil. Here, BlueLivesMatter and their supporters constructed police actions as rational and reasonable, and those who were subject to police violence as deserving due to their irrational refusal to obey authority. This discourse sought to discredit the claims of police racism. They also drew on a discourse of police as civil protectors, saving us from the violence and threat that seemingly lurks everywhere. This discourse sought to construct BlackLivesMatter as selfish and ungrateful for what the police actually do. Together, the AllLivesMatter and BlueLivesMatter campaigns sought to neutralize and counteract any discourse of civil repair among the BlackLivesMatter movement by constructing them and likeminded others as self-interested in that they only care about black lives, mad in that they sought to protect and make excuses for wild, hysterical and irrational subjects of police violence, and greedy in that they ignored the sacred and selfless things police do in risking their lives to keep us safe. These counter-discourses worked together to challenge the ongoing work of civil repair and racialized civil inclusion associated with recent manifestations of black consciousness and solidarity movements. They reflect the whiteness at the heart of the US civil sphere, revealing how that whiteness is patrolled and protected, but also identifying mechanisms that future black solidarity organizers and activists seeking civil repair may anticipate and attack as we work towards racialized civil inclusion.

11.30 Tea, coffee and biscuits

12.00 Trevor Stack “Radical Protest and the Civil Sphere in Constitutional Democracy”

Given that constitutional democracies afford opportunities for protest, why do some movements engage in more radical modes, and to what effect? In my paper I develop two theses derived from Jeffrey Alexander The Civil Sphere (2006). First, movements choose ‘radical protest’ (going beyond established modes) not only because they find the established modes inadequate, but also because ‘established civil society’ (civil sphere) appears deaf to their cause. Second, established civil society will generally stigmatize movements that engage in radical protest, but will occasionally respond sympathetically, recognizing a movement as ‘civil’ despite its radical strategy. The dynamics differ from one country to another, though.

What do I mean by established civil society? Social movements could be said to be ‘established’ to the extent that they have some hold over what Alexander terms “regulatory institutions” such as party and legal systems, voting, and “office” (constitutional democracy), as well as “communicative institutions” such as mass media, public opinion polls, and civil associations. They can be said to make up civil society to the extent that even conflicting movements tend to appeal to ‘civil’ code of values, including equality, inclusion, freedom, legality and peacefulness, while
disavowing ‘uncivil’ hierarchy, particularism, arbitrariness and violence, even while applying these values in different ways.

Civil spheres get established in a second, related sense. Civil society has a dark side, as Alexander emphasizes, in that the appeal to equality is only ever limited, and tend also to establish hierarchy and marginalization. For example, Jews were for centuries excluded as ‘uncivil’, like descendants of slaves, women and the working classes.

However, outsider movements can try to get civil sphere to reinterpret how the code gets applied. They can push for marginal groups to be recognized as ‘civil’: Alexander’s examples are the US women’s and Civil Rights movements, and the post-World War incorporation of Jews. They can even push for their exclusion to be seen as ‘uncivil’: examples are trade union demands fair treatment of workers, denouncing exploitation as ‘uncivil.’

In pursuing recognition, some movements will go beyond established means of protest. They do this not only because they find inadequate existing modes, such as voting for the opposition, resolution through courts, and legal modes of protest, but also because established civil society appears deaf to their cause. The established civil sphere will mediate demands by outsider movements—this is the role of the Northern media in Alexander’s account of the Civil Rights movement. The civil sphere may well refuse to recognize movements’ cause as ‘civil,’ though, which may well explain the Northern media’s initial indifference to the Civil Rights movement. The same lack of recognition may push movements to radicalize their strategy, as the Civil Rights movement did from the mid-1960s.

How does established civil society respond to such radicalized strategies? It generally responds by stigmatizing movements that engage in radical protest. This can have a polarizing effect and can lead to further radicalization. Civil society may on occasion respond sympathetically, however, recognizing a movement as ‘civil’ despite its radical strategy. For Alexander, this is the moment in which civil sphere opening becomes possible. An example would be the Northern media’s response to MLK’s civil disobedience over voter registration, which arguably led to Johnson signing off Act in name of ‘civil America.’

Civil sphere opening is more likely if, first, the radical mode of protest is seen as nevertheless civil—the obvious example is so-called civil disobedience. The movement will tend to render its cause in terms of a ‘civil’ code, claiming to represent a constituency whose identity and demands are ultimately civil, even if hitherto considered uncivil—again, the example of African Americans. Their exclusion can itself come to be rendered as uncivil. In addition, the institutional channels—in this case voter registration—can be held to be uncivil, which helps to justify going beyond those established channels.

To illustrate how the dynamics work differently in different countries, I will draw on my research in Mexico where, to begin with, established civil society is different. Until 2000, there was little room for social movements autonomous of the corporatist regime, on the one hand—for example, labour and trade unions were affiliated to PRI, which won all presidential elections from 1929 to 2000—and from the Church on the other hand, which still nurtures much of what is termed sociedad civil. It is also harder for movements to achieve a hold over the communicative institutions, which are divided into mass TV media that are pro-state and elite newspaper media where there is some freedom—especially where there is now competition—though state subsidization has historically led to self-censorship. Similarly, the regulatory institutions were until 2000 dominated by the President and now by political parties, which have lost legitimacy because they are seen as self-interested and thus deeply uncivil. The ‘civil’ code is also somewhat different to the US. To begin with, the issues taken up are different, focusing through the 1980s and 90s on free and fair elections, from
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the 1990s on the status of indigenous peoples, on socio-economic inequality—although the established civil society is usually elite, and on rule of law issues, including human rights and transparency, and now insecurity.

The dynamic of established civil society’s response to radical protest, understood as protest that goes beyond the established channels, is also distinct from the US. Radical protest is much more common than in the US, in part because the institutional channels are often inadequate and because it may be harder to the attention of established civil society. Radical protest is often stigmatized by established civil society, perhaps especially if it is associated with pre-2000 ‘habits of the past,’ such as corporatism. However, even violence may on occasion be justified by established civil society. An example is the vigilante (autodefensa) movement which spread across the state of Michoacan in 2013-14.

A further important difference is that the response of established civil society to radical protest is arguably less decisive than in the US – some movements make headway with radical protest even in the face of stigma. However, it can on occasion by important and in my paper I will offer two examples of how established civil society’s response to radical protest in Mexico. One example shows the civil sphere stigmatizing a movement for using radical protest, while the other is of civil sphere giving some legitimacy to a movement despite its use of arms in the initial phase of protest.

1.00 Sandwich lunch
2.00 Response by Liv Egholm, followed by open discussion
3.00 Tea, coffee and biscuits

Theme 3. Violence versus Non-Violence in Radical Protest
Radical protest, as we define it, includes any acts which go beyond the established channels of protest in constitutional democracy. It need not be violent and often is not. Yet social movements, including some of those detailed in the first two sessions, use acts of violence in their protest. This session, and the one that follows, will present a series of cases, asking how movements’ recourse to violence affects the dynamic of the response of established civil spheres. To begin with, why do such movements reject militant strategies that are non-violent and may be more accommodative to generating broad coalitions in support of radical social repairs (Cooke)? Do violent movements inherently polarize democratic societies, creating opportunities for backlash and internal repression? Or, alternatively, can violence play a constructive role in building or expanding a civil sphere? In the case of Northern Ireland (Kane) and Colombia (Tognato), the session will also reflect on the scope of protest in the aftermath of violent struggle in post-conflict societies.

3.30 Anne Kane “Violent Protest, the Civil Sphere and Social Solidarity in Northern Ireland”

“‘Northern Ireland’ was born from, and emerged into, political violence” (Harvey 2012). This statement indicates that any exploration and understanding of constitutional democracy in Northern Ireland, either the imperial form established in 1922 with partition or the power sharing form evolved from the 1998 Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement, must analyze the contribution of extreme radical protest enacted by those who suffered under the first form (Catholics and Nationalists) to a civil sphere central to the construction of the second form. Met with deadly force and coercion by the British government and “loyalists,” the early 1960s social movement for civil rights soon responded with violent resistance by the resurrected IRA, and the movement for justice and rights was once (again) heavily infused with the demand, backed by collective violence, for the end of British domination and unification of Ireland. The “Troubles” are now for the most part over, and No. Ireland remains an entity of the UK. Yet, power sharing has been institutionalized through the Northern Ireland Assembly, which includes members from both nationalist and unionist radical groups occupying significant governing positions. And a social
solidarity free from the worst of sectarian divides seems to have emerged from the ashes, constructed in large part through diverse forms and processes of reconciliation throughout the country.

I hypothesize that the violent protest – including bombings, killings, and hunger strikes – was not just destructive as argued in many analysis, but that the performance of violence against British domination during the Troubles contributed forcefully to the Northern Irish “civil sphere, that is, a sphere of discourse and institutions that mobilizes civil and anti-civil values, combining them with institutional resources (both “communicative” and “regulative”) to repair what are claimed to be deficits in existing institutions outside (and inside) the civil sphere” (Alexander 2006.) Indeed, like other forms of collective action in the civil sphere, violent acts of protest were “performances that [had] impacts on a variety of audiences...including those who share[d] little if anything, with those whose grievances are staged and whose claims are advanced (Kivisto and Sciortino, 12). This study will research collective violence in No. Ireland from 1969-1995, primarily that enacted by the IRA as representatives of the Catholic aggrieved. I will analyze its evolving and transformative discursive meanings, as interpreted by both Catholics and Protestants, and chart its discursive contribution to a civil sphere, first in disarray and then in repair.

4.30 End of session and walk around campus (weather permitting)

6.30 Dinner at Pizza Express, Belmont St for all conference participants

Sunday 22nd October

9.30 Carlo Tognato “Civil Transition and Radical Protests: Lessons along the Path to a Post-Conflict Colombia”

Over six decades of internal armed conflict in Colombia radical protest has taken up multiple forms. Some of them have undermined the civil sphere through the exercise of violence and intimidation. Other forms of radical protest, on the other hand, have contributed to expand the civil sphere and to strengthen its vibrancy. Since 2012 the Colombian government has carried out peace negotiations with the Colombian largest guerrilla group, the FARC, which also features as the world’s oldest insurgency. With the signature in November 2016 of the peace accords Colombia enters a new post-conflict stage and faces new challenges. A major one has to do with the transition from uncivil to civil radical protest within multiple scenarios of the country’s social life. In this paper I will focus on one of them, that is, Colombian public universities.

Since the 1960s public university campuses in Colombia have served as a stage for violent enactment of dissent and resistance. The everyday life of their communities has been syncopated by strikes or blockades that have repeatedly frozen their functioning for weeks and occasionally for months. Their campuses have been a scenario for the action of violent groups, often hooded, against the police, which by custom does not enter them unless under exceptional circumstances of violence. Public university campuses have been turned into training camps for the fabrication of explosives, into a terrain for propaganda and indoctrination, and into a scenario of intimidation of anyone daring to distance oneself too publicly or too explicitly from such practices. The images of armed hooded militias parading in universities, throwing stones or explosives at the police, destroying public property on campus, or interrupting solemn academic events or just regular classes have become part of the routine landscape of many public universities and have even come to iconize public universities in the eyes of broad segments of the Colombian society. In 2008 at the peak of the offensive by the Colombian military against the insurgency, the most widely read Colombian weekly magazine remarked that “as the guerrilla has been weakened in the jungle, its influence and its organization has been strengthening in some universities” (Semana 2008). Such situation has brought about an extreme polarization of the public sphere in universities and to its partial or total freeze over certain issues that are related to the internal armed
conflict, a freeze often backed by practices of direct or indirect intimidation, threat and ultimately silencing.

As the Colombian government negotiated a peace deal with the FARC, a series of interventions took place between 2014 and 2016 on the Bogota campus of Colombia’s largest public university, the National University. Such interventions sought to undermine violent radical protest on campus by triggering a broad public conversation both within the University and in the media on the need to transform public universities from war theatres to territories of peace. The interventions unfolded along three axes: from unilateral declarations to questioning; from coercive action to discussion; from laissez-faire to institutional engagement.

By the time the government had signed in August 2016 the first text of the peace accords with the FARC, it became apparent that to “civilize” radical protest on campus, it would not be enough to focus the interventions exclusively on the university community. Rather, it would be necessary to engage as well with the state police, which had been regularly tasked to respond to violence on campus. Police officers and members of the university community, in other words, would need to come to view each other differently. One way to get there would be to allow them to radically re-imagine the realm of possible interactions among them in an effort to break away from the frame that for over sixty years placed them on opposite fronts of a violent conflict.

In September 2016 a peace performance was organized which involved 32 students of the National University of Colombia dressed as hooded militants and 32 police officers wearing their anti-mutiny gears. In lines of eight and in student-police officer sequence they would walk all along campus holding a rope made up with the fabric of a Colombian flag. They would then converge on the central square of the university which has historically been the theatre of innumerable clashes between hooded militants and the police and of the parades of armed guerrillas. There, they would lay the ropes on the floor and compose the word “Peace” with them. After that, they would start dancing three songs: Gangnam Style by Psy, I Want to Break Free by Queen, and La Vida es un Carnaval by Celia Cruz. They would dance the first two individually, wearing their hoods and helmets, and then they would drop their hoods and helmets and dance together in pairs – student and police officer. At the end of the dance the students would accompany the police officers to the gates of the university campus.

Unlike in an ethnomethodological breach, this peace performance was not meant to show which rules of interaction made up that specific interaction order and how participants in that setting went about repairing the breach. Instead of emphasizing stability and repair, the breach sought out by the peace performance intended to make apparent possible routes to change that would contribute to alter the mutual perceptions that students and police officers had of each other, thereby setting the stage for change in their rules of engagement.

In this paper I will present how this performance was imagined and organized, how it managed to obtain the support on the part of the University and the National Police, how it built on the interventions that over the previous two years had sought to counter the practice of violence on campus, and how in the end it got cancelled due to the wave of threats and intimidation that violent groups directed against a group of students who two weeks earlier had staged an unrelated performance of resistance against them.

Maeve Cooke “Disobedience as Civil Renovation: Ethical Transformations in the Civil Sphere”

Civil disobedience is a form of protest that acknowledges the binding force of laws when they are authorized as valid by the subjects of the laws. It does not aim to destroy the entire legal-political system: it is transformative not destructive. Its transformative aims are ethical, driven by a concern fundamentally to change certain established laws, perhaps even certain core constitutional principles,
with a view to achieving a system of law, and its administration, that is better also in an ethical sense. In contrast to political dissidence, therefore, it has its home within modern constitutional democracies; using the term introduced by Jeffrey Alexander in The Civil Sphere, it may be described as a form of civil repair.

A satisfactory account of disobedience as civil repair requires careful consideration of what is being repaired. In Alexander's book, evidently, the object of repair is the civil sphere. Probing the concept of civil repair invites ontological reflection on the nature of this sphere. For, if the civil sphere is held to be antecedently complete in its essential features, repair will be thought of as restoration to the status quo ante: as a returning of the object to its original state. I refer to this mode of civil repair as reconstitutive. Alternatively, if the civil sphere is held to be permanently in process, repair will be thought of as a movement forward: as an ongoing, dynamic project of renovation, which transforms the object ethically for the better. I refer to this mode of civil repair as renovative. Alexander clearly allows for a processual, developmental view of the civil sphere and corresponding renovative account of civil repair. Nonetheless, the renovative, transformative aspect of repair is not well conceptualized in his work. C loser examination of what motivates the renovative endeavour highlights a deficiency in his general concept of civil repair. What is lacking is a basis in individual ethical identity formation. In my paper, using the case of civil disobedience to illustrate the problem, I seek to make good this deficiency. My alternative view of civil disobedience, and of civil repair more generally, calls for certain modifications of Alexander's account of the civil sphere, in particular of his conception of individual autonomy. It also calls into question his characterization of the civil sphere as a discursive space that is constructed in binary terms, as well as the corresponding account of ethical agency.

In the first step of my paper, I argue that making sense of civil disobedience requires a particular approach to political power, proposing a view in which individual freedom and authority are internally related. This provides a framework for an account of civil disobedience as potentially transformative action motivated by a constellation of ethical, legal and political concerns.

My proposed approach to political power fits well with Alexander's view that societies are not governed simply by constraining power and not fueled only by the pursuit of self-interest. It is supported and enriched by his account of the historical emergence of a civil sphere in which a certain kind of universalizing community has come to be culturally defined and institutionally established. Like Alexander, I understand universality as a concern for both individual autonomy and collective well-being. Furthermore, I endorse his account of law as a regulatory institution that is a powerful conduit for morality in a universalizing sense. In addition I share his view of democratic politics as a discursive struggle over representations by citizens bound together horizontally in an on-going project of civility, which entails responding to identity-based differences and the conflicts to which these give rise.

Alexander rightly sees civil repair as a crucial part of this democratic project: as a collective response to multiple kinds of distortions and perversions of the universalizing aspirations of the civil sphere. His account is broad enough to accommodate both the reconstitutive and the renovative understandings of civil repair. This, too, seems to me the right path. However, like his account of the civil sphere in general, his account of civil repair leaves open a crucial question about motivation. His discussion of Martin Luther King's non-violent direct action draws attention to the gap in his account. The relation between civil disobedients (such as King) and their fellow citizens is for the most part antagonistic. They break laws that their fellow citizens for the most part endorse, and they do so for ethical reasons that are not generally accepted as valid. But civil disobedients do not see the ethical reasons motivating their actions as purely particular; rather they see them as reasons relating to the wellbeing of everyone and their actions as part of an ethical project of universalizing civility. This raises difficult questions: What enables civil disobedients to see their actions as transformative rather than destructive, not as a rejection of civility but as an endeavour to repair it? Furthermore, why should they risk imprisonment, fines, social isolation
and other sanctions for the sake of a collectivity in which the dominant values are hostile to theirs? In order to answer these questions we need a fuller account of ethical identity formation than can be found in Alexander’s writings; specifically, an account in which the formation of individual ethical agency depends on engagement with other individuals within social institutions. My model of civil disobedience emerges from such an account. An added advantage of my proposed account of identity formation is that it explains why there is no conflict in principle between individual autonomy and universalizing solidarity. In Alexander’s work, by contrast, there is a troubling dualism: they appear as essentially distinct ethical ideals, reconcilable occasionally for purely contingent reasons.

Quite apart from this dualism, there is a further problem in Alexander’s account of civil repair (and the civil sphere more generally). According to my proposed view of ethical agency, relationships with other human agents are always potentially opportunities for mutual learning. This holds even for relationships with others whose values and ways of life are fundamentally in conflict with mine and even for those who do not embrace otherness, but see it as a threat to their identities. Such a picture of ethical agency challenges Alexander’s view of the binary structure of the discourse of civil society in general, and of the discursive construction of ethical identity in particular. Insisting on the binary character of the normative codes of civil society, he claims that the civility of the self articulates itself in language about the incivility of the other. He suggests, furthermore, that that such binary coding is an inevitable feature of human societies, even societies with well-developed civil spheres. Thus, modifying his account of civil repair along the lines I suggest will also require him to rethink this part of his Civil Sphere story.

11.30 Tea, coffee and biscuits
12.00 Response by Jeffrey Alexander, followed by open discussion
1.00 Concluding discussion
1.30 Buffet lunch and end of conference

Speakers

Maeve Cooke is Professor of Philosophy at University College Dublin, Ireland and a member of the Royal Irish Academy. Her current research interests centre on the relation between freedom and authority, with a specific focus on questions of democratic dissent and political violence. Her principal book publications are Language and Reason: A Study of Habermas’s Pragmatics (MIT Press, 1994) and Re-Presenting the Good Society (MIT Press, 2006). She is the author of many articles in the areas of social and political philosophy and has held visiting appointments at universities in the USA and Europe. She is on the editorial board of a number of scholarly journals.

Volker Heins is Permanent Fellow and Head of Research in the area of “Interculturality” at the Institute for Advanced Study in the Humanities (KWI) in Essen, Germany, as well as a member of the social science faculty at the University of Bochum. He is also Faculty Fellow of the Center for Cultural Sociology at Yale University. His areas of teaching and research include moral struggles in world society, multiculturalism, human rights and democracy, the politics of collective memory, and the Frankfurt School and its aftermath. Relevant publications include: “A Fire That Doesn’t Burn? The Allied Bombing of Germany and the Cultural Politics of Trauma,” in Ron Eyerman, Jeffrey C. Alexander and Elizabeth B. Breese, eds., Narrating Trauma: On the Impact of Collective Suffering (Yale Cultural Sociology Series), Boulder, Colo.: Paradigm, 2011 (with Andreas Langenohl); Der Skandal der Vielfalt: Geschichte und Konzepte des Multikulturalismus, Frankfurt and New York: Campus, 2013; “Recognition, Multiculturalism and the Allure
Anne Kane received her PhD in Sociology from the University of California Los Angeles, and is currently Associate Professor at the University of Houston-Downtown. Her research is in the areas of cultural theory and analysis, historical sociology, and social movements, with particular focus on meaning construction, collective and national identity, and Ireland. Her publications include: *Constructing Irish National Identity: Ritual and Discourse during the Land War, 1879-1882*, 2011, Palgrave Macmillan; “Narratives of Nationalism: Constructing Irish National Identity during the Land War, 1879-1882.” *National Identities* (Vol. 2, 2000); and “Theorizing Meaning Construction in Social Movements: Symbolic Structures and Interpretation during the Irish Land War, 1879-1882.” *Sociological Theory* (Vol. 15, 1997).


Karoline Andrea Ihlebæk is a post-doctoral research fellow at the Department of Media and Communication at the University of Oslo, and affiliated with the Centre for the Study of Political Communication and the Centre for Research on Extremism. Her research interests include migration, public debates, media power, editorial control and gatekeeping.

Maria Luengo Cruz, Professor of sociology at the Universidad Carlos III en Madrid, holds a PhD in Information Sciences from the Universidad de Navarra. She has published numerous articles of social theory, cultural studies and journalism in prestigious journals such as Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas (REIS), Zer, Anàlisi y Cinta de Moebio.

Stephen F. Ostertag earned his Ph.D. in sociology from the University of Connecticut (2008) under the mentorship of Gaye Tuchman. He is currently an assistant professor of sociology at Tulane University in New Orleans. Broadly, his academic interests involve the study of self-motivation and collective actions as they relate to process of civil expansion and contraction. More directly, he examines the role of moralities and emotions in building voluntary social ties and relationships, and constructing and traversing boundaries. He engages these areas through a variety of avenues including the study of journalism/news, racism, and crime/deviance. He has published in a number of scholarly outlets. Some of his favorite publications include the following: “Becoming Pure: The Civil Sphere, Media Practices and Constructing Civil Purification,” published in *Cultural Sociology* (Vol. 8, Issue 1, 2014); “Expressions of right and wrong: The emergence of a cultural structure of journalism,” (2016) published in *The Crisis of Journalism Reconsidered: Democratic Culture, Professional Codes, Digital Future*, edited by J. C. Alexander, E. Breese, and M. Luengo (Cambridge University Press); and “The battle over meaning: Digitally mediated processes of cultural trauma and repair in the wake of hurricane Katrina,” published with David G. Ortiz (New Mexico State University) in the *American Journal of Cultural Sociology* (Vol. 1, Issue 2, 2013).
**Trevor Stack** directs the Centre for Citizenship, Civil Society and Rule of Law at the University of Aberdeen, where he is also Senior Lecturer in Hispanic Studies. He received his PhD (2002) from the University of Pennsylvania and is the author of *Knowing History in Mexico: An Ethnography of Citizenship* (University of New Mexico, 2012). Currently, he is completing a second monograph titled *Citizen Personae*, and he also the lead editor of *Religion as a Category of Governance and Sovereignty* (Brill, 2015).

**Yasushi Xavier Tanaka-Gutiez** is a Berlin-based, independent writer whose interests include capitalism, post-Fordism, ontology and revolution. He earned his BA at Goldsmiths College and PhD at Yale, both in sociology. He was formerly the co-founding editor of the arts and culture publication *ShoppingHours Magazine* (2008-14).

**Carlo Tognato** is Associate Professor of Sociology and Director of the Center for Social Studies at the National University of Colombia, Bogotá. He is also a Faculty Fellow at the Center for Cultural Sociology at Yale University. For over a decade he has worked on cultural economic sociology. More recently his research has concentrated on the topic of civil reconstruction in postconflict. Recent publications include a book on the influence of culture in central banking, *Central Bank Independence: Cultural Codes and Symbolic Performance* (Palgrave-Macmillan, New York, 2012), and an edited volume on the influence of culture in urban policy, *Cultural Agency Reloaded: The Legacy of Antanas Mockus* (The Cultural Agents Initiative at Harvard University, 2015).

**Christine Unrau** is currently completing her PhD thesis at the department of Political Science of the University of Cologne. She is a Researcher at the Käte Hamburger Kolleg/Centre for Global Cooperation Research, University of Duisburg-Essen, Germany. Her research interests include globalization, humanitarianism, political emotions and transcultural political thought. Her recent publications are *Humanitarianism and Challenges of Cooperation*, co-edited with V. M. Heins and K. Koddenbrock (Routledge, 2016); “Introduction: Cultures of Humanitarianism, Old and New,” in *Humanitarianism and Challenges of Cooperation*, edited by V. M. Heins and K. Koddenbrock (Routledge, 2016); and “Imitation, Abgrenzung und Interkulturalität. Zur Frage der Emanzipation vom Westen im politischen Denken Lateinamerikas” (Imitation, Dissociation and Interculturality. Emancipation from the West in Latin American Political Thought), in *Einführung in die Transkulturelle Politische Theorie* (Introduction to Transcultural Political Theory), edited by S. Schubert, S. de la Rosa und H. Zapf (Springer, 2015).

**Discussants**

**Jeffrey Alexander** is Lillian Chavenson Saden Professor of Sociology at Yale University and the founder and co-director of Yale’s Center for Cultural Sociology. Among his recent writings are *The Dark Side of Modernity* (2013), *Obama Power* (with N. Jaworsky, 2014), and *The Crisis of Journalism Reconsidered: Economy, Technology, Culture* (ed. with E. Breese and M. Luengo, 2016).

**Liv Egholm** is Associate Professor of Politics at the Copenhagen Business School. Her books include *Philosophy of Science: Perspectives on Organisations and Society* (2014). Her current research aims to map philanthropic associations influencing (and being influenced by) the continual conceptualization of philanthropy and welfare from the middle of the 19th century until the present day contributing to a fuller and more elaborated understanding of the role played by philanthropic organizations at the crossroads of state, market and civil society.

**Peter Kivisto** received his PhD from the New School for Social Research in 1982. He is currently the Richard A. Swanson Professor of Social Thought at Augustana College and Visiting Professor and Research Fellow at the University of Trento. He is also Head of the Research Laboratory on Transnationalism and Migration Processes at St. Petersburg State University. His research focuses on immigration, social
integration, and civil society. His publications also include numerous works in the sociology of religion and on citizenship. His most recent books include *National Identity in an Age of Migration* (Routledge, forthcoming), *Solidarity, Justice, and Incorporation: Thinking through The Civil Sphere* (edited with Giuseppe Sciortino, Oxford University Press, 2015) and *Religion and Immigration: Migrant Faiths in North America and Western Europe* (Polity Press, 2014).